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PREFACE
Because the field of probation is likely to be
unfamiliar to most readers, I begin with what is admittedly
a cursory overview of the area.

A broader treatment of

the topic of probation can be found in numerous other
volumes (e.g., Dressler, 1969;

Killinge~

well, 1976; Senna & Siegel, 1981).

Kerper, & Crom-

I then attempt to

review the specific nature of probation officers' tasks
in Cook County, Illinois.

This brief description is drawn

from my three years of experience and research as an
employee of the County's Adult Probation Department.

It

is hoped that this Preface will lend greater meaningfulness
to the procedures, findings, and practical implications
of my studies.
Probation:

History, Definitions, Functions

Origin and Growth of Probation
Of the numerous correctional reforms and innovations which emerged in the nineteenth century few were
as widely diffused or as readily adopted as probation.
Probation is a judicial disposition entailing the conditional release of a convicted offender into the community
for a specified time under the supervision of the court
and subject to certain conditions.

Although it is rooted

in such common law practices as the suspension of sentence
iv

(Grinnell, 1941), credit for the first actual implementation of probation is generally attributed to the unofficial
and voluntary efforts of an altruistic Boston bootmaker,
John Augustus, who between 1841 and 1859 acted as advisor
'

and surety for nearly 2,000 offenders.
Augustus was an early and vociferous proponent of
the rehabilitative approach to corrections, declaring that
"the object of the law is to reform criminals and to prevent crime and not to punish maliciously, or from a spirit
of revenge" (Augustus, 1972, p. 23).

Augustus' patently

humanitarian and progressive treatment of offenders comprised a set of interventions that were designed to promote healthy changes and personal growth.

The "father of

probation" assisted criminals by supplying bail for a
temporary postponement of their sentence and by performing
the dual casework function of counseling and supervision
during the period of release.

If any of his charges were

too poor to pay court costs, Augustus would advance them
a loan and extend lodging and subsistence (Smith & Berlin,
1979).

Rudiments of selection appear in his method in

the form of a brief conversation, a subjective judgment
of the accused's "firm resolve" to remain temperate, and
a firm determination of whether he was "not yet past all
hope of reformation" (Dressler, 1969).
During his time, other concerned citizens mimicked
Augustus' efforts by putting up bail and offering
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employment to the "less incorrigible" individuals brought
before the magistrate.

Their success with an appreciable

number of these cases greatly impressed the court and was
instrumental in inducing Massachusetts to become the forerunner in probation legislation.

By virtue of the Proba-

tion Act of 1878, the law provided for the appointment of
a paid probation officer for the courts of criminal jurisdiction in the city of Boston.

The statute prescribed

the duties of a probation officer as attendance in court,
investigation of cases charged with or convicted of
crimes and misdemeanors, recommendation to the court with
regard to the advisability of using probation, submission
of periodic reports to the chief of police, and rendering
"such assistance and encouragement (to probationers) as
will tend to prevent their again offending" (Chute & Bell,

1956, p. 65).

Thus, while the law did not explicitly

create any new judicial power, its enactment was tantamount to placing the state's stamp of approval on a
judicial perogative already in use (Grinnell, 1941).
It is important to note that the drafters of the
statute clearly viewed probation as treatment:

they

included the proviso that those selected be "persons as
may reasonably be expected to be reformed without punishment."

Of equal significance is the fact that no addi-

tional restrictions were expressly stipulated upon eligibility for probation, other than the rehabilitativ·e
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criterion.

Probation was available to juvenile and adult,

male and female, felon and misdemeanant, regardless of
the particulars of the offense (Dressler, 1969).
Statewide probation was instituted in Massachusetts
in 1890, with a provision still appearing in many modern
statutes, that the probation officer should not be an
active member of the regular police force.

However, this

landmark legislation did not specifically grant to the
court the power to suspend sentences indefinitely.
Missouri in 1897, and Vermont in 1898, remedied this
omission, although in Missouri the statute was labeled
"An act relating to the parole of prisoners," and used
the words "probation" and "parole" interchangeably (Killinger, Kerper, & Cromwell, 1976).
Several other states passed probation laws in the
latter part of the nineteenth and in the beginning of the
twentieth centuries.

The statutes included many varia-

tions in applicability and organization.

For example,

Illinois (1899) and Minnesota (1899) provided only for
juvenile probation;

Rhode Island (1899) placed restric-

tions on eligibility, excluding persons convicted of
certain offenses (Killinger, Kerper, & Cromwell, 1976).
Rhode Island also regulated its probation services under
a statewide, state-controlled administration, while Vermont left the administration to individual, autonomously
operated counties (Allen, Carlson, & Parks, 1979).
vii

Although 33 states had allowed statutory provision for
adult probation by 1915, it was not until 1956 that all
states had granted authorization to the courts (President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967).
Throughout its history, probation has connoted,
among other things, a relatively mild form of punishment,
a second chance for first offenders, and a manifestation
of judicial grace (Vasoli, 1964).

Probation as leniency

is a viewpoint that is common in the general public and
the media.

Indeed, many contend that the probation of

criminals is the equivalent of unrestricted release into
the community.

This perspective is primarily a byproduct

of two factors (Barkdull, 1976).

First, supporters of

probation have been unable or unwilling to clearly argue
that probation is indeed punishment, that it does reduce
the freedom of individuals, and that it exposes them to
an increased risk of future incarceration if they do not
abide by the minimum standards of behavior.

Second,

probation has not been augmented by services which persuade the public to conceive of it as the symbolic analogue of incarceration.

In this sense, a sentence to

probation fails to quell the desires of victims, police,
and witnesses for equitable restitution.

It should be

parenthetically stated that although probation is popularly
perceived as leniency, it does represent a curtailment of
viii

liberty, a constraint of several areas of behavior, and
a more serious labeling event than other alternatives,
notably conditional discharge (Harris, 1982).
Probation Definitions
While there is considerable consensus among criminologists as to what probation should be, the term itself
embraces a variety of interpretations.

As a legal dis-

position, probation represents a sentence which permits
an offender to retain his/her freedom in the community
while under the supervision ofaprobation agency and subject
to conditions imposed by the court.

In reality, however,

it is usually considered a disposition in lieu of sentencing (Reid, 1981).

Basic eligibility for probation is

fixed by statute.

Generally, restrictions on eligibility

prohibit the granting of probation for certain serious
offenses (e.g., rape, armed violence, armed robbery) or
to offenders with a prior felony conviction (Killinger,
Kerper, & Cromwell, 1976).

In its Standards Relating to

Probation, the American Bar Association speaks of probation
as the preferred form of sentencing, unless the court
finds the public's safety jeopardized or the defendant in
need of institutional treatment.

They also recommend

that the probation decision be rooted in the facts and
circumstances of each case and based upon the availability
of institutional and community resources (Carter & Wilkins,

1976).
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The Model Penal Code and the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice standards and goals stress
the following advantages of probation as an alternative
sentence (Kerper, 1979):

(a) it maximizes the liberty of

the individual while serving the public interest;

(b) it

promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing
normal community contacts;

(c) it avoids the negative

and stultifying effects of confinement which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the
offender into the community;

(d) it minimizes the impact

of the conviction upon innocent dependents of the offender;
and (e) it greatly reduces the financial cost of an effective correctional system.
In selecting probation as a viable sentencing alternative, the judge may also consider a number of additional
factors.

Some are based upon the recommendations of crim-

inal justice personnel, for example, the probation
department's assessment of the defendant's "probationability" or the prosecutor's willingness to plea bargain;
while other factors refer to specific characteristics of
the offender:

his/her age, rehabilitative potential,

criminal history, drug/alcohol involvement, and mental
health status.

In addition, a set of essential questions

is usually considered in determining whether probation
is granted.

Does the defendant's attitude toward the

offense indicate genuine remorse?
X

Will being placed on

probation enable the defendant to pay adequate restitution
to the victim?

Will the granting of probation allow the

defendant to provide support and care for his/her family?
(Abadinsky, 1982).
The length of probation sentences varies from state
to state.

The American Bar Association recommends that

the term be two years for a misdemeanor conviction and five
years for a felony.

The Illinois statute delimits a max-

imum sentence of six months for a petty offense.

Generally,

states allow for an early termination of probation supervision (i.e., prior to the original, judicially ordered
date of termination).

This permits the Court some neces-

sary flexibility, since it is often difficult to settle
upon an equitable term at the time of sentencing (Abadinsky, 1982) .
A number of states authorize early termination
without supplying statutory directives that specify when
and how it is to be exercised;

other jurisdictions pro-

vide explicit guidelines for early termination.

Essen-

tially, a decision in favor of early release is rendered
if it appears that the probationer has made a good adjustment to his/her sentence and that further supervision or
enforced compliance with other conditions is no longer
necessary (Carter & Wilkins, 1976).

At other times, the

decision may not be indicative of an offender's readiness
to complete his/her sentence, but rather a refle.ction .of
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the need to keep caseloads down to manageable levels
(Abadinsky, 1982).
Social role.

A second definition of probationregards

it as a particular social role ascribed to an individual.
In this sense, it is the "status of a person convicted of
a crime or judged guilty of delinquency during a period of
suspension of sentence or corrective treatment in which
he/she is given liberty conditional on his/her good behavior and in which the State through its agents by personal
supervision attempts to assist him/her during good behavior" (Rummey & Murphy, 1952, p. 6).

Hence, for the offen-

der, probation status has implications different from the
status of either free citizen or confined prisoner.
Probation vs. parole.

The final definition of proba-

tion is simply constructed in terms of how it differs from
parole, the fundamental distinction being that parole
presupposes a term of imprisonment prior to release under
supervision while probation does not.
this formulation appears axiomatic;

At first glance
however, its short-

comings grow clear when it is recognized that the probation
statutes of a number of jurisdictions permit the sentencing
judge to rule that a portion of the probation term be
spent in prison or jail.

Accordingly, it may be more

appropriate to differentiate between parole and probation
on the grounds that the former is administered by a parole
board while the latter is a function of the Court (Vasoli,
xii

1964) •
The Goals of Probation
The three essential aims of adult probation are:
the protection of the community,

(a)

(b) the reintegration of

criminal offenders, an9 (c) the servicing of the Court
(Allen, Carlson, & Parks, 1979; Terwillinger & Adams, 1969).
The probation officer is the primary agent or vehicle
through which each of the above objectives is realized.
Community protection.

The process of achieving a

secure community implies two basic tasks.

First, probation

officers must determine the degree to which offenders are
likely to recidivate and/or identify which members of
their caseloads pose a discernible threat to the public.
In making these predictions of risk, officers examine a
number of factors, including the criminal's prior record,
use of drugs or alcohol, psychiatric history, familial
relationships and report demeanor.

Second, officers

must devise and implement a supervision strategy that
permits them to exercise a degree of surveillance and
monitoring commensurate with the probationer's assessed
dangerousness and likelihood of future criminal activity.
It is the officer's duty as a control agent to insure that
the conditions of probation (Senna & Siegel, 1981) are fully
satisfied, to promptly investigate reports or indications
of behavior that may result in the safety of others being
jeopardized, and to initiate probation revocation proceedings if indicated, i.e., to remove the offender from the
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community if he/she has failed to satisfactorily complete
the sentence (Smith & Berlin, 1979).
Reintegration of· offenders.

Reintegrating offenders

into society requires an evaluation of probationer needs,
and a diagnosis of major problem areas and deficiencies for
the purpose of formulating a treatment plan that will
allow offenders to fulfill the probation contact and make
a reasonable adjustment to society (Senna & Siegel, 1981).
In their efforts to rehabilitate, officers act primarily
as counselors/psychotherapists, guiding the probationer
through interpersonal difficulties, providing direction,
and assisting him/her to acquire insight into past behavior so that more socially acceptable and constructive
responses will begin to emerge.

Essentially, the probation

officer's basic function in this area is to support the
criminal in making important transitions:

from lawabiding

free citizen to convicted offender under supervision, and
finally a return to free citizen (Wallace, 1974).
Although the probation officer is usually the principal agent of treatment, he/she is often unable to provide
all of the interventions necessary to accomplish the
successful reintegration of offenders.

Limited depart-

mental facilities and personnel, coupled with large
caseloads, demand the use of community resources.

It is

the task of the probation officer as resource broker to
assess the service needs of the probationer, locate the
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social service agencies which address those needs as their
primary function, refer the probationer to the appropriate
program, and follow-up to verify that the probationer
actually received the services (Carlson & Parks, 1979).
Should the required service not be available in the community, it is the responsibility of the officer to encourage
the development of that service.
Servicing the Court
While the two preceding objectives of probation are
ultimately in the service of the Court, it is through the
preparation of presentence investigations that the probation officer most directly fulfills his/her duty as an
agent of the judiciary.

The presentence report is intended

to provide the sentencing judge with a comprehensive social
and psychological portrait of a defendant (Carney, 1979).
The report surveys the following vital areas:

the defen-

dant's criminal record, educational background, physical
and mental health, social history and financial status.
Further, it provides a description of the offender's
environment and present living conditions, the resources
that will be available to assist the offender, and
specific recommendations as to sentence, if requested by
the court or required by statute.

The probation officer

may also contribute his/her opinion regarding the motivations and ambitions of the defendant, an assessment of
the offender's rendition of the circumstances surrounding
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his/her criminal involvement, and an evaluation regarding
an appropriate supervision and/or treatment plan.
The presentence investigation serves a number of
purposes (Senna & Siegel, 1981):
1. The report aids the court in determining an
appropriate sentence.

Information contained within the

investigation assists the court in deciding whether there
is reason to maintain the case in the community, or whether
institutionalization is indicated.
2. It supports the supervising officer in his/her
development of a treatment program in the event the offender is granted probation.

The social and psychological

strengths and weaknesses of the offender as revealed in
the report may be considered in devising a treatment
strategy.
3. It develops a body of knowledge that can aid
prison or other institutional officials in the classifying,
treating, and releasing functions.
4. It furnishes the parole board with information
that may be utilized in planning a proper parole program
if and when the imprisoned offender is released.
5. It exists as a source of data for systematic
research in criminal justice;

for example, researchers

using these reports can identify the characteristics of
criminals which correlate with or predict probation
success or failure.

The format and content of presentence investigations
may vary between jurisdictions and also among individual
probation officers within the same area.

On the one hand,

some departments require voluminous reports addressing
every aspect of a defendant's life;

other departments may

direct officers to adhere to basic facts, such as the
offender's age, race, sex, and previous criminal record.
In addition, different probation officers working within
a single department may bring their idiosyncratic styles
to bear during the presentence investigations.

For example,

the "social work" oriented officer might stress psychological data, while the "rule-enforcing" officer may focus
on the offender's prior record and predictions of his/her
dangerousness (Senna & Siegel, 1981).

In short, individ-

ual differences among officers combined with variations
in interdepartmental standards produce wide disparities
in the manner in which presentence investigations are
prepared and utilized.
Probation Officers' Roles and Tasks
Officer Role Typologies
As suggested in the above discussion, probation
officers are obliged to wear a number of different hats
in their efforts to fulfill the three primary goals of
probation:

(a) community protection,

tegration, and (c) court service.
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(b) offender rein-

Several very similar

typologies describing the various roles of officers have
been constructed (Ohlin, 1956; Glaser, 1964; Jordan &
Sasfy, 1974; Keve, 1962; Klochkars, 1972; Tomaino, 1975).
The roles most often discussed in these typologies include:
1. The punitive or law enforcement officer.

The law

enforcement officer is basically concerned with the preservation of community safety through the control of probationers and a strict adherence to the stipulations of the
sentence.
a right.

Probation is conceptualized as a privilege, not
The probationer is usually perceived as a crim-

inal who should be continually monitored and closely
supervised, i.e., a danger from whom society must be
sedulously protected.

The law enforcer frequently reminds

his/her cases that probation will be revoked, without
exception, if conditions are violated.

This style of

supervision emphasizes firmness, legal authority, and rule
abidance.

Interaction between the rule enforcer and

probationers tends to be formal, official, and largely
a manifestation of "one upmanship" on the part of the
officer.

The punitive officer finds satisfaction in up-

holding the law for its own sake, irrespective of whether
the best interests of the probationer have been addressed.
2. The welfare-therapeutic officer or social worker.
The second type of officer identified in the literature
is essentially the diametric opposite of the rule enforcer.
The social worker, who strives to rehabilitate and
xviii

reintegrate offenders into the community, regards the
conditions of probation as hindering or blocking an offender's progress.

The probation period is a time for a

diagnosis of problems, an assessment of the probationer's
life situation and resources, and a remediation of underlying pathologies and intrapsychic conflicts.

The social

worker cultivates a personal relationship with offenders
in order to formulate a suitable treatment plan which will
assist them in avoiding future criminal activity and in
making their lives more productive.

The officer's over-

riding motivation is grounded in the assumption that
individuals are fundamentally good and will choose appropriate, legal behaviors once they are helped to understand
themselves.

This self-knowledge will promote growth,

foster prosocial attitudes, and culminate in the satisfactory observance of probationary rules.

Within this

context, an offender is seen as disturbed or troubled, a
victim of circumstances, socially disadvantaged or psychologically deprived, rather than an inveterate sociopath
or a pariah of society.
3. The passive time saver or civil servant.

The

probation officer who adopts the role of civil servant
exhibits little concern for the welfare of the community
or the probationer;

his/her job is considered a sinecure,

demanding a modicum of effort and personal commitment.
The civil servant concentrates on maintaining or advancing
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his/her position within the agency and finds no lawenforcing or casework vocation in probation.

Instead,

this type of officer directs energy toward ascending the
probation bureaucracy with the ultimate goal of retirement,
pension, or entry into'another field such as law or police
work.

Consistent work attendance, proper and prompt

completion of paperwork, and the kind of self-enhancement
that results in salary increases are characteristic of the
time saver.

Their conduct on the job contributes to the

smooth flow of office functioning;

however, all respon-

sibilities are met minimally and mechanically.

Although

contact with offenders is regular, it is often conducted
via mail-in or telephone reporting.

The civil servant's

duties, as he/she perceives them, are to instruct and
advise probationers concerning failure to conform, apprise
the court of the offender's criminal behavior or lack
thereof, and to operate as an observer of progress as
opposed to an initiator of behavioral change.
4. The protective/synthetic officer.

The final role

identification of probation officers is distinguished by
its recognition of both the treatment and control components of probation.

The synthetic officer's supervisory

style reflects his/her desire to

~atisfy

the basic orien-

tations of the rule enforcer and social worker.

In doing

so, he/she is (perhaps unknowingly) coming to grips with
the fundamental dilemma of officers, i.e., that of forging
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a reconciliation between the conflicting tensions arising
from the legal and social service dimensions of probation
work.

The protective officer seeks to integrate concerns

for monitoring and rehabilitation by conducting a separate
evaluation of each case to determine which particular
strategy will best protect the safety of the community
while concurrently meeting the needs of the offender.
This type of officer is most likely to develop a working
relationship with community resource agencies and local
police departments.

Thus, he/she recognizes the decided

complexity of probationers' common difficulties and
acknowledges the inherent limitations of his/her position
in working through these problems.
Probation Officer Tasks in Cook County
The officers of the Cook County Adult Probation
Department, who served as subjects in the present research,
can best be described as "synthetic officers" (see Lurigio,
1981).

That is, they perform a number of tasks throughout

the probation process that are directed at achieving the
dual objectives of community protection and offender
rehabilitation.

These tasks are both comprised of and

based upon a set of discretionary decisions that determine
the nature of the officer-offender relationship and the
fate of the probationer in the system.

There are four

essential discretionary decisions which relate to:

(a)

supervision; (b) treatment; (c) early termination; and
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(d) revocation.
Supervision.

The supervisory decision, which is

central to the surveillance or control aspect of probation,
consists of two components.

The first component pertains

to the actual frequency with which a probationer is directed to report to his/her officer.

The frequency of

contacts--although delimited by legal statute and specified
at the time of sentencing--is commonly modified in accordance with the Court's or officer's assessment of the
offender's dangerousness (i.e., risk level) or likelihood
of continued criminal behavior (i.e., potential threat
to the community).

Probationers may report on a monthly

(the prescribed and most common frequency), a bimonthly,
or a weekly basis.

In general, more risky offenders are

monitored more often.
The type or mode of supervision is the second component of the decision.

The officer may monitor a pro-

bationer through office visits, telephone contacts, or
mail-in reports.

Usually, the offender's assessed level

of risk determines the selection of a supervision mode.
For example, dangerous or felony probationers are required
to make regular visits to the probation office, whereas
less serious offenders are allowed mail-in reports.
Related to the determination of a supervisory mode is the
officer's decision to assume a particular posture with
different members of his/her caseload.
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Changes in posture

involve discernible shifts in a probation officer's attitudes, focus, and emotional tone during contacts with
offenders.

More specifically, officers' supervisory

styles ·are altered in response to three factors.
offenders':

(a) typical report demeanor;

The

(b) genuine

willingness to cooperate in the rehabilitation process;
and (c) expressed resolution to lead a productive and
law abiding existence (e.g., find a job, finish school,
refrain from gang-related activity).

These factors are

referred to generically as the probationer's "attitude."
Offenders who are honest in their self-disclosures and
willingly accept the conditions of their sentence are
viewed as progressing satisfactorily and as possessing a
"positive attitude."

A "negative attitude," on the other

hand, is reflected in a probationer's continued belligerence, indifference, sarcasm, or blatant attempts to patronize or ingratiate an officer.

Such behaviors are regarded

as indicative of a poor adjustment to probation (Lurigio,
1982).

Generally, positive and negative attitude cases are
given differential treatment.

Probation officers spend

more time monitoring their "negative" cases, are stricter
in their interpretation of rules, less willing to accept
the veracity of self-reports, and quicker to impose
penalties for any infractions.

They "lay down the law

early," "play by the rules," "accept no excuses," and
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often brandish the threat of revocation to intimidate
offenders who manifest signs of being a potential problem
(i.e., express a negative attitude).

In contrast, their

"positive attitude" cases experience "softer treatment" as
well as priority in terms of extra time on report days,
rehabilitative efforts, and resource referrals.

Officers

explain this difference in case strategies by alluding to
the "positive" group's cooperativeness, receptivity to
recommendations, and their amenability to change.

In short,

behavior toward a "positive attitude" offender is clearly
more empathic, involved, open, and essentially warm in
affect~

whereas, an officer's conduct vis-a-vis a "nega-

tive attitude" probationer is overwhelmingly suspicious,
detached, critical, and cool in its associated affect
(Lurigio, 1981).
At any point during the course of the probation
period, an officer may decide to make collateral contacts
or cultivate relationships with a probationer's spouse,
parent, teacher, friends, employer, or representatives of
other agencies serving the offender.

Primarily, these

contacts permit a verification of such information as residence, employment, and the fulfillment of special conditions.

They are also an attempt to enlist the aid of

significant others in the effort to control, rehabilitate,
and reintegrate the offender.

Finally, if the officer

suspects that a case is currently involved in illegal
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activities, he/she may submit requests for state and local
bureau of investigation reports which detail any subsequent
charges a probationer may have incurred during the period
of the sentence.
Treatment.

The second discretionary decision con-

sists of an assessment of whether the probationer's needs
require the utilization of counseling techniques or
extra-departmental resources.

This decision consists of

a gross evaluation of the offender's mental health status
(i.e., diagnosis), and an identification of major problem
areas (e.g., emotional, physical, interpersonal, financial).
During initial meetings with a probationer, the officer
searches for tell-tale signs of drug/alcohol abuse, symptoms of serious psychological disorders (e.g., disorientation, bizarre ideation or behavior), intellectual deficits,
and/or a lack of social or vocational skills.

Probation

officers in Cook County rely largely on their own sensitivity, common sense, and subjective judgments to alert
them to probationer needs and to direct them in formulating
problem solving strategies.

Also, the type of "counseling ..

offered by Cook County officers follows a didactic, instructional pattern that fits better within a guardian-ward
relationship model than within any of the psychotherapeutic
models presently in use.

Officers are reluctant to render

treatment services because of the nature of their educational backgrounds which has not prepared them to conduct
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actual psychotherapy sessions (Lurigio, 1981).
Officers are faced with two limitations in selecting
an appropriate treatment:

(a) the time they may spend

counseling or advising an offender is restricted due to
large caseloads; and (b) the choice of available referrals
is dictated by situations or factors outside the officer's
control (e.g., general economic conditions that affect the
number of job referrals, a lack of government funds limiting the available openings in a drug treatment program).
Hence, officers must be highly selective in choosing probationers who are most in need of treatment, and are most
likely to benefit from an intervention program.

Offenders

who take the initiative in requesting services and/or are
younger, have shorter prior records and display a "positive
attitude" are generally considered the best candidates for
counseling and adjunctive resources.
Early termination.

The officer has the option to

make a recommendation for the early termination of a case
if he/she has concluded that:

(a) the offender is no

longer a significant risk to the community;

(b) the

probationer's behavior has been exemplary (i.e., he/she
has shown a resolve to take the necessary steps toward
becoming a functional member of society);

and (c) con-

tinuation of the sentence would not facilitate rehabilitative efforts or may disrupt the offender's pursuit of
an alternate, noncriminal lifestyle (e.g., early
x~i

termination may be recommendation on the basis of an offender's request to leave the state for gainful employment).
In contrast, officers have similar power to effect extensions of periods of supervision up to the expiration of
the maximum sentence.

·It should be noted that final

authority in this matter rests with the Court.

However,

because judges are so dependent on the information furnished by probation officers, they generally concur with
the officer's request if it appears reasonable (cf., Greenberg & Ruback, 1982).
The prospect of early termination exists as an
incentive for "good behavior," and as a demonstration to
others that cooperation and compliance with rules are
rewarded.

A key factor in the decision to recommend early

termination is the regularity of the offender's reporting.
If a probationer has been consistent in his/her contacts,
it increases the likelihood that their case will be
reviewed for early termination.

Indeed, the "best pro-

bationers" are those who routinely report at their
scheduled times.

If a cancellation is unavoidable, these

individuals promptly call their officers to inform them
about the extenuating circumstances that prevented their
attendance.

Probationers who are frequently tardy,

periodically skip appointments, and who belatedly call
with untenable excuses for failing to report are evaluated
very negatively.

In fact, when queried about the progress
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of a case, officers are likely to respond on the basis of
a quick tally of the number of times the particular individual has missed a report day during the preceding six
months.
Revocation.

The final discretionary task of the

probation officer involves the decision to initiate revocation proceedings.

In most circumstances, if the offender

has perpetrated a crime during the probation term, his/her
sentence is automatically revoked.

However, if the viola-

tion does not entail the commission of a new offense, or
if the rule-breaking conduct is not regarded as serious,
the officer may evaluate the offender's criminal history,
attitude, report behavior, and employment status prior to
acting officially by filing a petition to the Court.

A

probationer who is seen as having potential for healthy
change is often "given a pass" for relatively minor transgressions.

In essence, the officer performs a powerful

screening function on the list of possible violations that
are eventually brought to the Court's attention.
Following the filing of a revocation petition, the
officer must make a second decision relating to whether
he/she will recommend "revocation" and a return to prison
or "continuance" on probation in the community.

This

determination is based upon the same set of factors as
the first.

On occasion, the officer will suggest a short

stay in jail when he/she feels that the probationer. has
xxviii

"promise" but needs to be "jolted" by serving some "hard
time."

Obviously, the Court does not always act in accor-

dance with the probation officer's recommendations.

None-

theless, as in the case of early termination, the Court
abides by the officer's suggested course of action in a
very large percentage of cases.
Conclusion
In conclusion, probation stands as a viable alternative to incarceration and is viewed by many experts as having a significant impact on the joint effort to rehabilitate
criminals and to reduce recidivism rates (Allen, Carlson, &
Parks, 1979).

As probation services and caseloads continue

to expand, officers are faced with the burden of diagnosing, supervising, and treating an overwhelming number of
offenders.

To meet this challenge, they often employ sub-

jective categorization strategies designed to classify
probationers into groupings that permit both a rapid identification of needs and risk levels, and an efficient
formulation of treatment and supervisory plans (Lurigio,
1981) .

The studies comprising this dissertation examine

the nature of these groupings and their effect upon
officers' judgments of cases.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In social psychology, the research pendulum has swung
decidedly toward cognitive methodologies, theories, and
models to account for social phenomena.

Rather than simply

manipulating stimuli, measuring responses, and inferring
processes, investigators have profitably turned to looking
within the black box of cognition (Fiske, 1981).

Arising

from this approach is the relatively new area of social
cognition which is at the interface of cognitive and social
psychology.

Social cognition has borrowed concepts, hypoth-

eses, measurement procedures,and paradigms from cognitive
psychology to examine and explain how persons cognize
their social world and social relationships (Taylor, 1981).
Studies in this area have typically attempted to identify
the cognitive structures and processes that underlie social
perception, judgment, and behavior.

Some questions of

interest to social cognition researchers include how individuals infer the dispositions of others, how they select,
store, and utilize data to form impressions of people
(individuals and groups), and how they interpret the
social environment according to their needs and attributions.

(For examples of the cognitive approach to social

psychology, see Carroll & Payne, 1976; Hastie, Ostrom,
1

2

Ebbesen, Wyer, Hamilton, & Carlston, 1980; Higgins,
man, & Zanna, 1981; and Nisbett & Ross, 1980;

Her~

for histor-

ical overviews, see Manis, 1977; Taylor, 1981; and Zajonc,
1980).
As suggested above, research in social cognition
draws upon the methods used by cognitive psychologists to
study both processing strategies and internal representations of reality.

The bulk of social cognition research

relies heavily on memory measures to tap the incorporation
of social knowledge into generic structures referred to
as schemas.

Along with other cognitive concepts, the

schema notion in particular has interested numerous social
investigators and has stimulated a large number of studies
on a wide range of research topics (e.g., person perception, self-concept, political information-processing,
attitudes, stereotyping).
A schema is an abstract cognitive representation of
organized prior knowledge, extracted from experiences with
specific instances (Fiske & Linville, 1980).

It guides

the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information relating to a defined stimulus domain (person, object, or
event).

A schema contains certain structural properties,

including (usually) a label identifying its contents,
general knowledge about the domain it represents, an
enumeration of the interrelationships among its properties, a set of presumed (or default) values for key

3

attributes, and a number of specific illustrative exemplars
(members of a schema with the most attributes in common
with other members of the grouping and the fewest attributes in common with constituents of other contrasting
schemas) and instantiations (concrete instances or tangible
manifestations of the schema).

Hence, schema-based cog-

nition involves the processes of inference, i.e., given
the applicability of a particular schema, people infer
thematically-related attributes and events that may never
be encountered (e.g., Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Cantor

& Mischel, 1979), and organization, i.e., schemas are
people's informal sets of principles or theories about
how the world should operate (consistency) and about what
goes with what (relevance)

(Fiske, 1981).

Both aspects of

schematic processing emphasize the impact of prior knowledge on new inputs.
The current body of social psychological research on
schemas is characterized by a number of substantive and
methodological shortcomings (See Fiske & Linville, 1980;
Hastie, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981).

For example,

investigators in the area have concentrated largely on the
elicitation of consensual schemas such as prototypes for
a librarian (Cohen, 1981), an extravert (Cantor & Mischel,
1979), or an elderly person (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981),
and rather little on individual variation in schema availability, content, and use (how a schema is employed in
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information processing) .
Following theoretical discussions and empirical evidence offered by Fiske and Kinder (1981), one would expect
to find important differences in schema construction and
application arising from higher levels of experience.

That

is, experts are likely to have more detailed and complex
knowledge structures (schemas) than non-experts, and are
more likely to possess the procedural skills to use their
schemas to solve problems or complete tasks.

This argu-

ment finds its parallel in cognitive psychologists' work
on expert-novice differences.

According to this litera-

ture, differences between experienced and nonexperienced
subjects in a given domain can be tracedtothe effects of
prolonged practice, or the acquisition of extensive knowledge (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973).
A second shortcoming of schema research relates to
the failure of investigators to study the schemas of subjects in real-world settings using realistic stimulus
materials as opposed to one-dimensional verbal descriptors
of behaviors and traits (Cohen, 1981).

Schemas that are

developed through actual experience are probably more complex in structure, and richer and more meaningful in
content than those suggested by laboratory studies.

Per-

son memory experiments are a good illustration of a procedure with low ecological validity that has failed to
provide particularly useful information about how people
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are perceived and represented by others.

For example, the

work of Cantor and Mischel (1979) and Taylor (1981) suggests that subjects form impressions of individuals
primarily on the basis.of roles rather than traits, but
because person memory experiments typically involve learning lists of trait adjectives about a hypothetical target,
this paradigm misses the level at which individuals are
actually being categorized.
Finally, there have been virtually no attempts to
identify the relationship between schemas and interpersonal
behaviors, e.g., attention, inference, evaluation, and
planning (Fiske & Linville, 1980).

Basic research in

social cognition has ignored behavior because its central
concerns have primarily involved an examination of internal
(cognitive) events.

Notwithstanding the problematic nature

of predicting responses from cognitive judgments (e.g.,
Schuman & Johnson, 1976), it is obvious that information
processing factors mediate much of social behavior and
social perception.

According to Fiske and Linville (1980),

the link between the schematic bases of cognition and
behavior is "an untapped gold mine" for social cognition
investigators.
The present studies are designed to bridge some of
the aforementioned gaps in schema research.

Probation

officers' judgments of criminals will serve as the arena
in which to explore questions of schema content and use

6

for several reasons.

First, probation officers are "ex-

perts" whose job requires them to actively acquire and
utilize information about probationers for the purpose of
rendering decisions regarding treatment and monitoring.
These decisions hinge upon officers' prior knowledge of
the characteristic behaviors and traits of various criminal
types.

It appears that this prior knowledge is:

highly organized;

(a)

(b) abstracted from previous experiences

with different groups of offenders;

and (c) invoked

during the judgment of each incoming case (Lurigio, 1981).
Thus, officers' assessments of probationers represent a
"real world" instance of schematic processing, and provide
an interesting opportunity to examine psychologically-meaningful representations of the social world.
Second, my position at the Cook County Adult Probation Department allows ready access to both realistic
stimulus materials (criminal cases) and a group of subjects who varied in experience (a central variable in the
studies), and provided me with the necessary background to
make informed interpretations of results--especially those
that demanded a working knowledge of the probation process
as well as an understanding of officers' attendant duties
and tasks.

In sum, the probation department was a conven-

ient place to do the research with few practical restrictions, and a cooperative and accessible pool of subjects.
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Third, there was_ some evidence to support the notion
of schema-based cognition among criminal justice experts.
For example, Carroll and Wiener (1982) in a study of
parole board members and Lurigio (1981) in a survey of
probation officers reported that experts categorized
offenders into schema-like groupings that contained information about basic types of criminals including the nature
of their criminal activity and its causes, social history,
psychological profile, prognoses for treatment, and
recommendations concerning levels of supervision and the
appropriate use of resources.

Hence, I had reasonable

confidence that the study of probation officers would
yield profitable findings.
Finally, probation officers' schemas of criminals
seem not only to influence judgments, but are also inextricably related to their activities as service providers
and agents of the Court (Lurigio, 1981).

In essence, how

officers "think about" probationers dictates how they
respond to probationers in terms of treatment interventions,
control strategies, and referrals to adjunctive agencies.
Therefore, the study of offender schemas may suggest how
knowledge structures mediate behaviors.
The literature review that follows is designed to
present a comprehensive overview of a large and seemingly
disconnected body of studies that are based upon or have
made reference to the schema concept.

A number of topics
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are addressed including:

(a) the definition of schemas

and their constituent components and features;
development of the

con~truct

(b) the

and a summary of prominent

areas of research that have examined schematic structures
and processing;

(c) schema change, and some of the liabil-

ities of schematic processing;

(d) a brief review of

investigations that compare groups of experts and nonexperts on the content and use of schemas in a variety of
perceptual and problem solving domains;

(e) a critical

evaluation of the concept highlighting the problems
involved in applying schemas to study social phenomena;
and (f) a description of studies that bear directly upon
the present research.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In approaching

n~w

situations and in forming impres-

sions of others, we bring to bear a wealth of past experiences, beliefs, and feelings about similar situations and
the persons within

them.

This storehouse of information

supplies us with a variety of preconceptions or hypotheses
concerning the events that are likely to transpire in a
given social episode, and shapes our judgments of the
behavior and dispositions of the episode's participants.
It also actively guides our perceptions and interpretations
of a wide range of episode variables (e.g., setting, purpose, outcome), and influences what and how information
about the episode is selected and retained in memory in
order to:

(a) arrive at a coherent, ordered, unified,

expectation-confirming, and knowledge-consistent representation of the experience (Alba & Hasher, 1983), and (b)
provide a subsequent basis for how the information will
be used (cf. Nisbett & Ross, 1979).
The cognitive structures and information processing
strategies that are evoked in a

~articular

situation are

often a function of the kinds of structures or strategies
we frequently or have recently accessed or applied in
past episodes (Higgins & King, 1981), the purposes we
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have in making judgments within the current situation
(Cohen, 1981), and, perhaps most importantly, the characteristics of the individual or individuals being perceived
in the immediate situation.

Other persons, who usually

constitute the primary focus of our attention (Schneider,
Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979), display certain physical
traits, behavior, and/or indicators of group membership
which may elicit one or more of our stereotypic notions
concerning types of people.

These internal categorizations

of person-related experiences not only influence the
assessments we make about others, but also determine how
we respond to them (e.g., Synder, Tanke, & Berscheid,
1977).

Finally, the context (i.e., the external situation

itself) provides essential information for the perception
of social episodes (Cantor, 1981).

Contextual factors

include a number of cultural and physical features of the
environment which place limits on the latitude of appropriate activities allowed to take place in a given setting,
lend fuller meaning to an actor's behaviors and intentions
(e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965), and make certain aspects of
stimuli particularly salient and likely to receive
attention (Taylor & Fiske, 1978).
Our responses to social situations are therefore a
product of the complex and dynamic interplay of relatively
long-term perceiver variables such as knowledge structures,

11
capacities and tendencies, and relatively short-term or
immediate situational conditions (i.e., characteristics
of the actors being perceived and the physical surroundings) as they conspire;to shape cognitive activity and
social interaction.

Such an analysis highlights the

interactive construction of the social world--both
perceptions and behaviors--as a function of both internal/
cognitive and external/contextual components (Neisser,
1976).

Of particular importance to the present research

are the higher-level cognitive structures that portray
portions of a perceiver's social world knowledge;

that

is, associations between behavior and person-related
elements that develop through experience and are stored
in semantic memory.
The Nature of Cognitive Schemas
Schema Definitions
Our cognitive conceptualizations of the world are
represented in structures which are called schemas.

A

schema is an abstract or generic cluster of knowledge
that specifies the constituent features and defining
attributes of a stimulus domain and the network of associations that is believed to hold among those features and
attributes (Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Fiske & Linville,
1980 ; Hastie, 1981; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; Taylor
& Crocker, 1981; Winograd, 1975).

A number of studies·
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have demonstrated that schernas are important in understanding, remembering, and thinking about such complex and
diverse concepts as objects, persons, groups, social
roles, situations, evertts, sequences of events, actions,
and sequences of actions (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Markus,
1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980).
In addition, they contain hypotheses about incoming stimuli, which include plans for interpreting and gathering
schema-related information (e.g., Miller, Galanter, &
Pribrarn, 1960; Tesser, 1979).

Hence, one of the chief

functions of a schema is to provide an answer to the
question, "What is it?" (Taylor & Crocker, 1981).
Schernas have been shown useful to perceivers in a
variety of tasks such as simple object and pattern
recognition (Labov, 1973; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed,
1972), the making of judgments (Markus, 1977), text cornprehension (Anderson, 1977), problem solving (Taylor,
Crocker, & D'Agostino, 1978), and impression formation
(Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980).

People have and use

schernas for perceiving visual arrays, for understanding
meaningful prose, for processing information about the
natural world, for understanding'and perceiving others,
and for perceiving and directing their own behavior
(Tesser, 1978).

They help to organize, structure, and

comprehend new facts;

they facilitate the encoding.,

storage, and retrieval of relevant information;

they
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affect the time it takes to process information, and the
speed with which problems can be solved.

Schemas are

analogous to large filing systems for classifying, retaining, and coordinating incoming sensory data (Taylor &
Crocker, 1981).

They also fulfill interpretive and

inferential functions.

That is, if information conveying

some relevant attribute is unavailable from the stimulus
itself or is ambiguous or is unavailable from memory,
schemas allow for the "filling in" of such information
(Minsky, 1975; Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977;
Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Tesser,
1978).

In short, schemas are cumulative, holistic, and

assimilative blends of knowledge (Spiro, 1977) that enable
persons to deal effectively and efficiently with the
information processing demands of a large and complex
world.
A Brief History of the Schema Concept
The term "schema" dates back to Kant (1787), who
developed the idea that people's experiences are collected
together in memory and that these collections are defined
by common elements.

Because these common elements

comprise categories of experiences, they permit a synthesis of abstract knowledge that represents the category.
According to Kant (1787), schemas as higher-order principles can be understood without specific reference to
any particular occurrence within a schematic category.
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Hence, one identifies experiences of the category by referring to the general schema that describes the category.
The neurologist Head (1920) adopted Kant's notion of a
schema, and stated that anything entering consciousness
is "charged with its relation to something that has gone
before."

In a similar vein, Woodworth (1938), in his

classic text on experimental psychology, theorized that
the process of remembering involved the "revival of one's
own experiences."
As a theoretical construct, the schema concept has
been operative in psychology for more than fifty years.
It was originally introducted into psychological research
as a reaction to the associationist models of learning
and memory (Hastie, 1981).

In moving beyond simple

experimental tasks, investigators discovered that the more
traditional analyses spawned by Ebbinghaus'

(1885) work

failed to account for what was rapidly becoming a considerable body of empirical evidence.

While early associa-

tion theories predicted a literal representation of a
stimuli in memory, researchers were uncovering large
differences between the structure and content of a
stimulus and its mental reproduction (Tulving & Donaldson,
1972).

Indeed, it wae shown that subjects in perception

and memory experiments imported a considerable amount of
prior knowledge that influenced their understanding arid
retention of novel information (Hastie, 1981).
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The use of schemas as explanatory mechanisms emerged
in many branches of psychology with similar but slightly
different meanings in each.

For example, Gestalt psychol-

ogists found the concept of an abstract schema useful in
describing memory for perceptual information (e.g., Woodworth, 1938).

The Gestalt tradition has since produced a

large literature demonstrating that verbal materials which
are meaningfully or schematically organized are better
remembered than nonschematic materials (e.g., Asch &
Ebenholtz, 1962; Garner & Whitman, 1965; Katona, 1940;
Turving & Pearlstone, 1966).

Also, Piaget's (1926) work

called upon schemas to explain the cognitive development
of children.

Finally, early researchers in problem solv-

ing (e.g., Betz, 1932; Flach, 1925; Selz, 1913, 1922)
viewed schemas as solution methods or plans of operation
guiding the problem solver's behavior.
Cognitive schemas found their way into modern
psychology primarily through the writings of Bartlett,
and it is to him that most workers in the area acknowledge
their debt.

In 1932, Bartlett completed a book entitled,

Remembering:

A study in experimental and social psycho!-

~

which presented a series of experiments involving

memory for complex literary material (e.g., brief stories,
prose passages, pictures, and American Indian picture
writings) .

His central stimulus for testing the effects

16
of time on the remembering of prose was the story known
as "The War of the Ghosts."

Bartlett reported that sub-

jects who had read the,narrative and were asked to recall
and repeatedly reproduce its contents omitted and/or
distorted essential details and introduced new elements
to the story.

Such errors increased dramatically with the

passage of time.

Greater delays produced more elabora-

tions, inaccuracies, and truncations of the material.

All

that appeared to remain of the original version were
"isolated but striking details" which seemed to correspond
to subjects' preconceptions.

Moreover, subsequent repro-

ductions by the same individual revealed that a persistent
idiosyncratic outline or form emerged in the recall
attempts.

Bartlett concluded that subjects were recon-

structing the events of the story using a few details and
an abstract cognitive schema as an elaboration plan.

He

summarized his findings as follows (Bartlett, 1932):
Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable
fixed, lifeless and fragmentary traces.
It is an
imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built
out of organized past reactions or experience, and
to a little outstanding detail which commonly appears
in image or language form.
(p. 213)
Thus, according to Bartlett' (1932), schemas represent a mass of active organizations of past reactions or
experiences.

Any one schema is presumably the collective

knowledge of a particular set of stimuli or a specific
type of previous experience.

Bartlett posited that the
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changes he found in subjects' reproductions of prose reflected a dependence on schemas related to the story or
onto which the story was mapped.

As the retention interval

increased, subjects relied increasingly on these general
schemas during recall attempts.

In other words, schemas

provided the basis for reconstruction in memory (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982).
influential.

Bartlett's work has been extremely

Indeed, much of the modern research on memory

for narrative discourse can be essentially viewed as an
extention of Bartlett's theories and methods with an
emphasis on accounting for accurate reproduction as well
as for errors (e.g., Rumelhart, 1975; Schank & Abelson,
1975).
The current resurgence of interest in cognitive
schemas is manifested in three lines of research.

The

first, conducted in the area of artificial intelligence,
has sought to define new data structures for encoding
complex descriptions of the world (i.e., situations,
events, and concepts) while endeavoring to construct
language production and comprehension machines.

The

result has been a proliferation of higher-order representations that utilize some form of knowledge clustering
such as "frames" (Kuipers, 1975; Minsky, 1975; Winograd,
1975), "scripts" (Schank & Abelson, 1975, 1977), "definitions" (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975), or other forms of
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schemata (Moore & Newell, 1974; Schmidt, 1976).

For

example, scripts or event schemas organize and direct the
understanding of a sequence of real-world activities.

They

may pertain to actions'involving specific occurrences
(e.g., Bob and Carol's wedding), or routine, well practised behavioral scripts (e.g., eating at a restaurant,
going to the dentist, attending a funeral)
Black,

&

Turner, 1979; Schank

&

(e.g., Bower,

Abelson, 1977).

The second domain of research in which schemas have
received considerable treatment has been that of memory
for connected discourse.

Principally inspired by Bart-

lett's seminal studies, several researchers have begun
to extend and formalize his ideas by attempting to model
the underlying memorial structures that are involved in
the processing of prose passages.

In particular, these

investigators have developed the hypothesis that readers
use previously learned schemas to facilitate the encoding, comprehension, and remembering of simple narrative
stories (Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 1976;
Anderson, Spiro, & Anderson, 1977; Dooling & Christiansen, 1977; Kintsch, 1975; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1975, 1978;
Mandler, 1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Rurnelhart, 1975, 1977; Rurnelhart & Ortony,
1977; Schank, 1975; Stein & Glenn, 1978; Thorndyke, 1976,
1977, 1978; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1979; Winograd,
1977) •
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The field of social cognition, from which the
present research arises, is the third and final area that
has made extensive use of schemata as descriptive or
explanatory concepts.

(Refer to the introductory chapter

for a discussion of the field.)

Two general classes of

cognitive schemas are commonly used by social perceivers,
and reflect somewhat independent programs of study in
social cognition (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). The first is
person schemas.

A person schema is an integrated cogni-

tive representation or impression of a specific individual
(e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980; Taylor, Fiske,
Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978).

The person portrayed may be

a close friend, family member, etc., or someone who is
only a transitory or casual acquaintance.

Person schemas

also include prototypic conceptions like introvert and
extravert (Cantor & Mischel, 1977) and self-schemata
(Markus, 1977).

The second is role schemas, which include

schemas for particular occupations;

for example, fireman,

doctor, college professor, librarian, or politician
(e.g., Cohen, 1977, 1981, 1983);

schemas for social

roles, such as spouse, parent, or child;

and generalized

conceptions of categories of people such as Blacks or
women.

Some of this research, growing out of an interest

in stereotyping, has been concerned with the cognitive
processing biases that can result in and maintain
curate representations of social groups.

inac~

(See Hamilton
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[1981] for a review of the literature on the cognitive
basis of stereotyping.)
As the above indicates, the schema construct has been
used to study a wide range of topic areas in psychological
research.

Because the concept of a schema as an organizer

of human experience is so encompassing, it is perhaps
inevitable that various investigators and theoreticians have
proposed models that differ in their explications of what a
schema is, how it is structured, or how it is applied
(Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980).

In spite of differing orien-

tations, several common assumptions underlie the various
formulations of the concept.

These commonalities include

four putative properties of schemas:

(a) schemas categor-

ize knowledge and experience, (b) schemas contain variables,
(c) schemas are organized, structured entities, and (d)
schemas affect the manner in which information is processed
(i.e., encoded, stored, and retrieved)

(cf. Hastie, 1981;

Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980).
Schemas Categorize Knowledge and Experience
Schemas embody conceptual knowledge that is encyclopedic rather than definitional in nature.

Although they

can be expressed in language and applied toward understanding language, they are not entirely or necessarily linguistic (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).

The contents of a schema

may consist of sensory input or perceptual images (Cantor,
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1981), affective components (Fiske, 1981), and well-learned
behavioral routines or response strategies (Fiske & Kinder,
1981).

Hence, a schema is more than a verbal description,

summary, or veridical copy of a phenomenon;

it captures

the totality of experience associated with the phenomenon,
which includes information that is encoded and stored in a
non-verbal manner (cf. Neisser, 1976).
Schemas are abstract, symbolic representations of
reality that specify the "normal constituent parts" of an
object, person, event, etc., and the "relationships that
normally hold between them" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).
Even when the essential characteristics of a schema are
depicted, they are generally portrayed as characteristics
that typically or commonly obtain.

Hence, schemas are

analogous to the "fuzzy" or prototype categories suggested
by the work of Rosch and her colleagues (e.g., Rosch, 1975,
1977; Rosch & Lloyd, 1976; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), as opposed
to strictly defined sets of classifying schemes.

For

example, an individual's schema for a CRIMINAL comprises a
configuration of correlated features (e.g., menacing
appearance, male, Black, uneducated, violent, muscular,
law breaking, ex-convict, belligerent, etc.), some of which
distinguish the criminal from different person types (e.g.,
psychotics), and others which are shared in common by a
variety of person types (e.g., football players can also
be Black, menacing, violent, and belligerent).

No actual
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criminal would be expected to possess all the characteristics of the schema;

however, any subset of its character-

istics might describe a real or easily recognizable offender
(cf. Cantor, 1981).
It is assumed that each feature of the CRIMINAL
schema is assigned a hypothetical weight which indicates its
importance or centrality in defining the schema.

Features

that are considered significant in determing category
membership are said to have high cue validity (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).

("Law breaking" obviously has higher cue valid-

ity than "muscular.")

Also, every feature of the schema

will not be associated with all of its members (e.g., the
Watergate conspirators were clearly not violent or uneducated, but were nevertheless reputed by many to be criminals).

Thus, the constituents of a schema are often quite

heterogeneous, resulting in a less than perfect nesting of
the schema's features (Cantor, Smith, French, & Mezzich,
1980).
In addition, it is assumed that there exists a
specific combination of features which constitutes the
exemplar of the schema, i.e., the clearest case of,category
membership containing maximal cue validity (Rosch, 1978).
Instances are matched against (compared to) the exemplar
in order to ascertain whether or not they are elements of
the category.

This comparison does not necessarily involve

an analysis of individual features, but instead may be based
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upon patterns of features that are not themselves distinguished (Wyer, 1980).

The greater the overlap of fea-

tures, the more quickly, reliably, confidently, and accurately the instance can be classified.

Therefore, typical

instances (i.e., those that share many features with the
schema exemplar) are categorized more efficiently than
atypical instances (Cantor et al., 1980).

For example, a

Black, uneducated, violent male who commits an armed
robbery and shows contempt for the Judge at his trial,
provides a more definitive case of a CRIMINAL schema match
than does a White, male, college graduate who is arrested
for pilfering items from a grocery store.

Similarly, Rosch

(1978) reported that subjects were able to easily classify
a robin as a bird, whereas they showed marked disagreement
in deciding whether to place a chicken in the same category.
Further, categorizing a given instance into a particular
schema is simplified if the exemplar of the schema is rich
(as measured by the total number of its features) and
distinct (as measured by the number of its features that
are not shared by rival categories)
Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976).

(Rosch, Mervis, Gray,

In short, the instances of

a schema vary in their typicality and ease of categorization.

Those that lie at the periphery or borderline of

the schema (i.e., instances that share few features with
the schema exemplar) are problematic in terms of determining
their category membership (Cantor et al., 1980).
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schema Variables
The properties that define the features of a schema
are represented as variables or slots that can be filled
whenever the schema is used to structure and comprehend
incoming information.

Schema variables are best thought of

as distributions of possible values.

That is, a particular

variable can take on any of a range of values with the
likelihood of a single value being determined by its position or typicality in this distribution.

Hence, just as

judgments regarding the fit between instances and schemas
are not always clear-cut, the values of schema variables
are also more or less probable, and rooted in the strength
of one's expectations.
Based on Hastie's (1981) notions pertaining to schemaevent relatedness and the memorability of information, it
is suggested that variable-value relationships can be portrayed on a conditional probability continuum.

Variable

values that are likely have conditional probabilities closer
to 1 [i.e., probability (value/variable) >.70], whereas
values that are not likely are clustered at the opposite
end of the probability dimension [i.e., probability (value/
variable) <.30].

Values that are unrelated or irrelevant

to the variable are found in the middle range of conditional
probabilities [i.e., probability (value/variable)

=

.50].

For example, a person's schema for an extravert may contain
a variable relating to "party behavior."

Likely values for
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this variable given the extravert schema (i.e., those with
conditional probabilities approximating 1) include garrulous,
laughs loudly, sociable, outgoing, rambunctious, center of
attention, etc.

In contrast, unlikely values (i.e., those

with conditional probabilities closer to 0) might consist
of soft spoken, reticent, shy, easily embarrassed, does not
dance, etc.

Variable values falling in the middle range of

probabilities (i.e., those that are irrelevant to the
variable) comprise events such as drinks coke, smokes
cigarettes, wears running shoes, etc.

Events or values

associated with intermediate conditional probabilities are
difficult to specify because of their extreme heterogeneousness.

(Strictly speaking, events completely removed from

the schema's domain of application also fall in the probability range of .50.)

Hastie (1981) suggests that the

identification of intermediate conditional probability values be restricted to events that are schema pertinent but
undiagnostic as illustrated in the preceding example.
When an assignment of values to variables has been
made, a schema is said to have been instantiated.

Instan-

tiation is the process by which a schema creates a description or representation from observations of a stimulus in
its domain, i.e., the process of matching inputs to slots
in the schema (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).

Instantiation is

analogous to the formulation of a "token" node in semantic·
network models (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1973) to represent
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the specific occurrence of an abstract concept.

When a

schema is instantiated during comprehension, a copy of the
general schema is constructed with data from the input
stream occupying the variable slots.

The process of instan-

tiation permits the organization and encoding of incoming
information into a familiar, coherent, conceptual representation (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980) .
Not every instantiation will match the expected values
for schema variables;

hence, there are constraints or

limits on what values are acceptable (Rumelhart & Norman,
1978).

Therefore, the likelihood of a value given a vari-

able shifts as the variable's constraints are modified.
Variable values are delimited by a number of elements,
including the to-be-comprehended stimulus as well as the
set of contextual and situational factors surrounding the
stimulus.

For example, one might have a schema for PERSONAL

CRIME that would comprise three variables:
victim, and an offense.

a criminal, a

On different occasions, the vari-

ables in the PERSONAL CRIME schema will assume various
values as a function of the stimulus environment which provides referents for a mental representation of the event
(Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).
Although the values of schema variables may vary
according to certain defining aspects of the external
environment, the

interrelationships among the variables

within a particular schema remain constant across times
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and settings.

In other words, because schemas express

stereotypic knowledge, they constrain the form in which
events can combine, while allowing flexibility in the semantic content of the events themselves (Thorndyke & Yekovich,
1980).

Thus, it is the criminal who generally perpetrates

the offense against the victim who suffers some sort of loss
or injury, irrespective of the identity of the offender or
victim or the nature· of the crime.
Constraints on schema variables serve two fundamental
purposes.

First, they indicate what kinds of objects might

realistically be associated with each variable, i.e., constraint values determine decisions about what is and what
is not an instantiation of the schema.

Second, constraints

on schema variables allow good guesses to be made about the
nature of unspecified variables when insufficient information is provided by current input or memory, or when a
stimulus configuration is so complex that the perceiver is
unable to encode all its details (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977;
Taylor & Crocker, 1981).

These inferred values are called

default options (Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977;
Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor
& Crocker, 1981).

Default options·presumably develop from

experiences with instances of a schema and are thus typical
qualities of the stimulus domain in question (Taylor &
Crocker, 1981).
The use of default options guides the process of
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recognizing a particular phenomenon by suggesting what features to look for and where to expect them, and by providing
answers to questions for which observations have not yet
been made (Kuipers, 197S).

The latter application of de-

fault values allows a schematic representation to satisfy
the "principle of continually available output" (Norman &
Bobrow, 1975) which states that a cognitive search process
should be able to provide a satisfactory outcome even when
its analysis has not yet been completed.

A lack of data

or processing resources should result in a degradation of
the quality of the output, but should not preclude any results from being produced.

It should be noted that default

options are not always fixed independently of the values of
other variables within a schema.

Instead, they are usually

chosen on a conditional basis, i.e., the designation of a
default value may depend upon the values already selected
to fill the slots of the remaining variables (Rurnelhart &
Ortony, 1977).

In other words, values of variables that

are inferred must be compatible or congruent with values
of variables that are known.

For example, if one learns

that a victim died of stab wounds resulting from an apparent
struggle with a would-be robber, and that an alleged murder
Weapon was found close to the scene of the crime, but is
not informed as to the exact composition of the weapon,
one is not likely to surmise that it was a hand-gun or·
garrote.
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The Structure of Schemas
The structural organization of schemas is characterized by a hierarchical relationship between a dominating
schema and embedded or lower level schemas which may serve
as "data" for the higher level schema.

That is, more

specific lower level schemas are linked with more abstract
higher level schemas in subordinate/superordinate relationships (Hamilton, 1981; Tesser, 1978).

For example, the

schema for a birthday party specifies and elaborates a more
general PARTY schema.

Although both share many of the same

features, the variables of the birthday party schema are
more precisely articulated than for the generic party.

A

party might have "food" as one of its variables, whereas a
birthday party schema would specify "cake and ice cream" as
its typical culinary delights.

Thus, a particular schema's

level in the schema hierarchy determines the constraints on
its constituent properties (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980).
Similarly, data stored within a schema constitute a
pyramidal structure with abstract or general information
contained at the uppermost levels and specific instances or
examples of the schema occupying the lower levels (Hamilton,
1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981).

At the most abstract level

is a generic concept (e.g., family) that has central defining features (e.g., parents and siblings), and variables
(e.g., sister).

At this level of abstraction, the con-

straint values associated with the variables may accept a

30

wide range of values {e.g., 1,2,3,4 or more sisters).

The

most basic or primitive level of a schema consists of a
number of specific instances, whereas the middle level contains exemplars of the schema.

Generally, the instances

that are stored within a schema will be "good examples" of
the schema, with instantiations of variables that probably
approximate the default values of the schema {e.g., Rosch,
For example, when one's schema for gangster is

1978).

evoked, the image of Al Capone may become available in
memory.
The separate elements of a schema, at any level, are
woven together in an associative network or pattern that
fashions a web of interconnecting nodes or pathways {cf.,
Hastie, 1980; Wyer & Carlston, 1979).

Each piece of in-

formation (i.e., schematic node) is directly linked to the
central concept or entry point.

In addition, separate

schematic nodes can be closely tied to each other.

Hence,

schemas are also horizontally structured (Hamilton, 1981) •
The associative linkages between single elements may be a
function of their (a) semantic similarity or conceptual
overlap (i.e., different features may refer to the same
superordinate concept);

(b) temporal contiguity (e.g., in

a script the elements are re1ated according to an ordered
sequence of events); or (c) encoding specificity (e.g.,
the information may be linked because it was acquired
during the same behavioral episode or within the same

31
social context) .
Schemas are not only defined by a web of intraconnections among their individual elements, but they are also
related to one another;via a rich interassociative network,
particularly at the lower levels of greater specificity
(Taylor & Crocker, 1981).

Therefore, a single instance may

be represented in several schemas, with between schema
linkages indicating the cross references.

Moreover, a

schema that is itself a distinct cognitive representation
can also serve as a specific illustration or example of one
or more different schemas.

For example, one's friend John

may be included in his/her extravert and psychologist
schemas as a concrete instance of each, while at the same
time, the individual can possess a separate person schema
for John that comprises his traits, physical appearance,
characteristics, and attributes as well as a number of
behaviors he has engaged in as manifestations of those
attributes.
Schematic Processing
Schemas operate according to an underlying cognitive
mechanism that processes incoming information.

Schematic

processing intervenes between the perception of a stimulus
and its cognitive representation in such a manner that
input is made more systematic and the resultant material
which is stored in memory does not directly correspond to
the original stimulus (Alba & Hasher, 1983).

This
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description emphasizes three points.
First, it places the locus of information processing
within the perceiver.

Schemas constitute a portion of the

contents of what is commonly referred to as the "black
box."

Although we clearly have not yet reached a level of

sophistication that permits a precise localization of the
neurological substrates that correspond to cognitive structures (i.e., schemas), it is nevertheless assumed that they
are existing "bundles" of knowledge that people "carry
about in their heads."

Positing the cognitive contents of

the black box is admittedly an act of theory, the importance of which is in providing a useful device for understanding and describing the relationships among input
features (i.e., the nature of information, its source and
the context in which it is received) and output variables
(e.g., beliefs, judgments, attitudes, behaviors)

(Fiske &

Linville, 1980).
Second, it suggests that schematic processing leads
to a greater organization and clarification of information
as opposed to greater randomness or uncertainty.

Schemas

simplify., categorize, and analyze incoming stimuli;

they

fill in missing components of incomplete stimulus configurations, guide the search for additional data, and in some
cases, amplify new information as it is encountered.
schemas actively reconstruct and redefine stimuli in a
process that renders them more recognizable and

Thus,
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comprehensible to the perceiver (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977;
Taylor & Crocker, 1981).
Third, it implies that acquired information is modified and/or interpreted in a direction that is consistent
with invoked schemas.

Material is not represented as a

veridical copy of the current environment, but is reshaped
to fit pre-existing abstractions of reality.

Therefore,

schemas function in the service of adaptive efficiency
rather than toward the achievement of precise and accurate
cognitive reproductions of stimuli (Cantor, 1981).
A collection of independent experiments employing
different stimulus materials, dependent measures, and
schematic constructs (e.g., person schemas, prototypes,
stereotypes, scripts) has yielded a set of similar findings
regarding the effects of schema evocation upon information
processing.

A body of research has demonstrated the ways

that schemas can influence, bias, and distort the encoding, representation, and retrieval of schema-relevant
information, as well as inferences and judgments about
schema-relevant stimuli (see Hastie, 1981; Nisbett & Ross,
1980; and Taylor & Crocker, 1981 for reviews).
In the field of social cognition, for example, converging evidence has revealed that the schematic processing
of information (i.e., processing that is guided by expectations or preconceptions) produces:

(a) more accurate

recall of schema consistent material (e.g., Rothbart,

~~"!!'-..........._
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Evans, & Fulero, 1979);

(b) a bias-toward-schema effect

leading to errors of commission, distortions in recall,
and false recognition (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Carlston, 1980; Cohen, 197?; Higgins & Rholes, 1979; Synder &
Uranowitz, 1978; Woll & Yopp, 1978);

(c) higher recogni-

tion confidence of schema-related information (e.g., Tsujimoto, 1978);

(d) greater resistance to the disconfirmation

of schema-relevant facts

(e.g., Markus, 1977);

(e) signi-

ficant clustering in recall (e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer,
1980);

and (f) faster reaction times in problem solving

and judgment tasks (e.g., Taylor, Crocker, & D'Agostino,
1978; Ostrom, Lingle, Pryor, & Geva, 1980).
The Executive Function and Schema Accessibility
The entire memory apparatus presumably contains a
multitude of schemata, any one of which may be activated
in response to environmental stimuli.

At any given time,

however, only a few of them are relevant to the stimulus
and are therefore necessary to fully process information.
A method that randomly or haphazardly searches for appropriate knowledge structures would obviously be protracted
and unwieldy, and could not possibly result in their
efficient selection.

The choice of likely schemata must

therefore be systematic.

What seems to be required is a

Processing mechanism that is highly sensitive, not only to
the immediate input and the context in which it occurs, but
also to the content and organization of available knowledge.
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Moreover, the mechanism must have the capacity to quickly
analyze and weight these components (i.e., input, context,
knowledge) in order to lead (more or less directly) to a
schema or set of schemas that best matches the impinging
information or sufficiently "accounts for the input" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).
Hence, it is proposed that schemas are embedded in a
larger information processing system which is guided by an
executive function.

[For extensive discussions of the

executive function in cognitive psychology, see Anderson
(1975), Neisser (1966), and Tulving and Donaldson (1972).]
The hypothesized tasks of the executive include (cf., Fiske
& Linville, 1980):

(a) abstracting schemas from specific

instances or experiences (i.e., directing the basic processes through which schemas are developed);

(b) indexing

schemas through concepts or labels to facilitate their
organization and identification in memory;

and (c) search-

ing for and evoking relevant schemas to process incoming
data.
Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) suggest that it is useful to envisage the relationship between the executive
function and a specific schema in terms of a computerprogramming metaphor in which the former is analogous to
a master program, and the latter is viewed as a procedure
that comprises a number of subroutines.

One can think of

the activation of a.schema (which is controlled by the
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master program or executive) as paralleling the invocation
of a procedure.

Lower~order

schemas, which are contained

within a superordinate schema, are analogous to subroutines.
Hence, the activation of subschemas is like the calling up
of subroutines within a procedure.

However, unlike ordi-

nary procedure calls in which the flow of control is only
from procedure to subroutine, the flow of control in a
schema operates in both directions.

It is as though a given

procedure not only can invoke its own subroutines, but can
also be activated by the subroutines themselves.

Thus,

although the executive-based search for a schema can only
proceed in one direction, the evocation process within a
particular schema may occur in a reciprocal fashion between
different levels.
Schemas may therefore be evoked from the top-down
(conceptually driven processing) or from the bottom-up
(data or event driven processing) .

Bobrow and Norman

(1975) describe these types of processing as follows:
"Conceptually driven processing tends to be top-down,
driven by motives and goals and fitting input to expectations;

event driven processing tends to be bottom-up,

finding structures in which to imbed the input" (p. l40).
Hence, bottom-up processing occurs when aspects of the
input directly suggest or activate schemas which correspond to them, or when subschemas activate or suggest the
superordinate schemas in which they are nested.

Top-down
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processing, on the other hand, occurs when a sub- or superordinate schema generates a search through the input data
for instances that confirm schematic expectations or resemble the particular constituents which they subsume.
For example, a probation officer is engaging in a
top-down processing of case information when any pertient
data is selected, reviewed, interpreted, and inferred from
a standpoint consistent with the officer's preconceived
notions about the types of characteristics or behaviors
that are associated with a specific category or categories
of offenders.

In bottom up processing, an offender schema

is evoked by the case information itself (e.g., knowing a
probationer has been arrested for drug possession may
invoke a "drug addict schema").

As each piece of infor-

mation is encountered, the officer attempts to comprehend
its meaning by relating it to knowledge structures that are
stored in long-term memory.

The evaluation of cases is

assumed to involve the simultaneous operation of conceptually driven and data driven processes (cf., Anderson,
1975; Rose, 1981).

Thus, an officer's judgments of an

offender are determined by both his/her knowledge about
crime and criminals, and the actual facts presented in
the case.
The readiness with which a schema is utilized in
information processing is a function of its relative
accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981).

Schema accessibility
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appears to be influenced by three factors:

recency, fre-

quency, and salience (Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull,
1981) .

If a schema has been recently accessed and used in

making a judgment or evaluation, the likelihood that itwill
be reactivated and applied as a basis for judgments in the
same or a different situation is increased.

A study by

Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) illustrates this point.
They had subjects make judgments about either helpfulness
or dishonesty.

Later, subjects were exposed to an ambig-

uous behavior description that could be interpreted as a
manifestation of honesty or helpfulness (giving another
student the answer to an exam question) .

Subjects who had

previously made helpfulness judgments viewed the behavior
positively and rated the target person as more helpful,
whereas subjects who had been making dishonesty judgments
interpreted the behavior in an unfavorable light and rated
the target as dishonest.

Thus, exposure to personality

trait terms in a priming task increased the accessibility
of the construct (i.e., trait schema) designated by the
terms, as indicated by subjects' tendency to use the primed
construct to later characterize the stimulus person in an
impression formation task. 1

Similarly, Carlson (1977) and

1 This research may be compared to the earlier work
of Sherif and his colleagues (see Sherif and Hovland, 1961)
Who were interested in the basic question of how judgments
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Lingle and Ostrom (1979) found that subjects who had made
judgments of a target person in response to stimulus
information were more likely to use the judgments as a basis
for later evaluations than to use the original stimulus
information.
The frequency with which a schema is activated also
affects its accessibility, in part, because a schema that
is activated frequently is likely to have been activated
recently (Higgins & King, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1980; Wyer

& Srull, 1981).

For example, Wyer and Srull (1980) pre-

sented subjects in an initial priming study with 6, 12, 24,
or 48 behavioral instances of a trait construct and found
a positive, generally monotonic relationship between the
number of instances presented (the frequency of schema activation) and the extent to which a target person in a subsequent impression formation task was characterized in

are affected by the context in which they are embedded.
Sherif and Hovland (1961), for example, found that a person's judgments of attitude statements relating to an
issue were a function of his/her initial attitude toward
the issue. Statements that were close to a subject's position (i.e., those falling within their latitude of acceptance) were assimilated and judged as more similar than
they really were, whereas statements that were discrepant
from their initial position (i.e •• those falling within
their latitude of rejection) were contrasted and judged as
less similar than they actually were. Whether assimilation
or contrast effects occur was also shown to be influenced
by a number of other factors such as the credibility of the
source presenting a persuasive message about the issue at
hand as well as the person's ego involvement in the issue
(Wrightmen & Deaux, 1981).
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terms of the construct.
If the repeated activation of a schema is massed
over an abbreviated period of time, then its accessibility
will be somewhat transitory.

If, however, the repeated

activation is dispersed over a long period, then the
accessibility effects will be relatively prolonged (Higgins,
Feldman, & Ruble, 1980).

Hence, variations in frequency

of activation over time may lead to stable individual
differences in the accessibility of schemas for different
perceivers.

Higgins and King (1981) have shown that dif-

ferences among people in construct accessibility can be
chronic and context independent, and that the constructs
which are accessible to a perceiver are a product of the
kinds of information the perceiver has retained about
others.

Along similar lines, Markus and Smith (1981) have

argued that the schemas individuals bring to bear in processing information about others are those that are important to their own self concepts.

In one study, Markus and

Fong (1979) reported that subjects who were schematic with
respect to independence for themselves made more extreme
judgments about the independence of another person than
did subjects who were aschematic ·With respect to this
trait.
Finally, the relative accessibility of a schema is
determined by salience.

A stimlulus that is distinctive

may elicit a schema which is relevant to that
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distinctiveness.

That is, individuals are more likely to

categorize themselves and others along dimensions that are
more striking or attention grabbing (McArthur, 1981).

For

example, a black in an·otherwise white group is more likely
to evoke the "black person" schema than a black in a group
of mixed racial composition or in an all black group.
Studies by Taylor and her associates (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978; Taylor, Fiske, Close, Anderson,
Ruderman, 1975; see Taylor, 1981) exposed subjects to group
discussions and found that the salient novel black in an
all-white group and the salient novel female or male in a
group of the opposite sex were rated as more prominent or
influential on a number of measures than the same actors
when they were less distinctive by virtue of appearing in
racially or sexually balanced groups.

The effect of momen-

tary salience on judgments and attributed responses has
also been demonstrated in other studies (e.g., Shomer &
Centers, 1970).

In addition, there is some evidence that

salience can cause increases in the accessibility of different aspects of a person's self-schema (McGuire, McGuire,
Child, & Fujioka, 1978).

McGuire and Padawer-Singer

(1976), for example, found that the characteristics elementary school children included in their spontaneous selfdescriptions were a function of their distinctiveness
within the classroom, with distinctive attributes being
more likely to be mentioned (e.g., green eyes, foreign
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birthplace) .
The Liabilities of Schematic Processing
As illustrated in the preceding section, schemas are
thought to play a fundamental role in the processing of
information and are invoked during attentional, encoding,
retrieval, and higher-order thought processes.

However,

the use of schemas may result in information being processed
selectively;

consequently, inevitable biases may occur

from their application.

While schemas are essential to

inputing structure and meaning to everyday perceptions,
they can also be dysfunctional to the perceiver by leading
to systematic distortions, errors in judgment, and information loss.

The liabilities of schematic processing stem

from four sources:

(a) the use of the wrong schema;

an illustory data base;

(c) type-1 errors;

(b)

and (d)

illusory correlations (Taylor & Crocker, 1981).
To the extent that schemas guide decisions and behavior, operating with an incorrect schema can produce a number
of negative consequences in cognitive processing, the first
of which is inefficiency.

That is, the time required to

assimilate information and solve problems may be increased
when an erroneous schema is used to recognize and interpret
incoming data.

In a study by Taylor, Crocker, and D'Agos-

tino (1978) subjects who employed cues suggested by a
wrong schema as the basis for solving a "common attribute"
task had slower decision times than did subjects applying
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the correct schema relevant cues or no cues (see also
Bruner & Potter, 1964).
A second possible consequence of having an incorrect
schema is inaccuracy.

·Individuals may make serious errors

of inference by distorting incoming information to be consistent with their schema.

Errors may also arise from

selectivity in recall, the insertion of default options,
and a reinterpretation of ambiguous information (Taylor &
Crocker, 1981).

Langer and Abelson (1974) reported a

seminal piece of research in which a group of clinicians
were shown a videotape of a young male who had recently
applied for a job and was being interviewed.

Half of the

subjects were falsely told that the interview was with a
psychiatric patient and that their participation was part
of a study of patient assessment, whereas the remaining
subjects were led to believe that the actor was a job
applicant and that they were involved in a study of employment interviewing.

It was found that the "patient schema"

resultedinthe perception of more psychopathology than the
"job applicant schema," and that subjects distorted or
redefined background data to be congruent with their
schema (cf., Bower, 1977; Cohen, '1977; Rosenhan, 1973;
Synder & Uranowitz, 1978; Zadny & Gerard, 1974).
A third consequence of processing an incorrect schema
is that once it has been misapplied, the perceiver may
actually modify reality to conform to the schema.

In the
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case of mental illness, institutionalization itself may
produce "secondary deviance" in which labeling a person as
a patient contributes to the formation of a negative selfconcept (Schur, 1971), ·

~reates

or perpetuates imputed

states or conditions (Becker, 1967), and sets the stage for
enduring self-fulfilling prophecies (Lemert, 1951, 1967).
This "self-fulfilling prophecy" effect has been demonstrated
in a variety of contexts including the effects of teachers'
evaluation reports on student performance (Rosenthal &
Jacobson, 1968), the effect of anticipating that another
will be hostile or competitive upon subsequent behavior
toward that person (Synder & Swann, 1978), the effect of
believing that physically attractive people are charming
and bright (Synder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), and the
effect of stereotyped expectations on interracial interactions (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974).
A second set of liabilities in schematic processing
derive from the establishment of an illusory data base.
An illusory data base is a collection of assumptions or
inferences that do not actually exist in the stimulus
information, but rather are contributed by the schema.
may be constructed by the use of default options, making
inferences that are later stored as data independent of
and in addition to the initial stimulus configuration,
and/or an indiscriminate, single-minded application of a
schema despite a less than perfect match with an evoking

It
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stimulus (Taylor & Crocker, 1981).

In a study demonstra-

ting how prior inferences may be incorporated in a schematic representation, subjects were given a list of traits
describing an individual and were then asked to judge how
appropriate the individual was for a particular occupation.
Later, they were told to list traits they thought would be
characteristic of the person.
Results showed that subjects listed the traits
judged to be more descriptive of the occupation they had
evaluated than the one they had not evaluated, even though
all the subjects were presented the same information about
the individual (Baumgardner, Leippe, & Ostrom, 1976; see
also Geve, Lingle, bstrom, Leipee, & Baumgardner, 1978;
Lingle & Ostrom, 1977).

Subjects had apparently convinced

themselves that the target person was suitable for the
particular occupation and had used the inference to guide
their subsequent judgments regarding his/her attributes.
The third liability of schematic processing is the
propensity for Type 1 errors (Taylor & Crocker, 1981);
that is, the tendency to accept data as consistent with a
schema when it is either neutral or inconsistent.

Four

features of schemas contribute to this bias:
1. The data base stored with a schema comprises
consistent or confirming instances.

A study by Ross,

Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) demonstrates this aspect.
their experiment, subjects were asked to distinguish

In
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between real and bogus suicide notes.

One group was

falsely told that they had done relatively well on the
task, while the others were erroneously informed that they
had performed poorly.

·Afterward, although subjects were

debriefed concerning the falsity of the feedback, their
impressions of themselves as socially sensitive (or socially insensitive) persons persisted despite their awareness that the performance evaluations were contrived.
Subjects were able to maintain these beliefs by drawing
on the relevant portion (i.e., data base) of their selfschemas (e.g., sensitive me) and finding supportive examples
of the behavior (e.g., me being sensitive) stored with the
schemas.
2. The criteria that indicate what is or is not a
"match" to a schema are often loosely or broadly defined.
For example, the layperson's schema for someone who is
mentally ill includes the presumption that the person will
behave in an unpredictable fashion (Nunnally, 1961).

This

makes the schema quite vague about what a mentally ill
individual should not do in any particular situation.
Hence, it becomes difficult or impossible to identify
instances that clearly dispute the schema;

information

that is irrelevant or inconsistent with the schema is
easily incorporated.
3. Encountering schema inconsistent or incongruent
information frequently results in a greater differentiation
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of the schema rather than a complete revision or rejection
of the structure.

Evidence that person schemas consist of

overarching general categories which encompass a number of
more specific subcategories supports this prediction (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981).

Also,

Taylor (1981) has suggested that when stereotypes are
disconfirmed, persons do not discard or adjust the stereotype on some dimension;
for the anomalous entity.

instead, they create a subcategory
For example, though a man may

contend that women are basically dependent, passive, and
fatuous, meeting an obviously intelligent, aggressive, and
successful woman may compel him to develop a new classification such as "castrating female," "bitchy broad," or
"career woman," a variant to his general stereotype.
Disconfirmations of a schema simply provide a basis for
forming a new schema subtype, not revising the existing
schema.
Generally, when information is incongruent with a
schema, the information may be repudiated as "bad data"
and the instance stored with the schema will remain
unchanged.

For example, when an individual who exempli-

fies a person schema acts in a

m~nner

that is contrary to

the schema, the behavior may be attributed to situational
or unstable causes (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983; Deaux

& Emswiller, 1974; Feldman-Summers & Kiesler, 1974; Heydan

& Mischel, 1976; Kulik, in press).

Thus, the incongruent
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behavior may have minimal impact on either the representation of the individual· (Crocker, Hannah, & Weber, 1983)
or more abstract levels of the schema.
4. A single schema is typically evoked in the course
of evaluating incoming stimuli;

equally plausible or

applicable schemas are not tested for their possible fit
to the data.

This point is aptly illustrated by what

Ross (1977) calls the fundamental attribution error, i.e.,
inputing the cause of an act to the actor while underestimating or ignoring the potential situational determinants
of the behavior.

For example, Ross, Amabile, and Stein-

metz (1977) told subjects to devise difficult questions to
ask a contestant in a general knowledge quiz.

Although

the questioner applied his/her own idiosyncratic knowledge
to develop the quesions, thus placing the contestant in a
hindered position, the questioner, the contestant, and an
observer all believed that the questioner was more knowledgable than the contestant, ignoring the obvious advantage of the questioner.

In effect, perceivers dismissed

the role of external forces, in this case the social
power of the questioner to define the nature of the interaction (see also Jones

&

Harris, ·1967; Taylor

&

Crocke.r,

1978).
The final liability of schematic processing stems
from

illusory correlations, i.e., systematic errors in

judgments of the degree of covariation between two kinds
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of events.

A series of several studies has shown that

psychiatrists and college students tend to overestimate
correlations they expect to be present on projective tests
(e.g., large eyes and paranoia), while underestimating or
failing to report correlations that are present but unexpected (Chapman, 1967; Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969).
Illusory correlations persist even when there is actually
a strong negative relationship between two associatively
connected events (Chapman & Chapman, 1969), when subjects
are offered a reward ($20) for being accurate (Chapman &
Chapman, 1967), and when subjects are given training and
feedback to improve their relationship estimates (Golding

& Rorer, 1972).

This phenomenon has been demonstrated with

three types of psychodiagnostic tests (Chapman & Chapman,
1967, 1969; Starr & Katkin, 1969) as well as a number of
other kinds of judgments (e.g., Jennings, Amabile, & Ross,
1980), and has been shown to be a basis of stereotypic
conceptions of social groups (Hamilton, 1976; Hamilton &
Rose, 1980; McArthur & Friedman, 1980; Rothbart, Evans,

& Fulero, 1979).

Schemas produce illusory correlations

by directing the search for evidence that is utilized in
assessing covariation, and by making certain categori~s
of evidence more available (i.e., easier to recall).
Both processes lead to an overrepresentation of this
evidence in judgments (see Crocker & Taylor, 1978).
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Schema Change
The preceding discussion recounted how schemas
typically resist change, and the consequences of this
resistance for social perceivers.

The "unalterable" nature

of schemas is both a blessing and a curse.

As previously

noted, some of the liabilities of schematic processing
include misperceptions and distortions as well as bias and
inaccuracy in making judgments.

Nevertheless, a schema

that remains stable contributes a sense of order and coherence to stimuli that would otherwise be complex, unpredictable, and often overwhelming.

This order and predict-

ability would be lost if cognitive structures shifted in
response to every piece of impinging information (Crocker,
Fiske, & Taylor, in press).

On the other hand, it is clear

that schemas would be highly dysfunctional if they failed
to change despite inconsistency with reality or inefficiency in processing.

There is evidence to suggest that

schemas can be modified on the basis of actual experience
(Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Rumelhart &
Ortony, 1977).
Schema change can basically occur in two ways (cf.,
Anderson, Kline, & Beasley, 1979) ..

First, schemas develop

with continued exposure to a variety of different instances
which represent a specific phenomenon.

A maturing schema

evolves by assimilating the relevant features of the
increasingly complex array of stimuli which it encounters
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over time (Flavell, 1963; Inhelder & Piaget, 1964).
is change by accretion:

This

adding new data structures to the

existing data base of memory, following the organization
already present (Rumelhart & Norman, 1978).

The second

form of change is accomplished through the process of
accommodation which involves restructuring the schema to
account for incongruent information, i.e., information that
is improbable given the schema (Hastie, 1981).

Incongru-

ency produces change by forcing the perceiver to alter
his/her previous knowledge in the face of evidence that is
contrary to prior expectations.

For example, if the schema

portraying my best friend Bill centers around his honesty
and integrity, and I recently discover he has stolen my
wallet, then it is probable that I will modify my existing
representation of Bill in order to adjust to this new and
inconsistent input.

(Unless I attribute his action to

situational instead of dispositional causes, in which case,
the episode would have a minimal effect on my impression).
The likelihood that incongruent information will lead
to schema change is determined by three sets of factors
(See Crocker, Fiske, & Taylor, in press).

The first set of

factors relates to features of the information itself.
Various studies indicate that incongruent information produces a greater impact on schema content and structure if
it is:

(a) processed without placing great demands on the

perceiver's memory load;

(b) moderately discrepant rather

52
than mildly or highly discrepant with the schema;

(c) un-

ambiguous, i.e., clear in its meaning or implications;
(d) dispersed over a number of instances as opposed to
concentrated in a few; ' and (e)

judged to be highly rele-

vant to the schema. 2
The second set of factors concerns characteristics of
knowledge structures that lead to or resist change.

In

general, schemas that are least responsive to incongruent
information are:

(a) well developed (i.e., contain large

quantities of schema congruent information);

(b) compactly

organized (i.e., comprised of numerous links among separate
schema components);

(c) difficult to access or activate

(it is obvious that information cannot modify a schema
that has not been evoked);
undisconfirmable.

and (d) logically or practically

A logically undisconfirmable schema is

one that fails to specify what types of instances or

2 Theories of information integration suggest that a
number of similar factors affect the relative weight
attached to a piece of information in impression formation.
These include:
(a) the order of the information, i.e.,
information presented earlier in the judgment process is
given greater weight than later information;
(b) the relevancy of the information to the particular judgment being
made, i.e., pertinent information is assigned more weight
than unrelated information;
(c) redundancy of the infer~
mation, i.e., information that is repetitive is given less
Weight than information that goes beyond the facts already
Presented; and (d) the source of the information, i.e.,
information emanating from a credible source is generally
given greater emphasis than information from a less
respected or discredited source.
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occurrences should not occur when the schema is invoked;
a practically undisconfirmable schema cannot be invalidated
because there is little opportunity for perceivers to obtain information that is inconsistent with the schema (cf.,
Reeder & Brewer, 1979).
The last set of factors that affects the impact of
incongruency on schema change is associated with the perceiver.

Differences in a person's receptivity to incon-

gruent information is primarily a function of the amount of
experience he/she has had in a given domain.

(A discussion

of expert-novice differences in schema content and use is
presented in the following section of this review.)

Ex-

perts' schemas are more extensive, integrated, rapidly
retrieved, and cohesive than the schemas of novices (Fiske

& Kinder, 1981).

Despite the vast store of information

available to them, they are able to utilize and organize it
efficiently.

Specifically, a tighter organization of in-

formation implies that experts can retain more in shortterm memory.

Therefore, in encountering incongruent input

the experienced perceiver possesses both the on-line
capacity to process the inconsistent data--which is more
difficult and time-consuming to process than congruent_
information (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981)--and the knowledge
to make efficient use of the data in moderating judgments
(Fiske, Kinder, & Larter, in press).

Hence, it would seem

that experts' schemas are more likely to be influenced by
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incongruency than nonexperts' schemas.

On the other hand,

as stated earlier, the highly organized nature of experts'
schemas may also make them less amenable to change.

Clearly,

further studies are needed to clarify the relationship between expertise and schema modification.
Finally, for incongruent information to instigate
schema change, the perceiver's motivation or goals must
promote accuracy over the maintenance of existing knowledge
structures.

Although little research has addressed what

conditions might give rise to an accuracy orientation, one
likely condition is outcome dependency (i.e., when one's
outcomes are directly dependent upon one's inferences, one
may be highly motivated to be accurate).

Indeed, prelim-

inary evidence suggests that outcome dependency does encourage the processing of incongruent information (Erber,
Fiske, & Swann, 1983).
Schema change can be initiated at one or more levels
including:

the variables themselves (e.g., variables may

be inserted/dropped from the schema, or the strength of
association between a variable and a schema may increase/
decrease);

the default options of a particular variable

(e.g., attributes of the option may be altered or it
becompletelyreplaced by a different option);

~ay

the con-

straints that define a variable's limits (e.g., the
variable's range of values may increase in latitude or
become more restrictive; in the extreme, the variable may
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be replaced by a constant term);

and the horizontal or

vertical structures of the schema (e.g., a schema may
change by acquiring a more hierarchical structure or more
levels of abstraction, or subcategories may be added or
dropped at any specific level of abstraction) .
Three theoretical models have been proposed to explicate the process of schema change:
sion, and subtype models.

the bookkeeping, conver-

The first two were originally

formulated by Rothbart (1981) to explain stereotype change;
however, they also provide a useful account of change in
other types of social schemas.

The third model, which is

equally useful and also discussed in the context of stereotype change, was offered by Taylor (1981).
The bookkeeping model suggests that people implicitly
monitor and compare the number or relative proportion of
schema consistent and inconsistent instances.

Change

results when the balance is gradually tipped in favor of
disconfirming events (i.e., those that deviate systematically from the schema).

In this view, schema revision is an

incremental process of piece-meal adjustments or "finetuning" in response to each new piece of pertinent information (See also Rumelhart & Norman, 1978).

The conversion

model proposes that schema change occurs in all-or-none
fashion, and is produced by a few critical and highly
salient disconfirming instances.

That is, information

which strongly contradicts the schema elicits sudden and
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dramatic changes in the schema.

The third model, called

subtyping, involves the development of separate lowerlevel categories.

According to this approach, schema

change can be described as a means toward specification in
which encompassing or overarching concepts become more
differentiated.

Disconfirming instances, which cannot be

easily assimilated into the larger schema are regarded as
unrepresentative of the overall grouping.

New subcategor-

ies emerge to portray these members, who may still possess
the defining features of the schema, but who are also
characterized by a set of contradictory attributes which
distinguish the subcategory from other schema constituents.
Weber and Crocker (in press) performed a series of
experiments comparing the three models.

In their studies,

subjects were presented with information about two stereotypic groups (librarians and lawyers).

Individuals in the

groups were described by three behaviors, one-third of
which were incongruent with the schema.

In some conditions,

the inconsistent information was dispersed so that each
individual performed one inconsistent behavior, in other
conditions the inconsistent information was concentrated
among a few individuals such that .one-third of the indlviduals completely disconfirmed the schema and two-thirds
completely confirmed it.

Results generally supported the

subtyping model of change when incongruent behaviors
described only a few members of the group, whereas the
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bookkeeping model of change explained the findings when
many members of the group were described by incongruent
behaviors.
The Expert and Novice:

Differences in Schema Content and

Use
The mechanisms of schema change imply that repeated
exposure to the various instances of a stimulus domain lead
to the development and modification of the cognitive structures that depict them.

Whether change occurs through

assimilation or accommodation, or whether one accounts for
change by bookkeeping, conversion, or subtyping, the basic
and underlying factor in schema revision appears to be the
perceiver's experience.

For example, in the bookkeeping

model, schema alteration hinges upon the accumulation of
disconfirming evidence;

similarly, the subtyping approach

presumes contact with different members of a category.

Both

processes involve making a schema more elaborate and differentiated through encounters with a growing number of
schematic instances.

Hence, one would expect that experts,

who by definition have amassed considerable experience with
a given object or activity, would possess' a more extensive
schematic representation of the phenomenon.
Indeed, a wealth of empirical evidence collected in
a number of diverse domains such as chess (e.g., Chase,
1978;

Simon, 1973b), bridge (e.g., Engle & Bukstel,

1978), go (e.g., Reitman, 1976), computer programming
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(e.g., Adelson, 1981), physics (e.g., Simon & Simon, 1980),
algebra (e.g., Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979), politics
(e.g., Fiske & Kinder, 1981), and social cognition (e.g.,
Markus & Smith, 1981) consistently reveals that the knowledge structures (i.e., schemas) of experts and novices
differ in both declarative knowledge (descriptions of
attributes) and procedural knowledge (rules or strategies
for the use of that knowledge).

Experts' knowledge struc-

tures are vaster, more organized, and more interconnected
than the structures of novices.

Also, experts use their

schemas more effectively and efficiently in comprehending
information and in solving problems (Fiske & Dyer, 1982).
Perceptual Domains.

A reviewofthe visual-spatial

skills literature demonstrates the superior capacity
of experts to encode and retrieve perceptual patterns
including chess board configurations, bridge hands,
and computer programs.

Pioneering work on perception

in chess was done by deGroot and his colleagues (deGroot,
1965, 1966; Jongman, 1968).

The basic procedure util-

ized in their studies was to present subjects with a
chess position and ask them to ascertain the best move
while they were thinking aloud about their strategy.
In his attempt to identify aspects of chess skill that
differentiated master from weaker players, deGroot
(1965) was unable to find any gross dissimilarities in
thought processes between the two groups (e.g., search
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heuristics and depth of search) .

Contrary to a widely

accepted misconception, master players typically explored
a smaller number of possible moves than less accomplished
players;

however, theywere adept at selecting the "right"

moves quickly, whereas weaker players spent inordinate time
analyzing the consequences of "bad" moves.

In addition,

deGroot (1965) reported an intriguing difference between
masters and novices.

Master players showed an ability to

reconstruct chess positions after viewing the board for
very brief intervals (5 to 10 seconds).

This result could

not be accounted for by the superior visual short-term
memory capacity of the expert because, when random patterns
of chess pieces were placed on the board, recall was equally
poor for master and weaker players.

The finding suggested

that chess masters retain a store of meaningful constellations of pieces or familiar board patterns that are structured and labeled in memory and therefore readily retrieved
during recall.
A series of experiments by Chase and Simon (1973a,
1973b) involving memory and perception, isolated and defined the chunks into which chess information was coded
by experts and novices.

Pauses in recall were adopted by

Chase and Simon (1973a) as indicators of the boundaries of
the chunks.

They utilized two techniques in their study:

a perception task requiring players to reconstruct a
position while it remained in full view behind a partition,

60
and a memory task, similar to deGroot's (1965) task, requiring players to remember a position after a short exposure.
Results revealed that skilled players grouped chess pieces
into highly stereotyped-chunks or patterns.

These patterns

consisted of circumscribed clusters of pieces in very localized regions of the chess board.

The pieces within in a

pattern were organized on the basis of both the visual
(color, proximity) and functional (attack, defense) features of chess play.

Further, masters exhibited superior

recall of board positions, demonstrated an ability to perceive familiar patterns more quickly, retained more information in memory, and retrieved successive chunks of information from long-term memory significantly faster and in
larger patterns compared to less experienced players.
Chase and Simon (1973b) concluded that skilled chess
performance can be explained by the master's large cognitive repertoire of hierarchically organized chess board
patterns (i.e., schemas) that are constructed through hours
of practice and stored in long-term memory.

Thus, it is

the contents of the expert's mental representations of the
game, not the components of his/her thought strategies
while the game is being played that is critical in determining the quality of outcome.

It seems clear that chess

expertise resides in the rapid "perceptual" recognition
processes that tap the master's long-term knowledge base.
The findings of Chase and Simon (1973a, 1973b) have been
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replicated in a number of other studies (Charness, 1976;
Chi, 1978; Ellis, 1973; Frey & Adesman, 1976; Goldin, 1978,
1979; Lane & Robertson, 1979) .
Engle and Bukstel (1978) studied mnemonic and perceptual ability among bridge players of differing levels of
expertise (expert, life master, average player, and novice).
The findings of four tournament-simulation tasks essentially
confirmed the results of the chess experiments.

Subjects

with more experience were able to recall and reconstruct
meaningful hands with greater accuracy and deftness than
those with less experience in the game;

performance with

unstructured stimuli showed little difference across level
of expertise.

Moreover, bridge experts displayed superior

memory for hands they had played, and were able to plan
hands and generate bids faster and more accurately.

It was

argued that accomplished bridge players with "supranormal"
memory are able to utilize their prior experience to configure and chunk information in more efficient ways than
players of less expertise.

Similarly, Charness (1979)

reported that bridge expertise, like chess, also depends
upon long-term knowledge and fast-access pattern recognition which are associated with winning strategies and
correct lines of play.

Finally, Eisenstadt and Kareev

(1975) and Reitman (1976) studied master and beginner
players of the oriental games of go and gomuku and found
that, once again, experts had superior memory for meaningful
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game board patterns.
A more recent study examined how expert and novice
computer programmers represent and use programming concepts
(Adelson, 1981).

Subjects were presented with 16 lines of

computer statements that could be organized in accordance
with procedure (i.e., the 16 lines could form three distinct
programs) or by syntax (i.e., each of the lines could be
grouped into one of five categories).
that:

Findings suggested

(a) the chunk size recalled by experts was larger

than that of novices, resulting in more lines being recalled
by the former;

(b) there was greater similarity of recall

order among the experts than among the novices;

and (c)

novices utilized a syntax-based organization, whereas the
experts employed a more hierarchical organization based on
procedural principles.

In short, the computer experts

showed greater memory capacity for the task, performed more
rapidly, and retained knowledge in more abstract categories
than novices.

In a similar investigation, McKeithen, Reit-

man, Rueter, & Hirtle (1981) compared the knowledge structures of beginner, intermediate, and expert computer programmers, and reported that increases in the level of
expertise were accompanied by changes in recall performance
and knowledge organization.

Experts correctly recalled a

greater number of meaningful program lines than did intermediates, who performed better than beginners.

Differences

in the organization of the recalled material were also
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uncovered:

beginning programmers' organizations were

grounded in a rich variety of common-language associations
to programming concepts;

intermediate programmers mani-

fested mixtures of proqramming and common-language associations;

experts evinced highly similar organizations

based clearly on programming knowledge (cf., Egan &
Schwartz, 1979, in a study of electronic technicians).
Problem-solving and non-perceptual domains.

The

ability to solve physics problems has also been explored
with regard to level of expertise.

Simon and Simon (1978)

studied the performance of an expert and a novice subject
on a kinematic problem by comparing their verbal protocols under think aloud instructions.

Examination of the

protocols indicated differences in problem-solving strategies and facility.

The expert applied what Simon and

Simon (1978) referred to as "physical intuition"

(the capac-

ity of the expert physicist to rapidly solve problems without a great deal of conscious deliberation, analogous to
the nonanalytic nature of the chess master's perceptual
ability to select appropriate moves);

that is, he initially

translated the English prose of the problem statements into
physical representations, then used those

representa~ions

to select and instantiate the proper equations.

In other

words, the expert subject accessed a schema that contained
the essential elements of the problem as well as the formulas and steps corresponding to its satisfactory solution.
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By doing so, the expert appeared to proceed more systematically and efficiently enroute to the solution, and completed the problem in less than one-quarter of the time,
while making fewer errors (cf., Larkin, McDermott, Simon,

& Simon, 1980).
Using a categorization task, Chi and Glaser (1979)
demonstrated that expert physicists rapidly classified
physics problems according to underlying central principles
(e.g., Newton's second law), whereas novices grouped problems on the basis of the physical entities contained in
the problem (e.g., an incline plane problem).

The ability to

categorize problems quickly (45 seconds per problem, including reading time) suggests the existence of problem-type
schemas.

Once a relevant schema has been activated in

response to the cues in the problem statements, the expert
physicist can proceed to systematically work top-down within
the invoked schema to search for the correct procedure in
solving the particular problem (see Chi, Feltovich, &
Glaser, 1979 for a fuller description of the expert physicist's schematic processing of physics problems).
Comparable findings were reported in studies of experts' comprehension and solution of algebra word problems
(Hinsley, Hayes, & Simon, 1977).

Results indicated that

experts organized their knowledge of algebra problems in a
number of categories (e.g., a triangle schema, a distancerate schema, a scale conversion schema) which contained
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special heuristics used in formulating problems, selecting
useful algebraic equations and diagrams, and making judgments about the relative importance of presented problem
information.

Hence, subject's schematic representations of

the algebra problems directed what aspects of the problems
they attended to, what information they expected and regarded as central to the problems, and what types of processing
strategies they adopted in solving the problems.
The notion of relative expertise has been applied in
testing the effects of involvement on political cognition.
Research has shown that subjects at a high level of political
sophistication possess schemas about governments that are
more complicated and elaborate than those presented by
subjects with little or no experience in the political
arena (Fiske & Kinder, 1981).

Variations in political

involvement also were correlated with different strategies
for processing information.

For example, in a study by

Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (in press) political novices and
experts read a description of a previously unknown third
world country under the expectation (prior schema set) that
it was communist, democratic, or unspecified.
Results indicated that political novices relied ·
heavily on consensual schemas in making judgments about the
country, organized information mechanically (i.e., by consistency), and made strong schema-relevant inferences.

In

contrast, political experts focused on the complexities and
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ambiguities of the description;

experts tempered their

inferences in response to salient schema-based inconsistencies in the material.

Correlational data revealed that

for experts, but not for novices, the moderation of inferences was mediated by their organization of recall in terms
of inconsistency.

Expert/novice differences in schema use

suggest that more cognitively involved persons can be more
sensitive to the complexities of presented information.
Experts in the Fiske, Kinder, and Larter (in press) study
appeared to be highly cognizant of the actual data they
encountered.

In dealing with new information, the expert

has a compact prior knowledge structure containing congruent
information that can be utilized efficiently with minimum
strain on his/her processing capacity.

Thus, there is

enough capacity remaining to effectively process incongruent information.
The differential use of high-level knowledge structures or schemas among experienced and non-experienced
persons has also been found in the domain of baseball.
Chiesi, Spilich, and Voss (1979) reported differences between experts and novices in the recall of baseball events.
Although high-and-low baseball knowledge individuals

·

recalled an equivalent number of isolated sentences of
domain-relevant information, experts performed better than
nonexperts in the recall of event sequences.

This differ-

ence was attributed to the experts' ability to relate the
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events to the game's hierarchical goal structure of winning, scoring runs, and advancing runners.
Finally, in the area of social cognition, the work of
Markus and her associates (Markus, 1977; Markus, Crane,
Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Markus, Crane, & Siladi, 1978;
Markus, Sentis, & Hamill, 1979) has demonstrated that the
existence of self-schemata (i.e., experience-based individual differences in self-knowledge) influences the processing of information about the self with respect to personality traits, sex-roles, physical appearance, and
creativity.

In brief, these studies revealed that persons

with self-schemata in a particular domain when compared to
aschematics (individuals who were sans schemata in the
domain) were able to readily:

(a) evaluate new information

with respect to its relevance to the domain;

(b) process

information about the self in the given domain (e.g., make
judgments and decisions);
in these areas;

(c) retrieve behavioral evidence

(d) predict future behavior in the domain;

and (e) resist information that is contrary to the prevailing schema.
Summary.

Research examining differences between

experts and novices in schematic content and proces- sing clearly suggests that the schemas of experts are
better formulated, more detailed, and complex, and
contain a tightly organized network of information
that is built from practice and/or
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experience within a specific domain.

It is likely that

experts' schemas contain more concepts, larger chunks of
knowledge, and more linkage among the concepts.

These

differences in the structure of experts' schemas are related
to differences in strategies for the use of schematic content.

Experts group and reduce incoming information in a

manner that allows for rapid and efficient retrieval by
relating the information to a long-term knowledge base.
Instead of perceiving and remembering individual pieces of
information, they process meaningful chunks of information,
making their perception more efficient and their recall
performance much higher.

Further, their superior ability

to solve problems is a function of schema-based heuristics
and sophisticated abstract categorization strategies.

In

comparison to novices, experts are less diverted by superficial characteristics, and can more easily identify the
fundamental elements of a problem.
A Critical Evaluation of the Schema Concept
The foregoing review of the extant literature reveals
that a considerable portion of the results of current research in human memory and cognition either has been predicted or explained by the schema ·concept.

Schema theory

has prompted investigators to consider a number of issues
concerning the parameters of memory and comprehension, and
has provided a powerful framework in which to interpret a
collection of findings emerging from different areas of
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psychology (e.g., perception, memory, social, cognitive).
In short, the notion of a cognitive schema truly revitalized theory and experimentation regarding how knowledge is
structured and information is processed.
Schema theory proposes that perception, understanding,
and memory are a joint product of the interaction of new
information with stored knowledge.

The basic assumption of

the theory is that an individual's prior experience, expectations, and goals will influence how he/she encodes, stores,
and remembers incoming data.

Hence, the existence of schemas

is predicated upon the operation of five fundamental underlying processes:

(a) selection (schemas direct the encoding

of information, i.e., what is stored in memory is a highly
selected subset of what is encountered in reality, only
information that is relevant to a presently activated schema
will be encoded);

(b) abstraction (memory is not a verbatim

record, rather, the central aspects or core meaning of a
stimulus are given priority during encoding while the nonessential features of the stimulus are lost);

(c) integra-

tion (incoming information is combined with previously
acquired schema-based information which is invoked during
the encoding episode);

(d) interpretation (schemas guide

any inferences that are made about missing information;
they also elaborate and distort information in a schemaconsistent direction;

and (e) reconstruction (memories

are reproduced or recreated by combining the accessible
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details of a stimulus representation with domain-related
prior knowledge) •
Empirical evidence which clearly supported the existence of these five processes would argue strongly for a
schematic model of memory.

Nevertheless, even if one were

to accept the actuality of such findings, one could still
insist that ultimately the cognitive approach upon which
schema theory is grounded, must be integrated with--even
superceded by--a physiological one.

That is, if schemas

are ever to become a "proven" (i.e., reified) component of
memory/cognition, they will eventually have to be understood in terms of additional levels of analyses.

Identify-

ing the neurological localization and arrangement of schemas
(i.e., discovering their embodiment in the anatomy of the
brain) would certainly elucidate many of the unanswered
questions researchers have relating to cognitive structures
and mechanisms.
Despite an impressive array of results that is consistent with the schema model and its predictions, the best
one may conclude is that traditional theories of cognition
and memory fail to fully explicate experimental findings.
Essentially, none of the research·has incontrovertibly
established schemas as the foundational structures of processing or storage.

Until recently it has merely generated

results that cannot be adequately explained by common sense
analyses or alternate perspectives (e.g., simple
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associationist models or purely perceptual theories)
son, 1980; Smith, 1980).

(Ander-

However, a timely review of the

literature by Alba and Hasher (1983) suggests that different
theoretical models and available empirical evidence may
account for or refute findings previously interpreted in a
schematic framework.

They report a series of studies which

indicates that the recall of complex stimuli is not dependent upon or closely tied to the activation of prior knowledge, and that memory for complex stimuli is far richer
and detailed than schematic processing would allow.
In their review, Alba and Hasher (1983) also proffered
a recently developed model of memory which they advanced as
an alternative to schema theory.

The model, forurnlated by

Johnson and Raye (1981), posits that information retained in
memory consists of both exogenous (derived from the perceptual episode) and endogenous (created by reasoning, imagination, and thought) traces.

The process through which an

individual differentiates between the two types is called
reality monitoring.

Each trace consists of a number of

attributes (e.g., spatial, contextual, sensory, semantic)
that define typical classes of internally--and externally-generated memories.

The comparative amount of these attri-

butes serves as the basis for distinguishing memory traces.
When a trace is retrieved, the information that identifies
its source (person-produced or stimulus-produced) is used
to determine whether the trace was part of the original
stimulus.

Generally, the distinction between internally--
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and externally--derived traces is clear.

However, on some

occasions, differences may be ambiguous, or the criteria!
discriminative attribute information may become inaccessible.

In either situation, a person would be unable to

correctly ascertain the trace's source-of-origin (i.e.,
he/she would confuse internally generated memory traces
with traces resulting from the encoding of the external
stimulus array).

The reality monitoring model is able to

explain a variety of mnemonic errors which are predicted by
schema theory, including:

reconstructive errors, inference

errors, and false recognition errors.
Conceptual clarity.

The schema concept and its

attendant research may also be attacked on substantive and
methodological grounds.

For example, attempts to formulate

general schema theories of memory are plagued by a number
of shortcomings.

Although the schema model is quite sue-

cessful as a descriptive theory--for example, it provides
both a vocabulary and conceptual framework for the representation of knowledge (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980)--it is
surrounded by fuzzy conceptual boundaries.

Definitions

•

of the concept and its variants (prototypes, frames,
scripts) are often so vague that it is not clear what, if
anything, they exclude (Martin, 1982).

Their usage by

theoreticians and experimenters is highly individualistic,
and has thus precluded the establishment of a common core
of basic meaning that permits a differentiation of both
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related and incompatible conceptions (see Taylor & Crocker,
1981).

Consequently, schema research suffers from a lack

of consensual operationalization (i.e., the link between
the conceptual definition of schemas and their operational
specification is tenuous (Fiske & Linville, 1980).
Testability.

The second area of theoretical weakness

in the schema model is its lack of specification of detailed
processes for manipulating and instantiating schemata:

How

can an experimenter be certain that a schema is truly being
activated, and if so, whether it i's the schema of interest?
It has not been determined what schemas will be evoked or
precisely how they are evoked.

Similarly, little is current-

ly known about the mechanisms that direct the application of
particular schemas in particular situations:

Is schema

activation controlled by cues that are predominant in the
stimulus configuration or by the schema's availability in
the mind of the perceiver, or both?

In addition, research-

ers have yet to identify the schematic mechanisms that
affect variables such as recall and reaction time, and to
define the elements or limits of schematic functioning:
Are different dependent measures mediated by the same or
independent schematic processes?

'What are subjects doing

when they are not reasoning schematically?

What happens

in memory when a schema is invoked repeatedly?

Does repe-

titious use of a schema facilitate or interfere with its
effectiveness as a memory organizer?

Finally, a major
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deficit of schema theory is the absence of a clear articulation of how schemas develop and change:

What is the pre-

cise nature of the processes through which schemas are
abstracted from

reality~?

How does experience result in

greater schema complexity?
Predictability.

The lack of a coherent theoretical

analysis of schematic processing has rendered the schema
concept

untestable and unfalsefiable.

The current state

of "schema theory" provides the basis for nothing more than
demonstration studies rather than the more sophisticated
approach of competitive model testing.

The schema concept

is presently loose enough to incorporate contradictory
hypothesis and patterns of empirical evidence.

Also, re-

searchers are guilty of glibly offering explanations of
results without a priori or firmly grounded theoretical
predictions, and of constructing elaborate cognitive frameworks that can account for any finding.

Thus, although the

schema model does entail some structural and process
assumptions, it is so vaguely specified that it is able
to explain post hoc virtually any set of available data.
Whereas many results are consistent with the notion of
schema-based processing, it is difficult to unearth any
findings that are inconsistent with it (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980; Fiske & Linville, 1980).

In short, the absence

of formal constraints on schema theory leads to an absence
of systematic operating assumptions across empirical
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investigations, thereby building in an ability to remain
impervious to disconfirmation and an inability to yield
precise predictability in studies.
For example, schema theory posits, and investigators
have found that schema-consistent material is better recalled than schema-inconsistent material (e.g., Cohen, 1977;
Hamilton et al., 1980; Rothbart et al., 1979; Synder &
Cantor, 1979; Synder & Uranowitz, 1978).

Inasmuch as

schemas guide the search for information, stimuli that constitute a good match to a schema are more likely to be
encoded than schema-incongruent stimuli.

Moreover, if the

incongruent material is encoded, it will probably be more
difficult to retrieve than schema-consistent material
because of the purported role of schemas in the organization of information and in memory search at recall.

Ob-

versely, schema theory and research also predicts and
supports the hypothesis that inconsistent information will
be more salient and memorable due to its distinctiveness
vis-a-vis the schema (e.g., Hamilton & Gilford, 1976;
Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Hastie & Mazur, 1978; Srull, 1981).
Such information requires additional cognitive work to be
incorporated into the schema, and is therefore said to be
deeply processed and available for recall (Hastie, 1981).
Similarly, contradictory predictions exist regarding
the issue of whether schematic processing is more or less
rapid than aschematic processing.

It is argued that
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schematic processing will be faster because of the well
organized and more easily accessible content of a schema
(Markus, 1977);

alternately, it is suggested that schematic

processing is slower

b~cause

both the input and data base

(i.e., schema) that has been evoked must be processed
(e.g., Rogers, Kuper, & Kirker, 1977).

In light of these

inconsistent predictions and results, investigators must be
called upon to identify the varying conditions under which
"conflicting" findings are to be expected.

More specifical-

ly, it appears that interactions may be operating to produce
seemingly contradictory evidence.

However, researchers

have done little to specify the nature of these possible
interactions.

This would necessitate a delineation of

both the factors involved and the pattern of anticipated
outcomes.
The failure of schema theory to satisfy the criteria
of testability and prediction seems to be due principally
to a lack of theoretical development in two areas which
suggest directions for future research:

(a) a specifica-

tion of the domains of knowledge for which schemas exist
and are used, and (b) an elucidation of the complex cognitive processes that operate on

an~

utilize the

schema~

(i.e., a precise description of how schemas are activated
and used during the comprehension, storage, and retrieval
of information [Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980; Fiske & Linville, 1980]).
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Constraining the number and types of schemas involves
an explication of the conditions under which they are developed and discriminated.

It is currently unclear how

minute in specificity schemas can be.

For example, it is

assumed that persons have a schema for "going to a restaurant" (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Bower et al., 1979).

Do

individuals also possess schemas for "attending a play" or
"buying a pretzel on the street corner in New York City?"
Perhaps as Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) suggest, when a perceiver is faced with a novel situation that does not precisely match any available schema, the situation is comprehended through the process of schema generalization in which
the variable constraints of an available schema are modified to provide a representation of the newly encountered
stimulus.

Basically, instead of creating an entirely new

schema to interpret every novel input, an existing, higherlevel schema which appears relevant to the input is invoked
and modified to fit the data.

More theorizing and research

is clearly needed to explicate this process (i.e., to
explain when and how schema generalization occurs).
The second area of limited theoretical development
is in the specification of detailed mechanisms for manipulating and instantiating schemas.

If veritably thousands

of schemas reside in memory, then it is plausible that
many of them may be applicable in comprehending and encoding events in a particular situation (cf., Anderson &
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Pichert, 1978; Baker, 1978; Thorndyke, 1979).

As previous-

ly discussed, the question of schema selection has been
addressed by positing the so-called executive function.
However, elaborations of this function and investigations
designed to infer its existence and operation have been
conspicuously absent from recent models of schematic
processing.
In sum, until schema theory is formulated in a falsifiable form, its validity will remain in question.

What is

required is the development of an overall cognitive or general process model that generates precise and testable predictions concerning the effect of schemata on the components
of information processing.

More theoretical and empirical

attention should be given to the specification of criteria
for identifying a "package of facts" in long-term memory
as a schema.

Such an analysis will undoubtedly serve to

make schema-related propositions more researchable.

By

itself, the schema concept is much less useful than when
it is embedded in a well-specified theory of process.
The notion of a schematic representation per se yields
ambiguous or contradictory hypotheses concerning schematic
functioning.

However, when it is. nested in a larger cog-

nitive framework, it provides fertile ground for the construction and testing of predictive theories about the
organization and functioning of human judgment and memory.
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The Use of Schemas in Diagnosis and Prediction
Despite the limitations discussed above, the schema
construct still has great value for the current studies in
that it provides a structural mechanism which represents
prior experience and creates high-level units that are
evoked by experts during assessment and decision-making.
A number of studies that are directly relevant to the present research indicate that schemas are a useful theoretical tool for investigations of how experts place people
into diagnostic categories and how they make predictions
about future behavior.

For example, Cantor et al.

(1980)

proposed that psychiatrists classify patients by sorting
them into "fuzzy categories" on the basis of their resemblance to the exemplar of the category.

In order to test

this hypothesis, trained psychiatrists were presented with
actual, unedited case histories of psychotics and were
asked to make a diagnosis for each of the patients.

They

found that psychiatrists were highly reliable, confident,
and accurate in their diagnosis of patients who shared
many features in common with the prototype (i.e., the most
typical or representative number of a group) for a diagnostic category.

The psychiatrists were considerably less

reliable, confident, and accurate in their judgments
about non-prototypical patients.
evidence, Cantor et al.

On the basis of this

(1980) argued that the schema

approach best captures the way clinicians think about and
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use diagnostic groupings.
Research by Carroll and his associates provides some
evidence supporting the activation and use of schemas among
expert parole

decision~makers.

In a pilot study by Carroll

and Wiener (1982) parole board members were asked to construct cases on the basis of 16 critical variables (e.g.,
criminal record, current offense, prison sentence, alcohol/
drug abuse, employment history).

Details pertaining to each

of the variables were written as prose statements using the
narrative style of actual parole cases and placed onto
small cards which were organized in separate piles according to information categories.

Subjects were instructed to

create a description of realistic inmates using the 16
information categories.
emerged:
robber,

Five discernible schema types

(a) the impulsive auto thief,
(c) the drug dealer,

(b) the armed

(d) the passion murderer, and

(e) the fraudulent credit card user.
In a related study, Carroll, Galegher, and Wiener
(1982) analyzed parole board members' judgments of the
causes of crime in a sample of over 200 parole interviews.
Results demonstrated that experts' assessments of the
etiology of crime were organized according to categories
that contained hypotheses about criminal involvement, and
recommendations concerning treatment and expected prognosis.

Five causal categorizations and their constituent

subgroupings were found:

(a) person (lack of control,
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easily influenced, immature, mental problems, acting
"smart," poor attitude, aggressive),

(b) money (monetary

gain, get money, family needs, no job),

(c) drugs,

(d)

alcohol, and (e) environment (victim precipitated, influence of associates, domestic problems, environment).

This

schematic classification of cases was significantly related
to release recommendations, prognosis for supervision, and
assessments of the risk of future crime.

Similar to clin-

icians who diagnose patients by placing them into "fuzzy
categories" (Cantor et al., 1980), parole decision makers
seem to identify criminals as "types."

These types not

only appear to contain information that is central to the
decision to grant parole, but they also comprise information describing different patterns of criminal and social
behavior, causes for this behavior, and treatments to remedy
these causes (Carroll et al., 1982).
Converging on the findings of Carroll et al.

(1982)

are results indicating the existence of schemas among
probation officers.

In a series of interviews aimed at

explicating officers' evaluations of offenders for risk
classification and treatment, Lurigio (1981) reported that
probation officers described

sue~

factors as drug use,

unemployment, influence of associates, absence of family
ties, and immaturity as causes of criminals' failure to
satisfactorily complete probation.

For example, the

"drug offender" was offered as a type of probationer who
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is highly unlikely to finish his/her sentence.

The "drug

offender" category included information (suppositions) about
the probationer's potential for future criminal behavior,
his/her interpersonal relationships, the kinds of crimes
likely to be on the record, reasons why the offender has
committed crimes, explanations regarding the individual's
preoccupation with drugs, and a prognosis for rehabilitation.
Summary
In summary, notwithstanding a number of conceptual,
theoretical, and empirical deficiencies, the schema construct has been usefully applied as a descriptive and explanatory mechanism across a wide range of psychological
research (perceptual, cognitive, social).

A schema is

defined as a hierarchically organized, abstract cognitive
structure that represents an individual's accumulated
knowledge, beliefs, and expectations regarding a defined
stimulus domain (person, object, or event) .

Schemas

specify the central features and relevant attributes (i.e.,
variables) comprising a phenomenon and the interrelations
among those attributes.

In addition, they lend meaning

to experience, guide the encoding, storage, and retrieval
of information, and allow a perceiver to make inferences
about data that aremissing from a stimulus configuration.
The evocation of any schema in a specific situation is
controlled by the executive function, and is determined
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by that schema's relative accessibility.
Although schematic processing can be advantageous to
a perceiver, it may also result in information loss as well
as a number of perceptual, interpretative, and judgmental
errors.

However, a schema that is sensitive to the features

of incoming stimuli (i.e., one that changes or adapts in
response to incoming stimuli) is less likely to lead to
error.

Essentially, schema change occurs through the pro-

cesses of assimilation and accommodation.

In the former,

schemas incorporate information by adding details to an
existing base of knowledge;

whereas, in the latter, the

actual structure of a schema is modified to account for
inconsistent data.

Both processes are influenced by the

type and degree of experiences a person has in a given area
of knowledge.

Hence, perceivers vary in the extent to which

they have well-developed schemas for particular stimulus
domains.

For example, the schemas of experts are generally

more detailed, organized, and complex than those of nonexperts.

Consequently, experts are better able to invoke and

use schemas to remember information and solve problems in
a variety of tasks.

Further, it has been demonstrated

that the schemas of experts have a significant impact upon
the manner in which they make assessments and predictions
about others.

The work of this dissertation explores

whether probation officers qua "experts" in the criminal
justic system organize their knowledge of offenders into
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schematic groupings, and if so, how these schemas affect
the judgments of criminal cases.

CHAPTER III
METHODS
Overview
The present investigations were designed to examine
the nature of offender schemas among probation officers and
to assess how these schemas influence the judgment of crim·inal cases.

The first study explored the existence and

content of schemas through interviews with officers concerning the composition of their caseloads.

Officers with

different assignments (Criminal and Municipal) and levels of
experience (expert and novice) were compared on schema detail
and number.

The purposes of the second investigation were

to validate the findings of Study 1 and to uncover any
additional schemas of probationers.

In this study, officers

and clerical personnel were asked to sort index cards--each
of which contained one piece of information from one of
seven different information categories (e.g., crime type,
demographics, prior record).

The information categories

portrayed eight of the schematic cases that emerged from
the initial investigation.

Subjects arranged the cards on

an information board in order to recreate the eight

c~ses.

It was predicted that officers would be able to accurately
complete the task, whereas nonofficers would fail to reproduce the schema types of Study 1.
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As in the first study,
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comparisons were made between expert-novice and criminalmunicipal officers.

The third study tested the effect of

schematic cases on information processing.

Subjects were

presented with schematic and nonschematic cases and were
instructed to judge the cases on a number of dimensions
(e.g., report behavior, propensity for future criminal
activity) .

It was hypothesized that schematic cases would

be judged faster, and with greater confidence and ease when
compared to nonschematic cases.
Study 1
The first investigation was essentially a pilot study
to clarify probation officers' schemas of criminal offenders.
The primary purpose of the research was fourfold:

(a) to

provide evidence concerning the existence of schemas and
their contents;

(b) to suggest how officers may utilize

schemas in making supervisory and treatment decisions about
probationers;

(c) to explore intergroup differences in

schema availability, content, richness, and use (Of paramount interest was the comparison between expert and nonexpert officers); and (d) to collect data that could be used
in the construction of materials for subsequent studies.
Participants
Forty probation officers of the Cook County Adult
Probation Department of Illinois served as respondents in
the study.

Officers were selected on the basis of their
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schedule availability and willingness to cooperate in the
research.

The sample was divided into equal proportions

according to their sex, race (White, Black, Hispanic), and
experience.

Experience·was dichotomized by a median split

of the number of years employed as a probation officer in
the respondent sample.

Those with less than three years

of duty were defined as "novices" and those with three
years or more were considered "experienced."

The mean age

of the participants was 30, with a range of 23 to 39.
Additionally, the sample consisted of an equal number
of criminal and municipal division officers.

Each division

grouping was composed of an equivalent proportion of
experts and novices.

The criminal-municipal distinction

is one of geographic location, caseload composition, and
officers' court activities.

Basically, municipal officers

supervise offenders who have committed crimes in the surrounding suburbs of Chicago.

Their cases, which are

assigned to them according to the geographic residence of
probationers, characteristically comprise first-time misdemeanants, white-collar criminals, petty thieves, and shoplifters.

In contrast, criminal division officers receive

cases on the basis of permanent courtroom assignments;
Criminal caseloads are more likely to contain felons, hardcore inner city criminals, recidivists, gang affiliates, and
members of minority groups.

Unlike municipal officers,

criminal division probation officers generally follow a
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case from its inception to its termination and are individually responsible for the full range of courtroom functions.
Procedure
The method of inquiry consisted of a semistructured
interview organized around standard questions but individualized by the interviewer to each participant.

Subjects

were informed that the investigation was an exploration of
the kinds of categories or groupings officers utilize in
differentiating among their cases.

It was made explicit

that the study focused on officers' subjective assessments
or perceptions of probationers as opposed to any systematic
strategies they may employ in classifying their cases for
supervision.

Respondents were then presented with a short

description of how stereotypes and preconceived notions of
persons can affect an individual's impressions and judgments
of others.

Two examples of probationer "types" suggested

by an earlier study (i.e., the drug offender and the high
risk probationer) were offered as illustrations (see Lurigio,
1981).

The schema concept and its relevance to the present

research were also briefly explained.

Finally, participants

were asked to discuss the various groupings (schemas) of
probationers that characterize their caseloads.

Fiske,

Kinder, and Larter (1979) have successfully used such a
procedure to elicit consensual schemas by asking subjects
to name various types of political systems and to provide a
distinctive set of attributes for each.

It should be noted
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that a concerted effort was made to uncover schemas via a
systematic and unbiased process.

Throughout the interview,

officers were assured of the anonymity of their responses
and were reminded to answer all questions with candor and
thoroughness.

All interview protocols were recorded as field

notes.
Interview topic areas.

Topic areas were developed

from a conceptual analysis of probation officers' tasks.

It

seemed reasonable to expect that if probation officers
actually possessed schematic categorizations of offenders,
these would contain information drawn from the contents of
case files, the nature of officers' duties as well as their
immediate objectives and ultimate goals as agents of the
Court.

For each schema mentioned, five topic areas or con-

tent domains were tapped:
report demeanor,

(a) criteria! attributes,

(c) supervision/treatment,

of crime causality, and (e) prognosis.

(b)

(d) attributions

Table 1 provides

sample questions for the five content domains.
Schema definitions.

A set of criteria was established

to assess whether a given depiction of an offender type was
an exemplification of "true" schema evocation.

First, a

schema was defined as an abstract .cognitive representation
of a probationer which was reported with a degree of detail,
specificity, and meaningfulness roughly corresponding to
Rosch's (1977) basic level of categorization.

Descriptions

that were obviously applicable to a single or small number of
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Table 1
Interview Content Domains and Sample Questions
Content Domain

Questions

1. Criteria! Attributes

What are the basic or core
elements of the schema type?
What traits differentiate the
schema type from other categories which are closely related?

2. Report Demeanor

Is the offender regular in his
reporting? On report days, is
the probationer respectful,
discourteous, cooperative, etc.?

3. Supervision

How often is the offender type
required to report? What kinds
of extra-departmental services
are recommended in the treatment
of the probationer?

4. Attributions

Why do you think this particular
type of probationer became
involved in criminal activity?
Is the cause of criminal
behavior temporary or permanent?

5. Prognosis3

Is the offender likely to become
involved in future criminal
activity? What's the probability the probationer will violate
the conditions of his/her
sentence?

3Attributions are inferences regarding the causes of
events or the properties of people or things that have
causal efficacy. Attribution theory is concerned with the
efforts of individuals to acquire a knowledge of the characteristics, intentions, or internal states of others from
their overt responses. A person making an attribution asks
such questions, "Who is responsible?," "How responsible is
he?," "What is it about the person that impelled him to act
this way?."
Weiner's (1974) model of attributions in achievement
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Table 1 (continued)
settings may be applied toward understanding attributions
about crime and criminals. Weiner's model posits three
dimensions or aspects upon which attributions vary:
(a)
whether the cause of the event is internal (i.e., something
about the actor) or external (i.e., something about the
actor's environment);
(b) whether the cause is stable and
enduring over time or relatively unstable and transient;
and (c) whether the cause is intended by the actor or relatively unintentional. For each evoked schema type, respondents were asked to speculate upon the etiology of criminal
behavior by arranging the cause or causes on the above
attributional dimensions.

92

criminals were not interpreted as evidence of schematic
processing.

Such examples were likely to reflect unique,

idiosyncratic instances rather than instantiations of a
category.

(These are not to be confused with descriptions

of offenders that were expressly presented as exemplars of
a schema type.)

At the other extreme were elaborations that

embodied a large portion of an officer's caseload.

These

were also discarded because they referred to overly-broad,
nebulous representations of probationers as opposed to discrete subtypes or categories (i.e., in Rosch's terms, the
commonality among elements within the category was minimal) .
Second, a specification of a probationer type was
recorded as a schema if it provided a unified and internally
consistent portrait of an offender (i.e., the depiction was
logically and temporally ordered, and unfolded in a smooth
flowing, story-like fashion).

Further, schematic groupings

were those in which the officer responded clearly and
sufficiently to the set of questions relating to the five
content domains.

If a probation officer was unable to fully

address one or more of the topic areas, his/her data were
dropped from consideration (e.g., a category label that was
offered without additional information or elaboration was
not coded as a schema).

Essentially, probationer schemas

closely resembled realistic case histories of offenders and
can be aptly described as neatly packaged "bundles" of knowledge tied together by a common thread or organizing theme
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(cf., Wyer & Srull, 1980).

In short, loosely constructed,

incongruous or incomplete portrayals were not regarded as
schematic instances.
Third, four respondents discussed typologies that
seemed to be grounded in textbook, theoretical, or actuarial
approaches to the classification of offenders.

These were

also excluded from the analyses inasmuch as they basically
involved the application of empirically derived and objectively scored scales that placed probationers into groups
according to risk assessments and/or treatment recommendations.

(In any event, these categorizations would not have

been recorded because of their lack of general agreement or
consensus.)

In addition, categories that were based upon

Court Judges' directives were not eligible for coding.
Hence, for purposes of the present research, schema types
were restricted to subjective groupings fashioned primarily
from officers' experience with and active supervision of
probationers.
Schema matching and labeling.

Probation officers'

typologies were matched for commonality by comparing their
responses to the content domains of each category elicited.
The initial step in the matching procedure involved ari

4All data coding and analyses were performed by the
investigator.

4
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examination of the 179 schema types mentioned by the participants to ascertain whether there was any consensus on
the criteria! attribute domain.

Common responses were

grouped together and a further inspection of the remaining
topic areas was conducted.

Commonality was determined on

the basis of whether the central elements or gist of
officers' replies to the content domain questions were
consistent.

Schemas were considered equivalent if their

separate descriptions agreed on the criteria! attribute
domain plus at least two of the other four topic areas.
Schema labels were provided by the investigator and are
intended to capture the essential qualities of the offender
categories. 5
Content coding.

A coding scheme was designed to

analyze the contents of the 40 interview protocols.

Par-

ticipants' replies were differentiated and tallied according to units of information.

An information unit was

defined as a single statement or idea (e.g., "This type
of probationer gets into crime because he has some real
psychological problems," "A burglar is different from a

5The labels are considered· important because it is
assumed that type names or "category concepts" play a central role in the encoding, storage, .and retrieval of
schematic information. Future studies could be usefully
directed at ascertaining whether probation officers concur
with these designations and, more generally, at identifying
the type names that officers spontaneously employ to describe criminal offenders.
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thief in his degree of professionalism").

Repetitious

responses conveying the same underlying semantic meaning
were not counted as separate information units.

Each

schema from each subject was scored for the number of
information units it contained.
Study 2
The findings of Study 1 clearly suggested the existence of shared offender schemas.

A shortcoming inherent

in the method, however, was that it relied on the interviewer to be neutral in eliciting and interpreting data (i.e.,
it contained none of the requisite controls for reliability or validity).

For example, the coding of interview

protocols was based heavily on subjective criteria and was
not conducted by a coder who was blind to the hypotheses/
purposes of the research.

Hence, it was possible that

demand characteristics and experimenter effects produced
an apparently meaningful description that may have been
overly biased.

The second study addressed this issue by

employing a card sort paradigm similar to that of Carroll
and Wiener (1982) which provides a more precise and rigorous methodology for detecting schemas.

Study 2

serv~d

primarily to validate the results of Study 1, and secondarily to identify additional schemas of probationers.
Participants
Subjects were 20 officers of the Cook County Adult
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Probation Department.

Participation was voluntary, and

was restricted to individuals who were not respondents in
Study 1.

As in the previous study, officers were divided

into expert and novice groups according to their number of
years employed as a probation officer, and into criminal
and municipal groups on the basis of their assignments.
There were an equal number of experts and novices in both
the criminal and municipal groups.
sample was 32;

The median age of the

65% were male, 50% Caucasian, 40% Black,

and 10% Hispanic.
A non-equivalent control group comprising 20 members
of the Department's clerical personnel was also recruited.
These workers perform a number of duties including filing,
typing, answering telephones, scheduling revocation hearings, and logging in-coming cases.

The performance of

their jobs does not require direct contact with probationers nor are they responsible for supervising and evaluating
cases.

Although the clerical staff obviously has more

knowledge regarding the procedural and legal aspects of
probation than the general population, there is no apparent reason to expect that the group should possess elaborate or organized schemas of offenders--at least not to the
same degree or extent as probation officers.
Materials
A sample of 10 probation officers who had participated in Study 1 were asked to provide one or two actual
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cases that were highly representative of the schema types
they discussed in the interview.

For example, if the

respondent had a schema for burglars, he/she was instructed
to identify one or more cases from his/her caseload that
best exemplified the category.

The files of selected

cases were examined for material such as PSI reports,
criminal histories, record sheets chronicling report
behavior, termination status summaries, and synopses of
offenders' use of resources.
reviewed.

Thirty-six cases were

In general, the information contained in real

cases corresponded to officers' schematic descriptions;
however, in some instances their characterizations of prototypic offenders did not precisely match the details in
actual files. 6

Nevertheless, the 10 core schemas of

Study 1, as a group, bore a strong and unmistakable
resemblance to authentic probation cases.
Information was extracted from files and combined
with the results of the interview for the purpose of
creating 10 realistic schematic cases representing the
offender types found in Study 1.

Schematic cases contained

information about each of the following categories:

(a)

~chemas of offenders are by definition categories
that are abstracted from experiences, and represent exemplars or composites of "real" criminal types. Therefore,
a one-to-one correspondence between the features of the
constructed schematic cases and actual probation cases was
not expected.
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crime (the offense for which the probationer was sentenced);
(b) prior record (a list of crimes likely to have been
committed by the offender and a description of the range of
his/her past criminal involvement);
race, and sex);

(c) demographics (age,

(d) social/psychological profile (evalua-

tions of the probationer's mental status, interpersonalfamilial relationships and social milieu, as well as attributions about the cause(s) of the offender's criminal behavior);

(e) report behavior (a summary of the probationer's

typical demeanor during'contacts with his/her officer);
(f) treatment (recommendations concerning levels of supervision and the use of counseling and resources);

and (g)

prognoses (a prediction of the offender's success or failure
while on probation and the likelihood of his/her continued
criminal involvement) .
Procedure
The procedure used in this study is similar to the
approach that Carroll and Wiener (1982) adopted in their
investigation of expert parole decision makers.

Each item

of information about each of the seven categories was typed
on a 3 x 5 index card and stacked in separate piles according to information type.

The

info~mation

was written as

prose statements using the style and examples of real
probation files.

The subject's task was to select one card

from each pile in order to recreate eight realistic cases. 7
It was assumed that officers would arrange the cards in a
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manner which reflected their underlying schematic representations of offenders (i.e., schemas would emerge as the
organizing principle for constructing the cases);

whereas

clerical subjects' reconstructions would be essentially a
random combination of the cards or based upon popular conceptions of criminal types.

On each trial, the order of

information cards within the seven piles and the sequential
ordering of categories between piles were randomized.

The

cases were formed by sorting the information cards on a
board approximately five feet in length and three feet in
height.

The numbers 1-8 were placed across the top of the

board (eight columns corresponding to the eight cases) and
the numbers 1-7 were placed down the left side (seven rows
corresponding to the seven information categories) .

Fifty-

7A pretest with a small sample of officers (n = 8)
revealed that the use of 10 cases (70 information cards)
presented an unmanageable and time consuming task for subjects to accomplish. Decreasing the number of cases to
eight by removing the two least detailed schema types of
Study 1 ("Conman" and "Violent Macho Man") made the task
more workable, both in terms of the time that was required
to complete the procedure and in the ease and efficiency
with which the information cards were handled and organized.
The pretest also recommended the adoption of the information
board.
Subjects reported that the ability to view cards
already placed in completed cases was very helpful i~ constructing later cases, and in rearranging cards between
cases.
In addition, the pretest suggested that the semantic relations between statements may have acted as cues in
matching the information cards within a category. To avoid
this problem, all words or phrases with high associative
connections were either modified or removed from the cards.
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six evenly spaced hooks served as holders for the information cards.

Subjects were informed that the purpose of

the study was to examine how they organize their caseloads
into different types of probationers.

Participants were

scheduled individually and were read the following instructions:
In front of you are piles of index cards. Each pile
consists of a set of cards that contain information
relating to a case variable. Each card has a separate
piece of information written on it. Your task is to
put together the cards to form eight different criminal cases which have been constructed from interviews
with probation officers, actual case files, and presentence investigations. Every case you assemble
should consist of seven cards--one from each of the
information piles. Start with any pile you wish and
choose from the piles in any order you desire. You
may change the arrangement of the cards as you go
along.
Remember, there is no actual right or wrong
way to do it. Rely on your subjective judgments.
Familiarize yourself with all of the cards before you
begin. There is no time limit.
Subjects were unobtrusively timed and observed while
performing the task.

At the conclusion of the procedure,

the participants were asked a series of questions relating
to:

(a) their reactions to the task;

(b) the components

of the organizing strategy they employed to compose cases;
(c) the kinds of labels or category designations they believed would capture the
constructed cases;

essentia~

nature of their eight

(d) explanations of why certain pieces

of information "naturally" fit together in some cases and
not in others;

and (e) a more in-depth discussion of the

constructed offender types, including an estimate of the
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prevalence of each in the Department's caseload, and an
elaboration of the five content domains of Study 1.
completing the task, subjects were debriefed.

Upon

During the

debriefing, they received an explanation of the purpose
of the investigation and were thanked for their participation.
Study 3
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 strongly supported the
notion that probation officers organize their knowledge
about crime and criminals into consensual schemas of
offenders.

The final study explored the extent to which

schemas influence how officers handle case information in
making judgments concerning probationrs.

More specifically,

the third investigation tested for any differences in the
processing of schematic and nonschematic cases.
ature suggests three possible processing effects:

The literspeed,

ease, and confidence.
Speed and ease.

A number of experiments in cognitive

psychology consistently show that, if a perceiver has a
schema for a particular stimulus domain, information relevant to that domain will be processed more quickly than
irrelevant information or information for which a schema
has not been developed (Taylor & Crocker, 1981).

This

effect has also been demonstrated in the area of social
cognition.

For example, in a study of self-schemata,
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Markus (1977) identified two groups of subjects who had
schemas about themselves for the traits of dependence or
independence, and a third group of subjects who were
aschematic on those traits.

Subjects were instructed to

read words portraying a mixture of schema relevant and
neutral adjectives and to press a button indicating whether
the adjectives were self-descriptive.

It was reported that

subjects with self schemas (either for dependence or independence) responded significantly faster to schema relevant
words than did aschematics.

There were no differences,

however, among the three groups in the processing time for
schema neutral adjectives.

Similarly, Markus and Smith

(1981) compared subjects who had masculine self schemas with
those who did not (i.e., aschematics) and obtained the same
results.

(See also Keenan & Baillert [1980] and Kuiper &

Rogers [1979] .)
Comparable effects were also revealed in a problemsolving experiment by Taylor, Crocker, and D'Agostino
(1978).

Subjects were presented with problems that con-

tained schema-relevant cues, schema-irrelevant cues, or
no cues (control) .

Problems with schema-relevant cues

were solved faster than control problems, and control
problems were solved faster than problems with schemairrelevant cues.

Finally, Lingle and Ostrom (1979) con-

ducted a series of investigations showing that subjects
who had formed a schema about a target person based on an
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earlier judgment (e.g., the suitability of the target for
a designated occupation) took significantly less time to
make a second similar judgment than a second dissimilar
judgment.
Whereas the above findings indicate that schema relevant information is processed faster, other data suggest
that attending to schema-relevant material may result in
longer processing times than attending to schema irrelevant
material.

For example, Markus (1977) reported that sche-

matics spent more time processing information when confronted
with false feedback on a schema-relevant attribute than did
aschematics.

Also, Markus, Sentis, and Hammill (1978)

found that subjects with "weight schemas'' (i.e., obese
subjects) took longer to process schema-relevant material
than subjects who did not possess a self-schema relating to
that dimension.

In a conceptually similar study, Rogers,

Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) had subjects make a series of
ratings on a list of adjectives.

For some adjectives they

made self-reference ratings (i.e., "Does this word describe
you?"); for others they made structural, phonemic, and
semantic ratings.

Rogers et al.

(1977) reported that

subjects who rated the adjectives' in terms of self-reference
were significantly slower in identifying information in a
recall task than were subjects who rated the material for
its structural, phonemic, or semantic characteristics.
Taylor and Crocker (1981) summarized the schematic processing
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time literature by concluding that, in general, information
which is central, redundant, or evaluatively consistent to
a schema will be processed more rapidly than information
which is peripheral, novel, or evaluatively mixed.
Evidence that schemas influence the ease of information processing comes primarily from the work of Rosch and
her associates on the cognitive representation of semantic
categories.

For example, it was found that subjects rated

prototypic instances of categories as significantly easier
to recognize and classify than nonprototypic instances
(see Rosch & Lloyd, 1978).
Confidence.

Some studies suggest that schema-based

processing may also affect the confidence with which persons make judgments.

A study by Cantor et al.

(1980),

which was discussed earlier, revealed that psychiatrists'
diagnoses of patients who resembled the prototype for a
diagnostic category were made with significantly greater
confidence than the diagnoses of nonprototypic patients.
Markus and Smith (1981) presented groups of masculine
schematic and aschematic subjects with a film depicting a
male college student in his dorm.

The actor's behaviors

consisted of both stereotypic masbuline (e.g., crushirig a
beer can, reading Playboy) and neutral activities (e.g.,
eating an apple, doing homework).

Later subjects were

asked to judge whether a list of schema consistent, inconsistent, and irrelevant adjectives were descriptive or
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nondescriptive of the actor.

Findings demonstrated that

schematic subjects were significantly more confident in
making "not him" judgments to all types of words than were
aschematics indicating that having a schema on one dimension (masculinity) allowed subjects to develop a clearer
image of the actor in general and to reject a variety of
possible attributes with high conviction.

Further, Cohen

(1983) reported that subjects were significantly more
confident when rating the representativeness of attributes
that were highly consistent or inconsistent with an occupation prototype (e.g., waitress) as compared to attributes
that were neutral to the protoype.

Finally, in a recent

study, Ferguson, Rule, and Carlson (1983) found that
subjects were more confident of the accuracy of their performance on a word recognition task when they had previously
rated the words on their self-descriptiveness (i.e., when
the words evoked their self schemas) than when the words
had been rated for their descriptiveness of other persons.
As shown in Studies 1 and 2, officers' schemas of
offenders represent extensive and structured knowledge
about probationers that comprises inferences relating to
treatment/supervision strategies and report behavior as well
as prognoses regarding future criminal activity.

The argu-

ment underlying the main hypotheses of the third study was
that when an officer has to make judgments about a probationer who "matches" a specific schema, then these judgments
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are made easily and quickly because the information required for the judgment is highly organized and readily
retrieved.

Judgments concerning nonschematic cases, on

the other hand, necessitate more cognitive work which
entails a thorough search through memory for case-related
information, an integration of this information, and a
determination of its relevance to the current assessment.
In accordance with the preceding argument and the
aforementioned findings, it was predicted that subjects
would process schematic cases with greater rapidity, ease,
and confidence than nonschematic cases.

Schematic proces-

sing was examined by asking expert officers to evaluate
schematic and nonschematic cases on four schema-relevant
dimensions, and to rate the confidence and ease with which
these evaluations were made.

Also, the time subjects spent

in judging the cases was recorded.
It should be noted that Study 3 focused on a property
of the stimulus material whereas the main thrust of Studies
1 and 2 was the comparison between expert and novice judges.
An implicit assumption of the third investigation was that
cognitive representations of offenders are available to
experienced officers .and therefore they were able to distinguish between the schematic and nonschematic cases
presented in the experimental task.

Presumably, it is this

distinction that produces differences in how information
is processed.

In other words, because schematic cases
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evoke knowledge structures (and nonschematic cases do not)
they influence officers' assessments of probationers in a
direction consistent with the hypothesized effects.
Participants
Twenty expert probation officers, one-half of whom
are assigned to the criminal division and one-half to the
municipal division, were selected for the third investigation.

The sample was also evenly divided between men and

women, and Blacks and Whites.

Officers who were subjects

in Study 2 were not asked to participate, inasmuch as their
experience in the Study and their knowledge of the Study's
findings, may have alerted them to the purpose of the third
investigation and therefore biased their responses.

Data

from three of the original respondents were discarded after
it was discovered they had been participants in the second
study.

Additional officers were recruited to replace them.

Materials
On the basis of actual probation files and the findings of Studies 1 and 2, a set of four schematic cases were
constructed:

"Burglar," "Drug Addict," "Female Welfare

Fraud," and "White Collar."

These offender types were

chosen because they exhibited:

{a) a relatively high· level

of detail in the interview as measured by mean information
units;

(b) the highest number of correct schema type

matches in the card sort task;

and {c) the highest degree

of cohesiveness on the cluster analysis.

Information was
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drawn from the schematic descriptions of Study 1, the
responses to the post-task questions of Study 2, as well
as the files of the "representative" cases that were utilized in developing the ~timulus materials for Study 2, in
order to create realistic case histories depicting each of
the four schema types.

The case histories comprised data

that were based upon the four "case information items" of
Study 2 (demographics, crime type, prior record, social/
psychological profile) and were written in a narrative
style patterned after actual P.S.I. reports.

Hence, cases

were prepared in a format intended to enhance their apparent authenticity, thereby increasing subjects' involvement
in the experimental task.
To more precisely assess the effect that schematic
cases may have upon information processing and officer
judgments, two additional sets of comparison cases were
created:

mixed schematic and real cases.

The mixed sche-

matic cases were formed by combining the case histories of
the "Suburb Kid" and "Gangbanger" types, and the "Uncle
Tom" and "Con Man" schemas. 8

(Each of these cases were

developed in the same manner as the schematic case

8 Mixed schematic versions were designed to provide
a set of comparison cases that were decidedly nonschematic.
The cases chosen for mixing were selected on the
basis of whether they would yield plausible case histories
when combined.
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histories.)

For example, the demographic and crime type

data of the "Suburb Kid" were matched with the prior record
and social/psychological profile of the "Gangbanger" to
produce the first version of the mixed schema set.

The

second version of this type was created by combining the
first two categories of the "Gangbanger" description (demographics, crime type) with the second two categories of the
"Suburb Kid'' description (prior record, social/psychological
profile).

This procedure was repeated with the "Uncle Tom"

and "Con Man" schemas to yield a total of four mixed cases.
In addition, 20 P.S.I. reports were selected from a sample
of approximately 200 that were written during the years
1979-1981. 9

The files of these 20 P.S.I. cases were then

checked for other pertinent materials (e.g., prior record
summaries, verifications of employment or education, psychiatric reports, previous probation records).

From these

sources, 20 real cases were prepared in the same format as
the four schematic and four mixed schematic cases.
During the construction of the 28 case histories (four
schematic, four mixed, twenty real), an attempt was made to
equate the descriptions on such factors as overall length

9The sample of P.S.I. reports were copies of actual
files that were made available to me during earlier studies
which I conducted for the purpose of identifying risk
factors among Cook County probationers.
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(determined by the total number of words per case), mean
sentence length and sentence complexity, level of vocabulary use, and reading time.

To provide a more objective

confirmation of case comparability, five judges were each
asked to evaluate a series of the four schematic, the four
mixed, and four different real cases on the aforementioned
variables. 10

Their suggestions led to the modification of

the structure and wording of nine cases.

(It should be

noted that any changes that were made did not affect the
essential nature or content of the cases.)
Two of the judges were also instructed to:

(a)

record the reading times for each of the 28 cases, and
(b) rate the cases on their verisimilitude (i.e., a judgment of how closely the constructed cases resembled actual
probation cases) using a seven-point scale ranging from
not at all similar to highly similar, and on their internal
consistency (i.e., a judgment of whether the information
both within and between the four "case information" categories was plausibly or sensibly organized) .

A seven-

point scale was also used for this rating, ranging from
not at all consistent to highly consistent.

The range and

lOThe judges were employees of the Cook County
Adult Probation Department whose job requires them to
routinely read through and process case files.
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variance of reading times, which were combined for the two
judges, were both minimal, suggesting that the lengths of
the cases were basically equivalent.
were rated highly on realism (M
(M

=

5.47).

=

Further, the cases

5.85) and consistency

Analyses of variance yielded no differences

between the three types of cases on reading time, consistency, or verisimilitude (all E's

>

.10).

The interjudge

agreement as measured by correlations on the ratings was . 85
for verisimilitude and .79 for consistency.
Procedure
Each subject was presented with four cases:
schematic, one mixed schematic and one real case.

two
The six

combinations of schematic case pairs were randomly combined
with pairs of mixed schematic and real cases (which were
also randomly matched), such that each schematic case
was presented ten times, each mixed schematic case five
times, and each real case one time.
cases were formed.

Twenty sets of four

The order of cases within each of the

sets was randomized.

Prior to each trial, a set was ran-

domly chosen without replacement.
Subjects were told that their task was to carefully
read and evaluate four actual criminal cases for the purpose
of making a number of judgments that are comparable to
the assessments they make in their day-to-day activities
as probation officers.

The judgments consisted of four

questions relating to the "treatment-inference" items of
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Study 2 (report behavior, treatment/supervision, prognosis).
Also, a question asking the subject to rate the typicality
of a case (i.e., how closely the offender resembled other
members of his/her caseload) on a seven-point scale, ranging from not at all similar to highly similar, was included
as a check on the case manipulation.
Report behavior judgments were measured by rating
the offender on both his/her cooperativeness during contacts, and his/her regularity in reporting on assigned
days.

An assessment of a case's prognosis was made by

rating the probationer's likelihood of successfully completing his/her sentence.
point scale.

All ratings were done on a seven-

The item referring to treatment/supervision

was presented as an open-ended question that asked the
respondent to provide a list of recommended extra-departmental referrals for the case, and to discuss the nature
of the counseling and monitoring strategies he/she would
employ with the offender, including the frequency and mode
of contact.

Following each of the inference items were

two questions relating tothe confidence (a determination of
how certain or sure subjects felt their response was
accurate or valid), and difficulty (the relative ease-with
which subjects responded to an item) which subjects experienced in making the case judgments.

Confidence ratings

were collected on a seven-point scale ranging from not at
all confident to highly confident;

the rating of judgment
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difficulty was also on a seven-point scale that ranged
from not at all difficult to extremely difficult.

The

total time subjects spent in completing the inferential
items was recorded for'each case.
cluded in this measure.

Reading time was not in-

Before respondents evaluated the

four cases, they were presented with a practice case to
familiarize them with the materials and procedure, and to
avoid the possible impact that the novelty of the task may
have had on the response time of initial cases.
After completing the four cases, subjects were debriefed about the true nature of the study.

In postexper-

imental interviews, no subjects expressed suspicions about
the actual purpose of the investigation or admitted to
having any prior knowledge about it.

Officers also stated

that they were unaware that their response times were being
measured.

Respondents were thanked for their participation,

and asked not to discuss the study with fellow officers
until it was finalized.

(See Appendices A and B for a sam-

ple of the presented case histories of Study 3 and a copy
of the case assessment questions and judgment scales.)

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Study 1
Types of Schemas
An inspection of interview protocols revealed a set
of 10 core schemas, each reported by 13 or more of the 40
participants.

These are displayed in Table 2 with an

identifying label for each and a synopsis of the data
relating to the five content domains.

No a priori standard

was adopted to delimit a cut-off point for core schemas.
However, an obvious break in the number of officers discussing each of the various types appeared at 13, inasmuch
as the remaining schemas were provided by 7 or fewer of the
respondents.

Findings indicated that among the ten core

types, "Burglar" (mean information units

=

11. 85) was the

most data-rich category, whereas the "Con Man" (mean information units

=

4.8) schema was the least detailed.

Secondary schemas (i.e., those described by less than 20%
of the respondents) accounted for 17% of the total
of evoked categories.
Number of Schemas
Analyses of results by race, sex, and officer
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Table 2
A Summary of the Five Content Domains
Relating to Schema Types
SCHEMA TYPE - BURGLAR
Criteria! Attributes - Highly professional;
only burglaries;

commits

criminal habits well learned - performed

with confidence and skill;

relatively intelligent;

small

in physical stature.
Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting;

makes an

effort to give the officer the impression he is not engaged
in criminal activities;

changes address often.

Supervision - Close supervision, frequent B. of I.
checks, "hard-nosed" treatment during report days;
verification of employment/residence at every stated change.
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (adoption of crimnal lifestyle) .
Prognosis - Poor - likely to continue in criminal
profession (this is all he knows and he is relatively
successful at it) •
SCHEMA TYPE - DRUG ADDICT
Criteria! Attributes - Noticeably psychologically
disturbed;

devoid

of social, interpersonal skills;

use of drugs permeates his entire existence;
dent on others (uses people like drugs);
emaciated, disheveled.

the

very depen-

physically
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Table 2
DRUG ADDICT (continued)
Report Demeanor - Inconsistent in reporting;
'

frequently late for appointments;

lies about drug use.

Supervision - Drug treatment is essential, officer
works closely with drug rehab personnel, physical tests
for the presence of drugs are mandatory.
Attributions -

Internal - stable - intentional (low

self-esteem) .
Prognosis - Guarded - If drug habit is corrected,
criminal behavior will cease.
SCHEMA TYPE - GANGBANGER
Criteria! Attributes - Typical juvenile delinquent,
a tough kid, usually Latin;

membership in street gang

gives meaning to life, a sense of self-worth;

dress and

distinguishing markings reflect gang affiliation.
Report Demeanor - Fairly consistent in reporting but
does not always cooperate;
guy image;

important to project a tough

not receptive to recommendations for behavior

change.
Supervision - Regular superv,ision (once per month
in-person reporting);

confrontation during sessions is

important, frequent challenging of gang involvement;
resources offered-- GED, employment services.
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Table 2
GANGBANGER (continued)
Attributions - External - unstable - unintentional
(gang affiliation) .
Prognosis - Guarded - Is not likely to become involved
in future crime if he ends his gang affiliation.
SCHEMA TYPE - UNCLE TOM
Criterial Attributes - Older Black male, uneducated,
generally respects the law but sees crime as the only
means of support;
important;

has done some prison time;

family is

periodically employed as a menial laborer.

Report Demeanor - Very consistent in reporting, takes
direction well, willing to participate in the rehabilitative
process.
Supervision - After six months, phone-in, mail-in
reporting is allowed;

report accommodations are made to

insure that the offender's employment is not disrupted.
Attributions - External - stable - unintentional
(environmental factors) .
Prognosis - Excellent - Is afraid to return to
prison.
SCHEMA TYPE - FEMALE WELFARE FRAUD
Criterial Attributes - Young Black woman, willingly
manipulated/controlled by men;
by different fathers;

has children out of wedlock

likely to have turned tricks for
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Table 2
FEMALE WELFARE FRAUD (continued)
money;

a survivor at any cost.

Report Demeanor - Changes address often, generally
late on report days, uses the care of children as an
excuse for non-reporting.
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month
in-person reporting); restitution payments must be
stringently enforced.
Attributions - External - unstable - unintentional
(forced by male partners).
Prognosis - Guarded - If she can disengage herself
from destructive relationships progress toward rehabilitation may ensue (has capability to live alternate lifestyle).
SCHEMA TYPE - CAREER/CON MAN
Criterial Attributes - A true criminal, amoral,
asocial;

owns big car, expensive clothes, stable of women;

often a pimp;
street smarts;

an opportunist, fast talker with plenty of
long and varied prior record;

knows how

to work the system, always on the con.
Report Demeanor - Fairly consistent in reporting;
extremely deceptive, falsely cooperative, frequently dishonest about his residence;
around" conditions.

looks for ways to "get
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Table 2
CAREER/CON MAN (continued)
Supervision - Close supervision, bi-monthly state and
local B of I checks, monthly verification of employment/
residence;

no reporting accommodations are made;

officer

vigorously exercises authority, threats of violation are
frequent.
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (lack
of moral development).
Prognosis - Extremely Poor - continued criminal
activity and an extended prison sentence are inevitable.
SCHEMA TYPE - VIOLENT/MACHO MAN
Criterial Attributes - Extremely low tolerance for
stress, highly prone to violence, a literal powder keg;
usually a Latin with alcohol problems;

a married man with

highly traditional attitudes about family, religion, sex,
etc.,;

believes difficulties can be solved through force.

Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting;
manageable on report days;

the least

often openly confronts the

officer, blatantly verbally aggressive, disrespectful in
tone, speech, demeanor.
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month inperson reporting);

resources offered --alcohol treatment.

Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (low
tolerance for stress).
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Table 2
VIOLENT/MACHO MAN (continued)
Prognosis - Guarded - Quite labile, easily instigated
to aggress.
SCHEMA TYPE - SUBURB KID
Criterial Attributes - White, young male residing in
affluent areas surrounding the city;

intelligent, usually

attending college or has plans for higher education;
responsibility, does crime for kicks;

lacks

parents rescue him

from difficulties.
Report Demeanor- Haphazard report behavior initially,
becomes consistent later;

parents frequently accompany

him to sessions and often call to inquire about progress
or to complain about his behavior.
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month inperson reporting);

frequent contacts with family are made;

after first year phone-ins are allowed;
explicitly set and enforced;

rules must be

resources offered -- family

therapy, psychological counseling.
Attributions - External - unstable - unintentional
(peer pressures).
Prognosis - Good - Closely involved with family;
has learned lesson.
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Table 2
SCHEMA TYPE - DUMB HILLBILLY
Criteria! Attributes - Appalachian White male, borderline mental retardate;

Southern in dress, speech, demeanor;

commits a variety of petty crimes;

usually his entire fam-

ily (e.g., parents, siblings, spouse) becomes involved in
criminal activity as a way of life.
Report Demeanor - Report behavior is inconsistent,
does not purposely miss sessions but simply forgets appointment times;

makes an effort to comply with the conditions

of his sentence;

demonstrates a desire to please the

officer, but often finds it difficult to comprehend his/her
directives.
Supervision - Close supervision;
structuring is indicated;

a high degree of

offender requires guidance and

direction at each meeting;

officer must communicate with

the offender at an understandable level.
Attributions - Internal - stable - unintentional
(lacks intellect, good judgment).
Prognosis - Poor - Does not have intellectual capacity to avoid destructive behavior.
SCHEMA TYPE - WHITE COLLAR
Criteria! Attributes - White, male, mid-30's;

gen-

uinely middle-class, an upstanding member of the community,
the man-next-door type;

an educated, successful person
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Table 2
WHITE COLLAR (continued)
with a stable family and employment history;

no prior

record.
Report Demeanor - Very consistent in reporting;
condescending toward the officer, indignant at times,
feels he is above the system;

expects special privileges.

Supervision - Very loose supervision;

officer is

careful to protect the confidentiality of the offender;
reporting is scheduled to work around the probationer's
employment responsibilites.
Attributions - External - unstable - intentional
(viewed circumstance as opportunity for easy money).
Prognosis - Excellent - Criminal activity is too
costly (may lose family/job, etc.).
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assignment showed no differences in the mean number of
schemas (all

~·s,£

>.20) and no differences among separate

comparisons of the number of subjects describing the 10
schema types (all

! 2 's,. £ >.25).

However, a significant

difference did emerge between the mean number of schemas
presented by expert
cers, t(38)

=

(~

=

4.1) and novice

2.08, £ <.05.

(~

=

4.8) offi-

In addition, there were

differences in the percentage of expert versus nonexpert
subjects elaborating specific schema types (see Table 3).
A tenable explanation for the greater number of
schemas offered by novices may derive from a tendency to
relate categories that are more nascent and/or speculative
in nature.

That is borne out by the fact that 85% of the

least reported schemas (i.e., those discussed by less than
20% of the respondents) were provided by nonexperts.

These

groupings were also the most loosely constructed and comprised the fewest units of information.

Experienced

officers seem to restrict their conceptualizations of
officers to cognitive representations that are more clearly
formed, salient, and central to their caseloads.

The

smaller number of schemas for experts suggests that this
group has settled upon a more efficient and parsimonious
strategy for organizing probationers and that they may be
less inclined to individuate the constituents of their
caseloads.

The shared superficial characteristics of

cases seem not to influence experts as much as nonexperts.

Table 3
Number of Expert and Novice Officers Invoking the Schema Types,
Mean Information Units, and Efficiency Index

Schema Typea

Probation Officers
Expert
Novice
n

Burglar

14

Drug Addict

10

Gangbanger

12

Uncle Tom

Probation Officers
Expert
Novice

Efficiency
Indexb

n

6*

14.3

9.4

.66

12.8

4.7

.37

4*

12.7

8.3

.65

10

4

11.7

9.9

.85

Female Welfare Fraud

9

5

9.9

5.7

.58

Career/Con Man

5

9

5.3

4.3

.81

Violent/Macho Man

4

10

6.2

4.2

.68

Suburb Kid

3

11*

8.9

5.1

.57

Dumb Hillbilly

3

11*

9.9

6.1

.62

White Collar

8

5

10.8

11.3

1.05

10

aChi-squar~ tests with 1 degree of freedom were performed to determine whether
there was a significant difference between the number of expert and novice officers
discussing each of the schema types.
bEfficiency Index= Novice Mean/Expert Mean

*E <.05

1-'
N
~
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Indeed, the schemas mentioned by a proportionately greater
number of experienced respondents may be those that have
more practical significance in terms of both the frequency
with which a "type of 6ffender" is assigned to an officer,
and whether or not the categorization contributes to more
effective treatment and supervision.
Differences in Schema Types
Differences in the number of separate schema types,
as shown in Table 3, may be partially a function of the
non-random respondent selection process.

The sample of

novices consisted of a disproportionate percentage of
officers who work in geographic districts in which the
"Suburb Kid" and "Dumb Hillbilly" are more likely to be
found due to the socioeconomic status and ethnic composition of neighborhoods.
The apparent ease with which experts invoke the
"Gangbanger" schema seems to emerge from their learned
ability to recognize the subtle trappings and characteristic demeanor of gang members.

Gang affiliates, who fre-

quently strive to conceal their group activities from
officers, commit a variety of petty crimes which may or
may not be related to their membership.

Thus, distinguish-

ing the "Gangbanger" from a common misdemeanant is often
difficult for the novice officer.

Only 25% of the non-

experts, compared to 80% of the experienced officers, were
able to detail the identifying markings, speech, dress,
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etc. of a typical gang member.

A similar circumstance

obtains for the burglary schema.

Initially, burglars as

a group appear to be a heterogeneous collection of criminals
whose only point of similarity is the offense for which
they were sentenced.

Data suggest that increased contact

with these probationers has led experts to identify essential underlying threads of commonality which synthesize a
loose collection of offenders into a discrete, verifiable
category.
Richness of Schemas
Examination of subjects' responses demonstrated
further differences between novice and expert officers.
Results indicated that experts presented a significantly
greater number of mean information units (M
did nonexperts

(~

=

6.22),

~(38)

=

5.68,

E

=

10.94) than

<.01.

This

finding suggests greater schema complexity and richness
among more experienced probation officers when compared to
a group with less than three years of service.

A simple

"efficiency index" was created in order to yield direct
comparisons between experienced and novice officers on
each of the schema types.

It was computed by the following

formula:
EI

= NE
E

where NE equals the mean information units of the nonexperts and E equals the mean information units of the
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expert group.
Inspecting the results of this analysis in Table 3,
it can be seen that in 9 out of 10 instances, novices
provided a less complete description of the probationer
schemas.

Further, among the experienced group there was

a strong positive relationship (r(8)

=

.81, E <.01) between

the number of respondents invoking a schema type and the
mean number of information units corresponding to the
type.

The correlation in the novice group was also signi-

ficant but in the negative direction (r(8)

=

-.79, E <.01).

This result is consistent with the earlier finding that
novices tend to discuss schemas that are less fully developed or firmly constructed.

In addition, it may indicate

that nonexperts were more sensitive to the demand characteristics of the investigative procedure as reflected by
their apparent concern with providing the interviewer with
as many categories as possible irrespective of whether
the groupings were sufficiently detailed.

Moreover, the

schemas evoked most frequently among the novice group
(i.e., "Dumb Hillbilly", "Suburb Kid") are those that
represent relatively recent additions to caseloads.

(This

is substantiated by officers' reports and department
statistics.)

Intuitively, one would expect these schemas

to be the least elaborate.

Perhaps these categories were

also available to experts, but they were unwilling to
discuss them because of their lack of richness.
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A stepwise multiple regression analysis of information
clearly supports the above conclusions.

The results given

in Table 4 show that response position, expertise, and
schema type emerge as significant predictors of mean information units.

These three variables explain more than 60%

of the variance in schema length
E <.001).

(~

=

.78, F(ll,29)

=

19.91,

Again, officers with greater experience provided

more elaborate schemas.

It was also revealed that the ten

core schema types differed significantly in richness.
Moreover, there is strong evidence suggesting a serial
position effect on schema density.

That is, schemas that

were evoked early in the order of presentation contained
much greater detail than those elicited at later stages in
the interview.

It is important to note that after con-

trolling for schema type and serial position, experienced
officers still give significantly richer schemas than
novices (!(1,29)

=

39.13, E <.001).

To summarize, novice respondents presented schema
types that were relatively simple and impoverished.

In

contrast, the schemas of experienced probation officers
may be described as a rich, interrelated network of information relating probationer traits and supervision strategies.

Moreover, the details of expert schemas were organ-

ized in a systematic fashion.

Hence, it appears that

experienced officers not only possess greater knowledge
of prototypical offenders, but they also make more
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Table 4
Stepwise Regression Analysis of the Variables
That Affect Schema Richness

Variable in order
of insertion into
regression equation

Multiple R

Beta

Schema Type a

.56

a

Response Position

.71

-.516

70.96**

Years Employed
(Expertise)

.78

.355

39.13**

F

7.40**

aSchema type was entered as a set of nine dummy
variables preceding the inclusion of the other variables.
**E <.001
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connections between separate pieces of schematic data.

It

was my impression that novices related probationer characteristics to treatment in a very simple-minded manner,
whereas officers with expertise did so with a high degree
of sophistication and facility, indicating both a fundamental difference in schema use and the greater descriptive
utility of experienced respondents' categorizations.
Experts' schemas were more clearly articulated, higher in
differentiation and vividness, elaborated with increased
certainty, and were volunteered more readily and spontaneously (i.e., fewer probes were required to elicit details
and less time was spent in evoking schemas) suggesting
greater cognitive availability.

Further, experienced

probation officers provided more concrete examples of
present and/or past members of their caseloads who instantiated the schema types.

Nearly twice as many experts

mentioned actual schematic cases when compared to nonexperts,

(~ 2 (l,N = 40)= 10.25,

E

<.01).

Study 2
Sorting Strategies
All subjects treated the task as meaningful, and
reported that the information presented in the study
realistically portrayed the types of probation cases found
in Cook County.

Moreover, officers indicated that the task

called upon many facets of actual probation work.

For
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example, when assigned a new case, their objective is to
make predictions about future risk and potential for rehabilitation by evaluating essentially the same set of case
variables contained in ,the cards (demographics, crime type,
prior record, etc.).

It was the investigator's impression

that probation officers approached the task more systematically and studiously than did clerical personnel;

the

latter appeared to handle the information with less confidence, control, and deliberation.

Officers' apparent "ego

involvement" in the procedure stemmed from a common concern
that their performance would somehow reflect their competence.

In fact, many officers quipped that the study was

a "disguised test" of their abilities.
Officers began constructing a large number of cases
with current offense, and followed with demographics and
prior record, respectively.

Of the 160 "offender schemas"

composed by probation officers, offense was used first in
93%, while 60% contained the offense-demographics-prior
record sequence as the first three information items.
Table 5 shows the median order of use for the seven information categories.

Officers in Cook County focus primarily

on the monitoring and control of .cases.

Hence, the

t~iad

of offense, record, and demographics is highly informative
(i.e., salient) because these variables are deemed fundamental in making assessments of future criminality
(Lurigio, 1981).

In addition, the above three factors
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were often mentioned as critical elements in the criteria!
attribute domain of Study 1;

therefore, they frequently

represent the central or defining pieces of information
in an offender schema. ' Offense and prior record were also
shown to be essential items in a similar study by Carroll
and Wiener (1982).

In their investigation, parole decision

makers constructed cases in a card sorting task by generally beginning with current offense, and then adding
criminal record and sentence.

In contrast, as reported in

Table 5, no consistent trend in the ordering of information
was found in an analysis of the clerical staffs' sequences
of card placements.
There was a basic difference in the kind of strategy
that the officer and clerical groups employed in constructing the cases.

Seventy-five percent of the officers sorted

the cards in a vertical orientation, i.e., by completing
one column before moving to the next;

whereas eighty

percent of the clerical staff members organized the information horizontally, i.e., by placing the cards from left
to right in sequential rows.

(It should be noted that the

five officers who adopted a horizontal strategy were novices.)

This finding su~gests that probation officers may

have had a clear or well-developed conceptualization of a
case and its components before placing the cards on the
board.

When questioned about their card sorting approaches,

a large percentage of officers (80%) reported that they
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Table 5
Median Order of Use for Information Categories

Information Category

Officer

Clerical

Crime Type (Offense)

1.03

4.17

Demographics

2.33

3.44

Prior Record

3.13

4.88

Social/Psychological Profile

4.41

3.38

Treatment

5.48

4.67

Report Behavior

5.75

3.87

Prognoses

6.95

4.28
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formed the categories case-by-case, as opposed to making a
series of separate or independent matches between any two
or more of the information cards.

To illustrate, consider

these statements by one of the officers:
I was able to see the entire version of a case before
I put it together.
It was like I had a picture of these
cases in my head and the cards were the different parts
of the pictures. All of them fit together into a
complete whole for each case.
I didn't feel like I
was just stringing together a bunch of facts. (Subject
017)
In contrast, clerical personnel, and half of the
novice officers (N

=

5), built their cases on a piecemeal

basis by organizing the cards in a seemingly hierarchical
fashion.

That is, they distributed all seven items from

one category across offenders and proceeded to the next
category.

The differential sorting strategies of officers

and clerical workers may indicate that the former processed
the information in a top-down or conceptually-driven manner
(i.e., they were guided by a superordinate description or
abstract category) .

In other words, officers imposed

their knowledge structures (schemas) on the data in order
to ascertain how the case variables were related in the
different offender groupings.

Their high-level knowledge

determined their interpretation of the low-level perceptual
units (information cards).

The strategy of the clerical

subjects and novice officers, on the other hand, was controlled by data-driven or bottom-up processing (i.e., the
information cards served as the foundation upon which their
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categories were constructed).

In sum, officers' typolo-

gies were a reflection of their preexisting schemas,
whereas clerical categorizations were foremost a function
of the presented information, and emerged after the cases
were formed.
Task Accuracy of Probation Officers and Clerical Staff
For each subject, the number of correct schema type
matches (i.e., accuracy) was computed for each of the eight
schematic cases.

This was done by comparing the cases con-

structed by the participants (i.e., obtained sorting patterns) with those that were created to portray the schema
types found in Study 1 (i.e., a priori categorizations).
In addition, a set of 40 "random subjects," which provided
accuracy scores analogous to actual subjects' scores (i.e.,
each random subject produced a "number of correct matches"
score for each schema type), was obtained via a computer
program that generated random combinations of the 56 information cards such that each random subject's cases had one
card from each information category.

Random subjects'

scores were compared to actual subjects' scores to test
whether the groups (officer and clerical) performed significantly better than chance.
A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA: Group Membership [officer vs. clerical) x Schema
type [burglar vs. drug addict, etc.) was performed on the
accuracy scores.

As expected, the effect of group

136
membership was highly significant, F(l,38)
indicating that, overall, officers
accurate than non-officers (M
task.

=

(~

=

=

59.02, E <.001,

4.8) were more

3.1) in completing the

This finding demonstrates that the effort to remove

any inherent connections between different information card
That is, it appears

statements was generally successful.

that subjects were unable to construct the cases solely
on the basis of any logical or lexical associations between
the cards.

Further, the finding confirms the validity of

schemas and clearly suggests that officers' categorizations represent more than a common-sensical organizing of
separate pieces of case information.
A significant main effect of schema type,
15.70, £ <.01 was also found.

~(7,266)

=

This main effect, however,

was qualified by a significant Group Membership x Schema
Type interaction,

~(7,266)

=

5.07, £ <.01.

Simple main

effects tests were conducted to examine the nature of this
interaction (Winer, 1971).

As shown in Table 6, the analy-

sis revealed that officers were significantly more accurate
than clerical workers in reproducing

six of the eight

schematic cases, and were slightly more accurate on the
other two.

Also, both officers, 'F(l,38)

and clerical staff persons, F(l,38)

=

= 167.22,

£·<.001,

33.40, £ <.01 con-

structed the cases more successfully than a random combination of the cards.

Finally, there were reliable differ-

ences among the eight schema types within both the officer,
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Table 6
Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches
SCHEMA TYPE

GROUP
Officers

Clerical

Burglar

5.35

3.65**

Drug Addict

5.65

3.05**

Gangbanger

4.05

3.30

Uncle Tom

3.50

2.75

Female Welfare Fraud

5.80

3.70**

Suburb Kid

4.70

2.95**

Dumb Hillbilly

3.40

2.50*

White Collar

5.95

3.30**

NOTE.
Simple effects tests were performed to compare
the officer and clerical groups.
See Winer (1971) for an
explanation of the procedures for pooling heterogeneous
sources of variance and estimating degrees of freedom
in simple effects tests following significant interactions
in a repeated measures ANOVA.

*£ <.05
**£ <.01
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f(7,222)

=

21.63, E <.01, and clerical, F(7,266)

E <.01 groups.

=

2.90,

Tests on the differences between all

possible pairs of means were done by the Newman-Keuls procedure (Winer, 1971),

~nd

are reported in Table 7.

Officers

seem to be most skillful at recreating cases that are
either highly salient because of their distinctiveness or
low prevalence ("White Collar," "Female Welfare Fraud") or
highly problematic, i.e., require close surveillance or
intensive treatment ("Burglar," "Drug Addict").

Moreover,

two of the four schema types with the greatest number of
correct matches, "White Collar"
(~

=

(~

=

5.95) and "Burglar"

5.35) were also the two most detailed schemas evoked

in Study 1.
An examination of the mean accuracy scores displayed
in Table 6 reveals that "Female Welfare Fraud''
"Burglar"

(~

=

3.65), and "White Collar"

(~

=

(~

=

3.70),

3.30) are

also the categories of probationers most correctly reproduced in the clerical group.

A possible explanation of this

finding is that these offenders bear a strong resemblance to
popular conceptions of various "criminal types" as depicted
in the media.

Indeed, 70% of the clerical participants

mentioned that television, newspapers and/or movies were
the primary source(s) of their criminal stereotypes.

For

example, the "White Collar" probationer is typically described as a middle-class, educated White who opportunistically commits a first-time offense, cooperatively completes
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Table 7
Summary of the Newman Keuls' Test for Differences Between
the Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches

SCHEMA TYPE
SCHEMA TYPE
1. Dumb Hillbilly

2. Uncle Tom

3. Gangbanger
4. Suburb Kid
5. Burglar
6. Drug Addict

7. Female Welfare
Fraud

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

ns

ns

**

**

**

**

**

ns

**

**

**

**

**

ns

**

**

**

**

ns

**

**

**

ns

**

**

ns

**
ns

8. White Collar

NOTE. Only those differences found in the officer
groups are presented. Within the clerical group, "Dumb
Hillbilly" differed from "Female Welfare Fraud" and
"Burglar" at the .05 level.

**E. <.01
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his sentence and is no longer a threat to society.

In con-

trast, the "Burglar" epitomizes the consensual notion of a
hardened criminal, i.e., he is a young, Black male, the
product of an impoverished environment, who has a lengthy
criminal record and no respect for authority, dispassionately views illegal activity as a profession, and who will
likely spend the majority of his life incarcerated.

The

"Female Welfare Fraud" type is a clear example of the
dependent, Black ghetto mother who struggles to fend for
her children while falling prey to an unscrupulous and
manipulating man.

A majority of clerical subjects (75%),

who were able to provide a label for their constructed
cases, described one or more of the above groupings.
Expert and Novice Probation Officers' Accuracy
Probation Officers' accuracy scores were further
analyzed with a 2 x 2 x 8 repeated measures analysis of
variance with Expertise (expert vs. novice) and Assignment
(criminal vs. municipal) as between-subjects factors and
schema type (burglar vs. drug addict, etc.) as a withinsubjects factor.

Results failed to demonstrate a main

effect of assignment (F<l) or a significant Expertise x
Assignment interaction (F<l).

These findings are consis-

tent with the evidence of Study 1 which showed no differences between municipal and criminal officers on schema
richness or number.

However, the analysis did yield a

significant main effect of expertise, ~(1,16)

=

8.84, E <
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.01, indicating that experienced officers (M

=

5.26, SD

=

2.11) were able to reproduce the cases with greater accuracy than novice officers (M

=

4.33, SD

=

4.83).

Addition-

ally, a significant main effect of schema type emerged,
~(7,112)

= 16.51, E

<.01;

however, it was qualified by

two significant interactions:
~(7,112)

(7,112)

=
=

3.29,

2.11,

E
E

Assignment x Schema Type,

<.01 and Expertise x Schema Type, F

<.05.

The three-way interaction of

Assignment x Expertise x Schema Type did not approach significance (F<l).
Simple effect comparisons were performed to examine
the two-way interactions.

As can be seen in Table 8,

municipal and criminal division officers differed in
accuracy on two of the eight schematic groupings:
hanger" and "Suburb Kid."

"Gang-

These differences can be

accounted for by the differential occurrence of offender
types in caseloads.

Simply stated, criminal division

officers are more likely to supervise "inner city Hispanics"
and "housing project Blacks"--two groups that tend to
become involved in gang membership and activity.

Municipal

division officers, on the other hand, are assigned a comparatively larger number of suburban offenders and are
therefore more likely to encounter probationers whose
criminal and social backgrounds are comparable to the
"Suburb Kid" type (i.e., middle class, White, educated).
An obvious conclusion is that officers develop stronger
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Table 8
Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches for the
Officer Group by Expertise and Assignment
SCHEMA TYPE

ExEerience

Assignment

ExEert

Novice

Burglar

6.1

4.6*

5.3

5.4

Drug Addict

6.4

4.9*

6.0

5.3

Gangbanger

3.9

4.2

5.0

3.1**

Uncle Tom

4.2

2.8*

3.5

3.5

Female Welfare
Fraud

6.3

5.3

6.0

5.6

Suburb Kid

4.6

4.8

4.1

5.3*

Dumb Hillbilly

4.0

2.8*

3.2

3.6

White Collar

6.6

5.3*

5.7

6.2

*E. <.05
**E. <.01

Criminal

MuniciEal
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schemas for offenders with whom they have direct contact
and experience during assessment, monitoring, and treatment.

In addition, experts appear to be more accurate in

identifying categories,of probationers that are less
recognizable as discrete groupings ("Burglar," "Drug
Addict," "Uncle Tom," and "Dumb Hillbilly")

(see Table 8).

Similar findings emerged in Study 1, where it was shown
that experienced officers evinced a superior ability to
pool together a loose collection of cases in forming integrated schemas of offenders.

Finally, there were signi-

ficant differences between schema types within both the
expert and novice groups.

These differences were analyzed

with the Newman-Keuls procedure and are presented in Table
9.
The analysis of officers' accuracy scores was completed by comparing the number of errors made by experts
and novices on each of the seven information categories.
Initially, the categories were dichotomized into two sets.
The first consisted of "case information items" that basically identify who the offender is (demographics, crime
type, social/psychological profile and past record);

the

second comprised "treatment-infer.ence items" that either
predict offenders' receptivity to officers' rehabilitative
efforts (report behavior and prognoses) or recommend appropriate supervision levels and treatment interventions for
the different criminal types (treatment).

Although all
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Table 9
Summary of the Newman Keuls' Test for Differences Between
Mean Number of Correct Schema Type Matches Within the
Expert and Novice Officer Groups

EXPERTS
SCHEMA TYPE

1

1. Gangbanger

Schema TyEe
4
5
6

2

3

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

2. Dumb Hillbilly
3. Uncle Tom

ns

4. Suburb Kid

**
**
**
**

5. Burglar

7

8

**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

6. Female Welfare
Fraud
7. Drug Addict

ns

8. White Collar

NOVICES
SCHEMA TYPE
1. Uncle Tom
2. Dumb Hillbilly
3. Gangbanger
4. Burglar
5. Suburb Kid

6. Drug Addict
7. Female Welfare
Fraud

8. White Collar

*E. <.05
**E. <.01

1

2

3

ns

**
**

Schema TyEe
4
5
6

7

8

**
**
*

**
**

**
**

**
**

ns

ns

ns

**
**
*

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns
ns
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the components of an offender schema are presumably developed and modified through officer experience, the information represented by the "treatment-inference items" is based
more directly upon the actual supervision of probationers
than the information contained in the case information
categories.

Hence, it was predicted that experts would

be more accurate than non-experts in matching the "treatment-inference items" because of their extensive contacts
with a greater number and variety of offenders.
To test this hypothesis, it was necessary to be
relatively certain that a schema had been invoked before
making a determination of comparative accuracy.

Therefore,

only those schemas in which officers' had matched three or
all of the "case information items" were included in the
analyses. 11 In order to account for overall levels of
accuracy, separate t-tests were conducted on subjects'
"treatment-inference item" scores for schemas that contained three "case information item" matches and for
schemas that contained four "case information item" matches.

lhcase information items" represent the central or
defining elements of an offender category in a manner analogous to the criterial attribute domain of Study 1. Hence,
one may reasonably conclude that officers who have matched
those items for a particular case are actually invoking the
same schema. This provided a reference point for comparing the accuracy of expert and novice officers on the
"treatment inference items."
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Consistent with the prediction, experts were more accurate
than novices in placing "treatment-inference items" in the
correct case for both the three,
four, t(l8)

=

5.25, E

~.001

~(18)

=

2.71, E <.05 and

"case information item"

schemas.
An additional analysis was performed to test for a
difference in the accuracy of expert and novice officers
in matching "case information items."

The number of con-

structed cases that contained three or four correctly placed
"case information items" was recorded for each officer.
The results of a t-test comparing the mean number of these
cases did not yield a significant difference between the
expert (M
ns.

=

5.15) and novice

(~

=

4.97) groups, t(l8)

=

1.35,

This finding supports the above conclusion that the

superior performance of experienced officers derives from
their differentially greater skill to accurately identify
"treatment-inference item" matches and not "case information item" matches.
Sorting Times
The length of time in minutes that subjects spent
completing the task was analyzed by t-tests.
revealed that officers (M

=

36.5 min., SD

=

Results
4.47) took

more time in sorting the cards than non-officers (M
min., SD

= 5.38),

t(38)

that novice officers (M

=
=

6.15,

E

<.01.

29.10 min., SD

= 21.65

Also, it was found

=

4.15) performed

significantly faster than expert officers (M

=

43.50 min.,
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SD

=

4.77), !(18)

=

5.21, E <.01.

Perhaps, these data

lend further credence to the notion that probation officers
(especially those with more experience) were invoking
schemas of offenders while sorting the cards, whereas
clerical personnel were combining the facts by haphazardly
matching the information categories, or on the basis of more
general or popular conceptions of criminals.

Accordingly,

officers' completion times were increased because both the
input (case variables) and their data base of experience
(schemas) required processing (cf., Markus, 1974).

In line

with the findings of Study 1, it is presumed that novices'
schematic representations are less extensive than experts',
and therefore their processing time was also less lengthy
than experienced officers.
One could alternately argue, however, that schema
evocation should have resulted in faster sorting times.
Indeed, a number of studies suggest such an outcome (see
Taylor & Crocker, 1981).

The card sorting procedure pre-

sented subjects with a novel challenge which has no parallel in their regular duties.

Hence, they searched their

memories for pertinent information and strategies that
might have assisted them in structuring and completing the
task.

Officers (especially experts) had more knowledge to

explore, more options to consider, and more relevant
experiences to examine when compared to clerical staff
members.

If the task had required subjects to recognize
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or differentiate between types of cases or to make familiar
judgments about offenders, then it would be more likely that
possessing schemas would lead to quicker responses.

Fin-

ally, officers' longer :completion times may simply have
been a function of greater evaluation apprehension (i.e.,
because officers had more ego-involvement in the task they
took longer to complete it) .
Cluster Analysis
Subject-generated card sortings were also subjected
to a categorical cluster analysis that organized constructed
cases into similar groupings--with each subject providing
one case per grouping (SAS Manual, 1982).

Results revealed

that officers' response patterns optimally clustered into
nine offender configurations (schemas) that evidenced a
significant degree of associative cohesiveness within
clusters and a small degree of similarity between clusters
(cubic clustering criterion (CCC) = 21.21, R2 = .35).

In

contrast, the analysis yielded negative CCC scores for
clerical subjects' data, suggesting poor or "loose"
groupings of cases (i.e., there was high within cluster
variance and low between cluster variance)

(SAS Manual,

p. 420).

An attempt was made to identify the underlying
schemas embodied in the resultant nine clusters of offender
types by (a) comparing the cases contained in each of the
groupings with the set of schematic cases that were created

149
from probation files;

and (b) examining officers' re-

sponses to the post-task questions which asked them to
label and describe their categorizations.

As shown in

Table 10, three new schema types were found:

"Project

Black," "Barroom Brawler," and "Shoplifter.''

In addition,

four of the core schemas uncovered in Study 1 were validated:

"White Collar," "Female Welfare Fraud," "Drug

Addict," and "Burglar."

I was unable to clearly define

the two remaining clusters.
Summary and Conclusions
The results of the second study clearly demonstrate
that the schemas of offenders found in the first investigation were not merely an artifact of the methods employed
to collect and interpret the data.

Officers' apparent

facility at reconstructing the cases, coupled with the
strong groupings that emerged from the clustering procedure, suggest that stereotypic, consensual categories of
probationers may serve as a framework for the assessment
and treatment of caseloads in Cook County.

The validity

of these categories was given further support by the "control group's" inability to assemble the types as

accu~ately

as officers, and by the failure of the group's constructions
to form any discernible clusters.

Hence, there is a firm

basis to conclude that probation officers' schemas represent more than simple interfeature associations (.i.e.,
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Table 10
A Description of the Offender Schemas Suggested
by the Cluster Analysis
SCHEMA TYPE - BARROOM BRAWLER
Criteria! Attributes - Ethnic White;
conservative;

blue collar

hates members of minority groups;

concerned

with preserving the "purity" of his neighborhood;

has a

drinking problem that leads to assaultive behavior;
married with children (may be abusive) .
Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting;

generally

cooperative but may be boisterous and aggressive.
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month
in-person reporting);

discussion of alcohol abuse;

resources offered -- alcohol treatment, family therapy.
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional
(drinking caused by low self-esteem;

proving of mascu-

linity is important) •
Prognosis - Fair - If alcoholism is recognized and
treated the offender will not become involved in future
incidents.

SCHEMA TYPE - PROJECT BLACK
Criteria! Attributes - Young, Black male, resides in
housing project;

"cocky" attitude, uneducated;

in gang activity, "hates police";

involved

can be very dangerous;
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Table 10
PROJECT BLACK (continued)
extensive juvenile record;

has spent time in jail.

Report Demeanor -·very inconsistent;
violated for nonreporting;

arrogant and challenging.

Suoervision - Close supervision;
I checks;

likely to be

monthly local B of

officer must set strict rules/limits throughout

the sentence;

offender should be ordered to appear before

the Judge if uncooperative.
Attributions - External - stable - intentional
(victim of society, product of fatherless home and "ghetto
mentality").
Prognosis - Extremely poor - Crime is his only means
of survival;

gang influence is powerful.

SCHEMA TYPE - SHOPLIFTER
Criterial Attributes - Female mid-thirties;
ployed, drifter;

unem-

has been involved with drugs and

prostitution, lengthy criminal record;

unkempt.

Report Demeanor - Consistent in reporting, manipulating;

changes address often;

emotionally labile,

histrionic.
Supervision - Regular supervision (once per month
in-person reporting);

if noticeably improved or employed

after 6 months-1 year, may report by mail for remainder
of sentence;

resources offered--employment service.
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Table 10
SHOPLIFTER (continued)
Attributions - Internal - stable - intentional (emotional problems, immaturity, unable to delay gratification,
impulsive).
Prognosis - Fair - If a steady job has been secured
and a trusting relationship has been established with the
officer, she will not readily resort to criminal behavior.
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semantic connections) or common-sensical combinations of
separate pieces of case information.
Additional evidence that confirms the validity of
schemas (although admittedly highly inferential) comes
from the different strategies that subjects adopted to
organize the information cards.

It appears that officers

approached the task by imposing their knowledge structures
on the materials in a manner which may be analogous to the
cognitive activity that takes place during the evaluation
of offenders for referral and supervision.

That is, when

officers are assigned a new case, they process the information contained therein by starting with conceptualizations of what may be present and continuing with a close
examination of the case for data consistent with those
conceptualizations.

Officers' preexisting schemas of

probationers guide the search for data until the particular
characteristics of the case invoke one of their available
categories.

It is assumed that if a category is not read-

ily found, a new one is developed or an old one is modified
(See Taylor, 1981 for a discussion of how stereotypes
change).
Consistent with the findings of Study 1, it was
revealed that experienced officers were significantly more
accurate than novices in recreating five of the eight
schematic cases.

This differential accuracy was primarily

a function of the expert's ability to match the "treatment-
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inference" variables (report behavior, treatment and prognoses).
sources:

Officers' knowledge of these areas derives from two
(a) experience in supervising cases through the

entire range of an offender's sentence, and (b) practice
with making decisions and receiving feedback about the
appropriateness of monitoring levels and treatment interventions.

As novice officers follow an increasing number

of cases from inception to termination (i.e., gain experience), they begin to form more "complete" and elaborate
schemas that contain information regarding case outcomes
as well as probationer behavior and future criminality.
Also, it was shown that officer assignment (criminal vs.
municipal) can affect the type of offender categories that
are developed.

In other words, officers are more likely to

possess schemas for criminals who occupy their caseloads
(i.e., those with whom they have had direct contact).
In summary, the results of Studies 1 and 2 provide
convergent support for the existence of probationer schemas.
The next and final stage in this series of investigations
examined the effect of offender schemas on information
processing and case judgments.
Study 3
Confidence, Ease, and Typicality Ratings
Each subject's confidence and difficulty ratings
summed across the four judgments for each case, and
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analyzed with one-way repeated measures analyses of variance.

Consistent with the predicted result, officers'

ratings of confidence were significantly higher when judging schematic cases (M:= 6.44) than when judging mixed
schematic (M

=

32.41, £ <.01.

5.04) or real (M

=

4.85) cases, F(2,38)

=

Post-hoc tests using the Newman-Keuls

procedure revealed no differences between the mixed and
real cases.

However, officers' ratings of confidence for

both the mixed and real cases were significantly lower
than their ratings of the schematic cases.

The pattern of

findings for the difficulty ratings was similar.
rated schematic cases (M

=

judge than both mixed cases
(~

=

1.94),

~(2,38)

=

Officers

1.59) significantly easier to
(~

=

2.30) and real cases

7.98, £ <.01.

Post-hoc tests indi-

cated that there was no difference between schematic and
real cases;

the mixed cases, however, were rated signi-

ficantly more difficult to judge than both schematic and
real cases.

Additional analyses were performed to test

for differences in confidence and difficulty ratings among
the four schematic and mixed cases.

No significant differ-

ences were found (all Fs < 1, ns.) .
Perhaps the mixed schematic' cases led to more
problematic judgments because they portrayed more novel
or complicated histories and/or contained information that
may have been less expected or less consistent than the
information presented in schematic cases (which by

/
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definition contain information that "typifies" a particular
type of probationer) or in real cases (which basically
comprised a sample of ordinary or common offenders).
Results revealed that officers rated the schematic cases
(~

=

6.45) as being significantly more typical than either

the mixed cases (M
K(2,38)

=

=

4.65) or the real cases (M

27.35, E <.01.

=

4.85),

Post-hoc comparisons of these

means yielded significant differences between the schematic
cases and both the mixed schematic and real cases;

however,

there was no statistically detectable difference between
mixed and real cases.

Finally, as expected, ratings of

difficulty and confidence were negatively correlated for
each of the three types of cases (all E's <.05).
Report Behavior and Prognosis Item Responses
Studies 1 and 2 revealed that officers' schemas of
probationers contain inferences regarding report behavior
and prognoses.

If subjects were activating these schemas

during the judgment task, it seems reasonable to expect
that the ratings of schematic cases would be more consistent than the ratings of mixed schematic cases inasmuch
as the former were guided by shared pre-existing

cogn~tive

structures whereas the latter were essentially a product
of officers' idiosyncratic responses to relatively unfamiliar offender histories.

To test this hypothesis, each

subject's summed ratings of the two report behavior items
and the single rating of the prognosis item were recorded

I
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for each of the four schematic and four mixed schematic
cases.

The variances of the ratings were computed across

subjects for each case and were then pooled within each of
the two sets (Hays, 1913).

F-tests were performed to deter-

mine whether the variances in the ratings of schematic and
mixed schematic cases were different.

Results indicated

that judgments of report behavior for schematic cases were
significantly less variable (cr 2

=

3.21) than judgments of

report behavior for mixed schematic cases (cr 2 = 7.41), ~(16,
36)

=

3.21,

E

<.05.

A significant difference in the var-

iances of the prognosis judgments was also found.

Again,

the ratings of schematic cases evidenced significantly less
variability (cr 2
cases (cr 2

=

=

2.89) than the ratings of mixed schematic

6.47), ~(16,36)

=

2.24, E <.05.

These data

suggest that officers rated schematic cases by drawing upon
a common knowledge base which represents particular types of
offenders.
Treatment/Supervision Item Responses
Subject's written responses to the treatment/supervision item were examined by computing the mean number of
information units for each type of case.

An information

unit was defined in the same manner as in Study 1.

It was

hypothesized that the assessments given for schematic
cases would be more elaborate (i.e., contain more information units) than those given for nonschematic cases.
suggested in Study 1, officers have developed a well-

As
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articulated treatment plan as a central and highly accessible component of an offender schema.

Hence, treatment

inferences relating to schematic cases are presumably derived from a storehouse of knowledge and prior expectations
regarding appropriate intervention strategies for particular
categories of probationers, whereas the inferences made concerning mixed schematic and real cases would be formulated
primarily or solely on the basis of the information presented
in the case itself, and therefore would be less complete or
extensive.

Results failed to confirm this prediction.

There

were no differences in the mean number of information units
between schematic (M
real cases (M

=

=

6.55), mixed schematic (M

6.70), F(2,38)

<

1.

=

6.25), and

This finding may be are-

flection of subjects' attempts to respond to each case as
fully as possible.

Again, officers may have viewed the task

(cf., Study 2) as an occasion to test or demonstrate their
"expertise"; hence, they made a deliberate effort to be
thorough on the treatment/supervision item for every case.
Response Time
Response time for each case was defined as the interval between the presentation of the judgment items and the
subject's signal that he/she had completed the items.
was recorded to the nearest minute.

The data strongly sup-

ported the hypothesis that schematic cases (M

=

3.80 min.)

would be processed more quickly than mixed schematic (M
6.90min.) and real cases (M

=

Time

5.20 min.), F(2.38)

=

=

34.68,
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E <.01.

Follow-up comparisons showed that schematic cases

were processed more rapidly than both mixed schematic and
real cases, and that real cases were processed more rapidly
than mixed cases.

As previously discussed, it appears that

mixed schematic cases were viewed as more problematic than
either schematic or real cases.

This is consistent with

the earlier finding which revealed that subjects rated the
mixed schematic cases as more difficult to judge than both
of the other two types of offender histories.
Pearson product-moment correlations were computed
between response times and subjects' ratings of difficulty
and confidence.

A significant positive relationship was

found between response times and ratings of difficulty for
each of the three types of cases (all E's <.05).

Further,

results indicated that officers were more confident when
they responded more rapidly to schematic cases, r(38)

=

-.24, ns, whereas for nonschematic cases they were more
confident when they took longer to make judgments, £(38)
.61,
ent,

E <.05.
~

=

=

These correlations are significantly differ-

2.00, E <.05.

This difference is explicable under

the following assumptions:

If officers have previously

stored inferences regarding schematic cases, judgments
that are related to those inferences could be made quickly
and confidently (cf., Pachella, 1974).

In contrast,

because officers presumably have not formed assessments
about nonschematic cases, they may have first searched
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their memory for judgment-related information for the
decisions at hand.

The time required for this process is

a positive function of the extensiveness of the information
search.

If this is true, and if subjects report greater

confidence in judgments that are based on a more thorough
search of stored information and thus require more time to
complete (cf., Sternberg, 1969), then the positive correlation between confidence and response time for nonschematic
cases would be expected.
Summary and Implications
In summary, the evidence reported in Study 3 suggests
that schemas of probationers not only function to organize
and structure knowledge, but they also affect the processing and assessment of cases.

A schema-based model of

offender judgments is grounded in the principles of cognitive economy and efficiency.

Along with descriptive in-

formation about criminals, schemas carry information
relating to effective supervision strategies, and predictions of expected report behavior and the risk of future
criminal involvement.

These bits of information, accessed

via the schema itself when it is called up to assist in
the examination of a case, are available in memory to
serve as mediators for such routine officer decisions as
changing report modality or frequency, filing petitions
for violation, or selecting useful counseling techniques.
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Hence, judgments that relate to schematic cases are made
more rapidly and with greater ease and confidence, because
officers are retrieving already-made inferences rather than
retrieving a set of relevant facts and making an entirely
new judgment based upon those facts.

This conclusion is

also supported by the correlation and variance data.
In addition, the third study points to the problems
inherent in constructing aschematic stimulus materials in
the area of social cognition--a task for which existing
methods are of limited value.

The complex and highly

varied nature of cases makes it extremely difficult to
create histories that are entirely devoid of schema-evoking
content.

This is further complicated by the overlapping,

"fuzzy'' nature of offender categories, and by the nature
of schema variables themselves which are represented as a
probablistic range of values.

Therefore, one is faced with

the challenge of developing an aschematic version of a
schematic case which often does not exist or cannot be
plausibly created.

It is likely that "schemaness" is a

property that is portrayed on a number of multi-variable
continua.

Hence, there is always the possibility that as

a value becomes less schematic on a variable in one category, it may move closer to the schematic value of that
variable in another category.

An interim solution to the

problem was to use two different kinds of nonschematic
comparison cases, one set created by combining schematic
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cases and a second set selected to be representative of
actual cases.

Indeed, the mixed cases proved to be diffi-

cult to judge as shown by ratings and response times.

Never-

theless, the issue of whether mixed cases were truly
aschematic remains unresolved.

Clearly, additional re-

search is needed to provide more definitive answers to this
methodological dilemma.
The problem of creating aschematic cases has more
than methodological implications;

it also reflects the

loosely formulated nature of schema theory and the attendant
"mushiness" of the schema concept (see Fiske & Linville,
1980).

In the field of social cognition, the goal of

greater theoretical and definitional preciseness is both
more necessary and more difficult to achieve.

Nonetheless,

the stimulus materials used in schema research can only be
as useful, detailed, and meaningful as the conceptual
frameworks that recommend their construction.

Hence, more

theoretical consideration should be given to articulating
definitive criteria for identifying a package of information in long-term memory as a schema.

Guided by such

advances in theory, investigators can then proceed to manipulate and measure schematic var'iables with increased
preciseness and validity.
A final point to be addressed relates to the selection of dependent measures.

Research in social inference

and memory has demonstrated that schemas have important
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effects on attention, recognition, recall, and judgment
(see Chapter Two).

A limitation of the third study was its

failure to examine whether schematic processing would lead
to differences in one or more of these factors.

For

example, additional research will be needed to clarify
the impact of schemas on:
sing probationer risk;

(a) officers' accuracy in asses-

(b) the speed with which officers

diagnose offender problem areas;

(c) the actual develop-

ment of effective treatment strategies;

and (d) the organ-

ization and retrieval of case information.

(See Appendix

C for the Analysis of Variance Tables of Studies 2 and 3.)

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Schematic Processing
The present research offers converging evidence
supporting the concept of offender schemas, i.e., cognitive
generalizations about criminals that structure, summarize,
and explain the diverse elements of probation cases.

Sys-

tematic differences were found among experienced and nonexperienced officers which indicate that experts' schemas
are:

(a) richer in content (experts' schemas contained a

significantly greater number of information units);

(b)

more meaningful (experts discussed a smaller number of
schemas which seemed to be more central to their caseloads
and to possess greater descriptive utility);

(c) better

articulated and formed (less probes were required to
elicit information from experts during the interview,
their descriptions were highly organized, and they were able
to recreate cases more accurately);

and (d) more clearly

related to therapeutic and supervisory decisions (experts'
schemas contained detailed plans for responding to particular types of offenders, and t?eir superior performance
in the card sort task stemmed from their ability to identify correct "treatment-inference item" matches) .
On the basis of reported findings, one may speculate
164
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about the influence of schemas on probation officers' diagnoses of offenders for treatment, and predictions about
their future criminal activity.

Results suggest the

availability of organized categories of probationers that
guide the processing of case information, contain inferences
about the causes of crimes, and control the formulation of
supervisory strategies and the selection of appropriate
treatment modalities.

If schemas actually exist, they

probably direct the examination of an offender's case by
dictating what key items should be reviewed, what can be
ignored, how ambiguous material is to be interpreted, and
how missing facts can be deduced.

They may also contain

one or more prototypical examples that are highly representative of the essential details of a case.

In sum, know-

ledge organized in a schema operates to guide the perusal
of probationer information so that an officer talks about
"cases like these" and appears to know more about a case
than has been read (cf., Taylor & Crocker, 1981).
The schematic organization of knowledge relevant to
probation officers' assessments of offenders is a natural
outgrowth of the constraints imposed upon the officer by
the task and by inherent limitations of memory, attention,
and cognitive effort.

Because the voluminous information

about a probationer must be quickly evaluated and applied,
the evocation and use of schemas offers an efficient way
to handle case material.

Thus, in functional terms,
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schemas facilitate cognitive economy (Fiske & Kinder, 1981)
in memory storage by providing simple mechanisms to structure and categorize the multiple, redundant input impinging
on the officer (Cantor'& Mischel, 1979).

If probation

officers possess ready-made and well-structured knowledge
about "types" of offenders, then their mental resources
need not be exhausted by creating and developing cognitive
representations of probationers in each encounter with a
novel, incoming case.

Thus, material stored in an offen-

der schema will remain more accessible over time for
retrieval and comparison with future input.
The cognitive economics afforded by schematic procesing, however, may be a mixed blessing.

On the one hand,

categorizing criminals into meaningful groupings provides
a solid foundation for efficient information processing and
judgment.

On the other hand, an undue reliance on precon-

ceived notions is potentially costly inasmuch as it encourages a blanket ascription of the features of a particular
schema to each presumed member, even when those characteristics are not truly descriptive of the individual being
evaluated.

Such gratuitous imputations may constrain the

subsequent activity of an offender as well as color the
perceptions and responses of the officer (cf., Synder,
1981; Synder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977).

Further, the

presence of schemas may lead officers to engage in a "confirmatory strategy" when testing hypotheses about various
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probationers and their inferred traits and behaviors.

By

searching for "procrustean fits" to their cognitive groupings, officers may misjudge--and mistreat--criminals who
poorly match their preconceptions.

This tendency toward

type 1 errors (accepting data as consistent with a schema
when it is neutral or inconsistent) stands as a formidable
obstacle in the way of necessary schema change.

If, indeed,

modification occurs (and there is some evidence to suggest
.
d oes ) , 121t
.
.
1.1 k e 1 y to b e 1n
.
1t
1s
response to repea t e d ,

incongruous information across a number of different cases
(i.e., the bookkeeping model).
In short, the advantage of schematic processing is
that it results in rapid and informed judgments and prevents
officers from being overwhelmed by case materials or by
caseloads of often unmanageable proportions.

The disad-

vantage is that it may culminate in an offender being
assessed solely on the basis of the schema into which he/
she is placed, rather than on the basis of his/her unique
circumstances or characteristics.
Offender schemas can be viewed as probation officer's
"implicit personality theories"

(Schneider, 1973) about

l2In Study 1, a number of officers reported that
changes in the nature of offender schemas were possible.
Change was most likely when information was highly disconfirming, salient, repetitive, and dispersed.
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what behavioral signs (e.g., offense committed, report
demeanor) coexist with what dispositional qualities (e.g.,
low self-esteem, asocial personality), and about how these
qualities tend to cluster and co-occur in various types of
criminals (cf., Schneider & Blankmeyer, 1983).

These

theories are invoked whenever officers make decisions about
a probationer's treatability and/or riskiness.

The ques-

tion may be raised as to whether these schemas are entirely
creations "in the heads" of criminal justice experts or
if they have an independent grounding in reality.

Research

examining personality typologies and object categorizations
suggest that there are significant, meaningful correlations
among person attributes, and among object features in the
real world (Mischel, 1981).

For example, there is a

strong, likelihood that gregariousness will co-occur with
voluble, outgoing behavior in a particular kind of person
(i.e., extravert), just as mellifluous songs, feathers, and
wings tend to co-occur in a particular kind of animal
(i.e., canary).

Hence, it is likely that schemas are

neither exclusively a product of experts' cognizing nor
built altogether from the qualities of actual offenders.
Instead, the contents of schemas are a function of the
interaction between officers' perceptions, inferences,
etc., and the nature of the offenders assigned to them for
supervision and treatment.
Information "in the heads" of experts and in the real
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world combine to form a reasonably accurate and organized
cognitive representation that is useful to officers in
effectively performing their duties.

Such structures

probably develop via an abstraction and consolidation
process whereby specific data relating to probationers is
summarized into more general and parsimonious groupings in
order to facilitate economy in the cognitive system.

In

sum, offender schemas allow for a quick and efficient
processing of information, provide a basis for going
beyond case history material in drawing inferences and
making judgments, and affect how incoming information is
interpreted and categorized.

Finally, there is ample

evidence that schemas also influence memory processes
(Hastie et al., 1980), although the present investigations
did not explicitly examine this issue.
Practical Implications
In addition to having theoretical significance, the
results of the present research contain practical implications for prediction and diagnosis in the area of probation
supervision.

Recently, there has been a growing interest

in formulating and applying various typologies to categorize offenders for treatment and surveillance (e.g., Megargee & Bohn, 1979).

The use of classification techniques

derives from the notion that a structured screening process
will permit more accurate, consistent, and equitable
decision-making.

The cognitive schemas of probation
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officers may serve as a useful starting point for the
development of such assessment devices.

They not only

comprise distinctions among critical groupings, but they
also provide differential treatment strategies, predictions
of risk and prognoses for improvement and rehabilitation.
Probation departments can better allocate their
limited resources and better organize and monitor burgeoning caseloads through the accurate identification of
offenders who require a large share of agency staff time
as well as those who demand fewer interventions and are
less likely to recidivate.

The achievement of these ends

translates into greater effectiveness and efficiency in
the provision of correctional services.
Of course, the predictive and diagnostic power of
schemas remains to be tested.

In the event that they are

found to be inaccurate, measures can be adopted to make
probation officers aware of their misperceptions and to
train them to utilize more objective strategies in categorization.

It may also be demonstrated that schemas

contain a "kernel of truth," in which case only the more
useful aspects of officers' cognitive representations will
be incorporated in the design of 'classification instruments.
Directions for Future Research
The research reported in this work represents a
necessary first step in identifying the existence and

171
contents of cognitive schemas in a specific group of professionals within the criminal justice system.

The

current studies establish the usefulness of a schema
approach in understanding how probation officers make
rapid diagnoses for treatment and recommendations, and
predictions about subsequent riskiness and criminal involvement.

They also suggest recommendations for future

studies with basic and applied implications.
One goal of future investigators should be the formulation of a set of procedures for:
tence of schemas,

(a) testing the exis-

(b) differentiating between various

types of schemas within a specific domain of knowledge,
and (c) describing the interrelationships between the
separate units of information constituting a given cognitive representation. 13 This would require greater preciseness in operationalizing dependent measures of schematic
processing and would certainly result in greater conceptual
clarity (see Chapter One).

The other side of the same

coin involves an explication of what schemas are not (i.e.,
when and how nonschematic processing occurs, and how it
differs from schematic processing) .

The problem of creat-

ing aschematic stimulus materials (see Study 3) relates
to this issue.

Finally, the current work points to the

l3study 1 suggests useful guidelines for uncovering
schemas in an interview procedure.
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importance of examining individual difference variables
in schema research.

More specifically, cognitive social

psychologists should be encouraged to move out of the
laboratory to examine now knowledge is organized among
"experts," and how this organization actually affects
behaviors (e.g., judgments, perceptions, hypothesis testing
strategies) .
Some potentially important directions for further
investigation of offender schemas in the area of probation
include:

(a) a study of the particular case-relevant cues

that trigger the evocation of a specific schema type (i.e.,
a study of how officers "match" probationers to categories);
(b) a test of the effect of schemas on information processing and recall among probation officers;

(c) an identi-

fication of factors that account for the differential richness of schema types;

(d) an exploration of whether the

relative frequency and/or detail of schematic categories
are related to the actual prevalence of offender types in
the probation population;

and (e) a direct examination of

how officers apply schematic knowledge in rendering judgments about probationers.
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Schematic Case Number 3
"Female Welfare Fraud"
Name:

Miss Buford

Descriptive Information: Miss Buford is a 23 year-old Black
female convicted of two counts of welfare fraud, and sentenced
to four (4) years probation.
She was cooperative throughout
the interview, appeared neatly dressed and was accompanied
by three children, ages 7, 4 and 2.
Prior Record:
6/8/80

Disorderly Conduct
5 Days Jail, $100 Fine

7/16/81 Soliciting
Dismissed
9/18/81 Shoplifting
Dismissed
1/15/82 Soliciting
1 Yr. Supervision
Social/Psychological Profile: Miss Buford is a soft spoken
and humble woman whose primary concern is the care and wellbeing of her children. She has been dependent upon men most
of her adult life and has lived with them in a number of
seeming love-hate relationships. The offender described
several incidents in which she was "beaten up bad" by her
live-in boyfriends, who "make her do things against the
law." She is unable to extricate herself from these situations because of her dependency needs, low self-esteem, and
fear of retaliation which might also be directed at her
children. Miss Buford was forced to quit high school at age
16 to work to support her family.
She soon became pregnant
and began living with a man who threatened her into "turning tricks." After a short time, he left her and she subsequently sought the comfort of three or four other men who
treated her in a similar fashion .(physical/emotional abuse,
manipulation and abandonment). Miss Buford reported that
he·r current male companion showed her how to falsify applications to increase her monthly welfare income. She insists
that she had to do it in order to "feed her little babies."
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Mixed Schematic Case Number 4
"Suburb Kid/Gangbanger"
Name:

Mr. Anglet

Descriptive Information:· The offender, Mr. Anglet is a 2,0year old white male living in the suburbs and entering his
third year in college. He arrived at the interview accompanied by his parents. Although he was a well-dressed,
"clean-cut," intelligent young man, he answered many of the
questions in an obviously sarcastic tone. ML Anglet seemed
to resent his parents and openly ridiculed some of the
remarks they made concerning his behavior. He was convicted
of shoplifting and sentenced to a one (1) year probation
term.
Prior Record:
1/18/81

Theft
Dismissed

6/15/81

Vandalism
Dismissed for Want of Prosecution

7/24/81

Disorderly Conduct
$100 Fine

9/25/82

Simple Assault
90 Days D.O.C.

1/17/83

DWI
License Suspended

Social/Psychological Profile: Mr. Anglet presents himself as
a typical juvenile delinquent, a tough kid who receives a
sense of identity and self-worth, largely from an affiliation with his peer group.
He appears to be a product of his
environment, i.e., in order "to fit in with the rest of the
group," he must engage in criminalactivity. The offender's
life centers around being with his friends and gaining their
approval.
Indeed, the streets are a proving ground for his
masculinity. Mr. Anglet learned how to "make quick money"
from his companions, who believe that the more conventional
ways of earning a living are reserved for "suckers and
wimps." He reported that he had abandoned attempts to find
employment because "every place I went they turned me down
without saying why." Breaking the law seems to give the
offender a feeling of exhilaration and pride, and is a
convenient outlet for pent-up anger and frustration.

196
Real Case Number 16
Name:

Mr. Tyro

Descriptive Information: Mr. Tyro is a 38 year-old, Black
male with a muscular build, dressed in a leather jacket and
jeans. The offender swaggered into the interview and
behaved in an aggressive, self-assertive manner throughout.
He was recently convicted of assault and sentenced to a
three (3) year probation term.
Prior Record:
9/24/74
11/15/76

Theft
Dismissed
Battery
2 Yrs. Probation

2/27/79

Possession of a Controlled Substance
1 Yr. Supervision

7/17/81

Burglary
1 Yr. D.O.C.

Social/Psychological Profile: The offender is a native of
Selma, Alabama, but was reared in Chicago, Illinois, where
he received a lOth grade education with largely inadequate
school performance. He has never been married and is
presently living with a woman who has recently given birth
to a child. The offender reported that in the past year he
has changed residence six times. Mr. Tyro has worked at a
number of odd jobs (e.g., car wash attendant, cab driver)
but has never remained in any of them for more than a sixmonth interval. He has been unemployed since 1980. Despite
his lack of formal education, Mr. Tyro is a smart, fast
talking, street-wise man who showed that he can be quite
affable. He seemed to go to great lengths to convey the
impresion that he has "reformed himself" and is "no longer
interested in committing crimes." In fact, he denies any
responsibility for his present conviction although the
record indicates clear evidence of his involvement. Mr.
Tyro's past record, and reports by his former probation
officer belie his good intentions.
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CASE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. How typical is the above offender? That is, how closely
does he/she resemble any members of your caseload?
Circle one.
not at all
similar
1

2

neither similar
or dissimilar
3

4

not at all
similar
5

7

6

2. In his/her reporting behavior, how consistent is the
offender likely to be?
highly consistent
1

2

neither consistent
or inconsistent
3

4

5

not at all
consistent
7

6

How confident are you about the above judgment?
not at all
confident
1

2

neither confident
or unconfident
3

4

5

highly
confident
7

6

How easy was the above judgment to make?
neither easy
or difficult

not at all
difficult
1

2

3

4

extremely
difficult
5

7

6

3. In his/her reporting behavior, how cooperative (e.g.,
follow the officer's directives, comply with conditions,
participate in a rehabilitative plan) is the offender
likely to be?
not cooperative
or uncooperative

highly
cooperative
1

2

3

4

not at all
cooperative
5

7

6

How confident are you about the above judgment?

1

2

highly
confident

neither confident
or unconfident

not at all
confident
3

4

5

6

7

199
CASE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS (Continued)
How easy was the above judgment to make?
~either easy
or difficult

not at all
difficult
1

4

3

2

extremely
difficult
5

7

6

4. Briefly discuss the nature of the treatment and supervisory strategies you would employ with the offender.
Include a list of possible referrals and the frequency
and mode of supervision you would adopt.

How confident are you about the validity of the above?
not at all
confident
1

2

neither confident
or unconfident
3

4

highly
confident
5

7

6

How easy was it for you to make the above assessment?
not at all
difficult
1

2

neither difficult
or easy
3

4

extremely
difficult
5

6

7

5. How likely is the offender to satisfactorily finish
his/her sentence (i.e., not be involved in future crime,
comply with his/her conditions)?
very likely
1

2

neither likely
or unlikely
3

4

not at all
likely
5

6

7

How confident are you about the above judgment?
not at all
confident

neither confident
or unconfident

1

3

2

4

highly
confident
5

6

7
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CASE ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS (Continued)
How easy was the above judgment to make?
not at all
difficult
1

2

neither easy
or difficult
3

4

extremely
difficult
5

6

7
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Table I
Two-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for Group
Membership and Schema Type on Number of
Correct Schema Type Matches

ss

df

358.05

39

A(Group Membership)

217.80

1

Subjects Within Groups

140.25

38

497.75

280

133.00

7

43.00

7

6.14

321.75

266

1. 21

Source of Variance
Between Subjects

Within Subjects
B(Schema Type)
A X B
B X Subjects Within
Groups

**£ <.01

MS

217.8

F

59.02**

3.69

19

15.70**
5.07**
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Table II
Three-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance for
Assignment, Expertise, and Schema Type on Number
of Correct Schema Type Matches

ss

df

96.85

19

.40

1

.40

34.23

1

34.23

.22

1

.
. 22

62.00

16

2.87

354.75

140

151.30

7

21.63

16.51**

A X C

30.20

7

4.31

3.29**

B X C

19.37

7

2.77

2.11*

7.38

7

1. 05

14.64

112

1. 31

Source of Variance
Between Subjects
A(Assignment)
B(Expertise)
A X B
Subjects Within
Groups
Within Subjects
C(Schema Type)

A X B X C
C X Subjects
Within Groups

*.e <.05
**.e <.01

MS

F

8.84**
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Table III
One-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance
on the Confidence Ratings

ss

df

Between Subjects

124.73

19

Within Subjects

764.00

40

Type of Case

481.63

2

240.82

Residual

282.37

38

7.43

Source of Variance

NOTE.

MS

F

32.41**

Ratings on the two schematic cases were combined
for the analysis.

**E. <.01
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Table IV
One-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance
on the Difficulty Ratings

ss

df

Between Subjects

104.06

19

Within Subjects

274.67

40

81.23

2

40.61

193.44

38

5.09

Source of Variance

Type of Case
Residual

MS

F

7.98**

NOTE. Ratings on the two schematic cases were combined for
the analysis.
**£ <.01
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Table V
One-Way Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance
on the Typicality Ratings

Source of Variance

ss

df

Between Subjects

14.99

19

Within Subjects

66.00

40

Type of Case

38.94

2

Residual

27.06

38

MS

19.47

F

27.35**

.712

NOTE. Ratings on the two schematic cases were combined for
the analysis.
**E. <.01
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